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3Foreword
A robust structural transformation is critical to shape a country’s 
ability to generate a faster and more inclusive growth that is 
required to tackle social challenges, such as unemployment and 
poverty. Structural transformation driven by export is highly relevant 
for Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia; countries where several trade 
strategies and export promotion policies have been undertaken but 
are yet to take full advantage of their export led-growth strategies. 
Progress has been insufficient to secure the types of benefits 
experienced by other countries which have pursued higher value 
production for their economies.
Considering the social and political upheavals that dominated the 
region in 2011, the current context is particularly opportune to 
identify the gaps and obstacles encountered in the reforms initiated 
over the past decade and to address the constraints which hinder 
Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia from moving up the value chain—a 
move which could create more and better quality employment 
opportunities for the youth of the region.
This study considers how increasing productivity and moving up 
the value chain could enhance economic development in North 
Africa.  Particular attention is paid to how development of export-
led growth strategies requires a host of improvements to the 
institutions and services that support trade. Egypt, Morocco and 
Tunisia have to create an environment where a greater diversity of 
productive activities can thrive, in particular, activities that are more 
complex than the current export basket.
The study has been prepared with in-depth dialogues with the 
Governments of Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia, through in-country 
4missions and consultation seminars. This effort made the study 
more relevant to the situation in the countries and makes the policy 
recommendations concrete. 
The report is a milestone in guiding the Bank Group interventions in 
these countries as well as providing an intellectual basis for policy 
dialogues between the Bank and its stakeholders in the areas of 
trade and industrial policies.
We believe that the report will provide policy makers with insightful 
information on strategic industries to promote in order to move up 
the value chain.  We hope that it will create a good basis for dialogue 
in this critical juncture to ensure a healthy economic recovery from 
the social and political unrest of 2011. 
Zondo Sakala
Vice President
Country and Regional Programs and Policy
African Development Bank Group
5Preface
During the first decade of the Millennium, with annual growth rates 
averaging nearly 5 percent and good progress towards achieving 
the Millennium Development Goals, developments in North Africa 
seemed to cement the view that the economic gains were translated 
into improvements in the real and perceived wellbeing of people in 
the region.  The social and political changes that started in Tunisia 
in the early days of 2011 and spread across the region, therefore, 
took many, if not most observers by surprise.  However, many of 
the underlying issues and key drivers behind the calls for change 
had been emerging for some time-notably the very high levels of 
unemployment among youth, educated youth in particular; the 
entrenched and, in some cases, very high levels of poverty and 
within borders regional disparities; and the modest progress in 
areas related to voice, accountability and transparency. 
What North African countries experienced in the lead-up to the 
social and political upheavals in early 2011, it could be argued, was 
the classical dual middle income country trap: insufficient political, 
social, and economic inclusion combined with a pattern and level 
of economic growth insufficient to absorb a growing and better 
training labor force. North Africa’s decent growth performance has 
generally reflected high rates of investment rather than major gains 
in productivity. Experience from fast-growing emerging regions 
elsewhere in the world, South East Asian notably, suggests that 
diversification and economic transformation towards higher value-
added production are essential ingredients in bringing about 
productivity gains and stronger and more sustained economic 
growth-dimensions that are likely to go a long way in addressing 
some of the key challenges related to inclusion and job creation in 
North Africa.
6South Korea-a country with almost no natural resources yet posting 
a thirteen-fold increase in per capita GDP during the 1980-2010 
period-is a particular instructive example in that it has achieved 
sharp increases in economic productivity and economic welfare 
through policies that an export-oriented strategy that enabled rapid 
access to technology and firms to capture scale economies.
This report explores the South Korean experience, with a view 
to extract the lessons that may be gained for North African 
policymakers, and provides a diagnosis of the conditions and 
constraints to growth prevailing in Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia along 
with preliminary, hands-on policy recommendations on how these 
countries could improve their exports in the strategic industries.
We hope policy makers, researchers, and representatives of the 
civil society and the private sector in North Africa will find this report 
useful and we would welcome any feedback you may have.
Jacob KOLSTER, 
Regional Director, North Africa A - AfDB
Nono MATONDO-FUNDANI, 
Regional Director, North Africa B - AfDB
Comparative study on export policies
7Acknowledgements
This Comparative Study of Export Policies in Egypt, Morocco, 
Tunisia and South Korea was produced by a team of AfDB staff and 
external experts. Its content and the topic selected were discussed 
with the Governments of Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia. 
Jieun Choi (Country Economist of the AfDB) conceptualized and 
task managed the study. Meanwhile, Yasser Ahmed (ORNA, 
AfDB) provided substantive contributions to the preparation of 
the study while Kaouther Abderrahim (ORNA, AfDB) provided 
intellectual inputs and coordination with Governments and other 
authors throughout the preparation of the Report. The report was 
prepared under the supervision of Jacob Kolster, Regional Director 
(ORNA, AfDB), who provided critical analytical advice and quality 
assurance.
Chapter I, Structural transformation in Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia: 
A comparison with China, South Korea and Thailand, was drafted 
by Prof. Ricardo Hausmann and Sebastien Bustos from Harvard 
Kennedy School. Chapter II, Country Specific Context - Review 
of existing policies and identification of constraints, was drafted 
by Jieun Choi and Kaouther Abderrahim of the AfDB. Chapter 
III, The Korean Experience and Policy Implications for North 
African Economies, was drafted by Prof. Jihong Kim from Korea 
Development Institute. While preparing each chapter, the authors 
visited the countries and interacted with the Governments, scholars, 
and civil society in order to make the findings of the study useful to 
each country.
The Report benefited from useful comments from peer reviewers: 
Bernard Hoekman (Director, International Trade Department, 
Comparative study on export policies
8World Bank), José Guilherme Reis (World Bank) and Thomas 
Farole (World Bank). Ahmed Galal (Managing Director, Economic 
Research Forum) and Hoda Selim (Economic Research Forum) 
also provided their intellectual inputs and concrete suggestions to 
improve the quality of report. The Report  benefited from practical 
advice of Gil Seoung Kang (EDRE, AfDB) and Christian Lim (OSGE, 
AfDB) for scoping of the study. The Report also received analytical 
comments and editing from William Shaw.
Special thanks go to Nono Matondo-Fundani, Regional 
Director (ORNB, AfDB), and Amani Abou Zeid, AfDB’s Resident 
Representative in Morocco, who supported the preparation of 
the report and provided strategic guidance to the team.  Barry 
Boubacar-Sid (ORNB, AfDB), Abou Amadou Ba (ORNB, AfDB), 
Charles Muthuthi (EGFO, AfDB), Almaz Amine (EGFO, AfDB), Tarek 
Amar (EGFO, AfDB), and Charaf Eddine (ORNA, AfDB) provided 
support and inputs during the consultation missions. Aoua Dembele 
and Sana Miled (ORNA, AfDB) provided logistical assistance.
Special thanks goes to the Korean Government and the Korean 
Trust Fund at the AfDB, which provided substantial financing without 
which the study and the report would never have seen the light of 
day.  In this context,  prompt support from Kazumi Ikeda-Larhed 
(Head of Unit, ORRU, AfDB) and Belinda Jeruto Chesire (ORRU, 
AfDB) regarding the budget and administration was forthcoming 
throughout. 
The Report has been prepared as a part of the on-going policy 
dialogues between the Bank and the countries in the areas of trade 
and industrial policies. During the consultation mission to Egypt, 
Morocco, and Tunisia, the team met the Government officials, 
private sector, and Civil Society of each country and received their 
feedback. 
Comparative study on export policies
9In Egypt, the mission visited Ministry of Finance (Ms. Amina 
Ghanem and Ms. Omneya Ramadan), Mr. Mohamed Ragui (Export 
Fund), GAFI, and the Industrial Zone in Giza. The team presented 
the initial findings of the study and received comments from various 
scholars from ERF, ECES, ENCC, American University of Cairo and 
other institution such as Social Fund for Development, African Exim 
Bank, and the private sector. Donors, including WB, OECD, UN, 
EU, and JICA, participated and shared their views. 
In Tunisia, the mission visited Ministry of Industry (Mr. Ridha Klai 
and Mrs. Fatma Thabet Chiboub), Mrs. Saida Hachicha (Ministry 
of Tourism, Trade and Handcraft) and Mr. Abdellatif Hama, CEO 
of Export Promotion Center (CEPEX). The mission also visited 
Techno-Parks in Sousse (Mr. Hichem Turki) and Monastir (Mrs. Neila 
Gongi), and met private sector companies which are operating in 
the techno- Park (Yamaichi Electronics). The mission shared the 
finding of study during the meetings and received feedback from 
the different stakeholders.
In Morocco, the team visited Ministry of Foreign Trade (Minister, Mr. 
Abdellatif Mazouz), Ministry of Industry (Mr. Nabil Chaouki), Maroc 
Export (Mr. Larbi Bourabaa), ANPME (Mrs. Latifa Echihabi), ASMEX 
(Mr. Younes ZRIKEM) and CGEM (Mr. Mounir FERRAM). The team 
presented the initial finding of the study to Mrs. Malika Dhif (Ministry 
of Economic and Finance). 
During the dissemination seminar, which was held in Tunis on the 
24th of November, 2011, the delegations from Egypt, Morocco, 
and Tunisia participated and shared their views on the report. The 
Tunisian participants include: Mr. Raouf Sfar (Director General, 
Ministry of Finance), Mr. Mondher Ben Brahim (Director, Ministry of 
Finance), Mr. Lotfi Zguir (Director Ministry of Finance), Mr. Mohamed 
Jouneidi Abderrazak (Director, Minisry of Industry), Ms. Lamia Zribi 
Comparative study on export policies
10
(Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation), Ms. Wahida 
Jeribi (Director, Central Bank), Mr. Mohamed Toujani (Director, 
Central Bank), Mr. Khaled ben Hamida (CEPEX) and Ms. Chelbia 
Cheffia (CEPEX). The Egyptian delegation included: Mr. Mohamed 
Helmy Nabaw (Ministry of Industry and Foreign Trade) and Ms. Dina 
Kafafy (Egyptian National Competitive Council), and Ambassador 
of Egypt. From Morocco, Mr. Ali Mehrez (Maroc Export), Ms. Kenza 
Benouiss (Ministry of Economic and Finance) and Mr. Mohamed ben 
Ayad (National Council of Foreign Trade) participated in the seminar. 
The Chief Economist and Vice President for Regional and Country 
Programs of the AfDB, together with the various departments of 
the Bank, the Bank’s Egypt field office and Morocco field office, 
and the Ambassador of Korea also participated the seminar.
Comparative study on export policies
Table of Content
Chapter I - Structural transformation in Egypt, Morocco 
and Tunisia:  A comparison with China, South Korea and 
Thailand - Ricardo Hausmann and Sebastián Bustos
Introduction1. 
What you export matters: Assessing export composition 2. 
Economic Complexity and subsequent growth 3. 
Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia in the product space4. 
Timing and sequencing: Learning from the East Asian 5. 
experience 
Policy implication6. 
Chapter II - Country Specific Context - Review of existing 
policies and identification of constraints - Jieun Choi and 
Kaouther Abderrahim
Introduction1. 
How to move up to higher growth in Egypt2. 
How to move up to higher export growth in Morocco3. 
How to move up to higher export sophistication in Tunisia4. 
Conclusion5. 
Chapter III - The Korean Experience and Policy 
Implications for North African Economies - Jihong Kim
Introduction1. 
Overview of the Korea’s Development Process 2. 
Lessons of the Korean Experience3.  
Comparative study on export policies 11

13
Abbreviations
BOT Bilateral Investment Treaties
CAMPAS Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics
COMESA Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CU CustomUnion
DOT Direction of Trade
ECI Economic Complexity Index
EFTA European Free Trade Area
ERSAP Economic Reform Structural Adjustment Program
EU European Union
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
FTA Free Trade Agreement
FTZ Free Trade Zone
GAFTA Greater Arab Free Trade Agreement
GDP Gross Domestic Product
HHR Hwang, Hausmann and Rodrik
ICT Information and Communication Technologies
IMF International Monetary Fund
IZ Industrial Zones
ITC International Trade Center
KDI Korean Development Institute
MENA Middle East and North Africa
MIDA Moroccan Inverment Development Agency 
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement
OECD
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development
PTA Preferential Trade Agreement
QIZ Qualifying Industrial Zones
RCA Revealed Comparative Advantages
SITC4 Standard International Trade Classification,
SME Small and Medium-sized Enterprises
Comparative study on export policies
UNCTAD
United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Developmen
USA United State of America
WDI World Development Indicators
WEO World Economic Outlook
WTI World Trade Indicators
WTO World Trade Organization
Comparative study on export policies14
Chapter I 15
Structural transformation in Egypt, Morocco 
and Tunisia:
A comparison with China, South Korea 
and Thailand
Ricardo Hausmann and Sebastián Bustos
1. Introduction
Countries seldom grow rich by producing more of the same. Development implies changes in what countries produce. Structural transformation is the process by which countries 
move into new economic activities. In turn, new economic activities 
are the ones that are able to achieve higher levels of productivity, 
pay higher wages and increase the level of prosperity of a country’s 
population. Structural transformation is crucial for economic growth: 
countries that are able to upgrade their production and exports by 
moving into new and more complex economic activities tend to 
grow faster (Hausmann and Rodrik 2003, Hausmann, Hwang & 
Rodrik 2007). 
During the past decade, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia have 
experienced sustained growth (Figure 1). They were able to narrow 
the income gap with the United States. However, growth was not 
outstanding in the sense that the three countries did not improve 
their relative position in the world in terms of income per capita in 
the decade to 2009. 
Figure 1 shows the dynamics of income per capita, income as a 
share of that of the United States and investment rates for Egypt, 
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Morocco and Tunisia. In all three countries, the past decade has 
seen a recovery in income per capita relative to the US, but none 
has been able to supersede their historical maximums. Egypt is 
below its relative level of 1960 despite its oil discoveries. Morocco 
is below its 1980 level, even though it has shown a positive trend 
in the more recent period. Tunisia is also below its 1980 peak and 
has fluctuated without much of a trend in recent years. A similar 
story is told by the evolution of the investment rate: it has fluctuated 
around moderate levels, indicating that investors are not finding 
too many unexploited opportunities. Morocco, however, does 
show an improving trend.  Since the beginning of the nineties, the 
average investment ratio has been largely above the world average 
in Morocco and Tunisia, and slightly below the world average in 
Egypt. But the past 5 years have seen an improving trend in all 
three countries. 
Table 1 uses a fixed panel of 139 countries to calculate the 
rankings of income per capita for the 1984-2009 period. In fact, 
as Table 1 shows, neither Egypt nor Tunisia was able to improve 
their relative ranking in the world in the past 25 years. Morocco did 
improve, but its progress happened essentially in the 1984-1994 
decade. While the three North African countries have not improved 
their income ranking, China, Korea and Thailand experienced 
outstanding improvements by their ability to develop and move to 
new industries. 
This paper explores whether the growth of Egypt, Tunisia and 
Morocco, and the outstanding performance of China, Korea 
and Thailand are related to their different patterns of structural 
transformation. While the productive structure of the North African 
countries has changed at a slow pace over the last decades, 
the three Asian countries experienced much more pronounced 
structural transformation, moving into new economic activities to 
sustain their stellar growth. 
Structural transformation in Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia 17
Figure 1 - GDP per capita (logs) and investment 
share to GDP 
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Table 1 –  Income per capita rankings
Country name 1984 1989 1994 1999 2004 2009
Egypt, Arab Rep. 82 59 91 78 92 90
Morocco 97 85 81 82 83 83
Tunisia 68 71 68 66 68 71
China 118 113 105 93 86 77
Korea, Rep. 48 38 34 35 33 33
Thailand 83 73 64 71 72 72
N countries in sample 139 139 139 139 139 139
Source: Authors’ calculations using WDI indicators. Income rankings use GDP/
PC in current dollars. 
Figure 2 – Unemployment and Employment  
Average 2000-2009
Source: Authors’ calculations using WDI data. 
Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia are among the countries with the 
lowest employment rates as a share of the working age population. 
This fact implies that GDP per capita is affected by the low level 
of workers per capita. To illustrate this point, think of the following 
AFG
ALB
ANT
ARB
ARE
ARG
ARM
AUS
AUT
AZEBEL
BEN
BGD
BGR
BHR
BHS
BIH
BLZ
BOL
BRABRB
BTN
BWA
CAN
CHE
CHL
CHN
CMR
COL
CRI
CUB
CYP
CZE
DEU
DNK
DOM
DZA
EAPEAS
ECAECS ECUEMU
ESP
EST
ETH
EUU FIN
FJI
FRA
GBR
GEO
GHAGRC
GTM
GUY
HIC
HKG
HND
HRV
HUN
IDN
IND
IRL
IRN
IRQ
ISL
ISRITA
JAM
JOR
JPN
KAZKGZ
KHM
KOR
KWT
LAC
LAO
LBN
LBR
LCN
LKA
LMC
LMY
LTU
LUX
LVA
MAC
MDA
MDG
MDV
MEA
MEX
MIC
MKD
MLI
MLT
MNA
MNG
MRT
MUS
MWI
MYS
NAC
NAM
NER
NIC
NLD NOR
NPL
NZ
OECOEDPAK
PAN
PER
PHL
POL
PRI
PRT PRY
QAT
ROM
RUS
SASSAU
SEN
SGP
SLE
SLV
SRB
SUR
SVK
SVN SWE
SYR
THA
TTO
TUR
TZA
UGA
UKR
UMC
URY
USA
VEN
VNM
WBG
WLD
YEM
ZAF
ZMB
ZWE
EGY
MAR
TUN
0
10
20
30
40
Un
e
m
pl
o
ym
e
n
t, 
to
ta
l (%
 
o
f t
o
ta
l la
bo
r 
fo
rc
e
)
30 40 50 60 70 80
Employment to population ratio, 15+, total (%)
19
simple exercise. Assume that productivity per worker was constant 
and that these three countries were able to achieve the average 
employment ratio of Latin America during the last decade.  If this 
were possible, income per capita in Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia 
would be 39, 31, and 46 percent higher than its current level. 
One reason why it would not be possible is that those employed 
today are more skilled than those of working age that are currently 
not working. Expanding employment without reducing average 
productivity and wages would require structural transformation, so 
that the new more productive activities would allow the economy 
to include millions of lesser skilled workers without reducing the 
average productivity of the economy.  
To assess the changes in the productive structure of countries 
we use data on the export of goods, as compiled by the United 
Nations COMTRADE. We use trade data following the Standard 
International Trade Classification, Revision 2 at the 4 digit level 
(SITC4) which allows us to explore the evolution of the export 
basket of countries since the early sixties. Unfortunately, there is no 
international comparable data on the exports of services. Although 
goods exports do not allow us to see the whole of the productive 
structure of a country, it does reveal the industries where the 
country has developed a level of productivity that is high enough to 
compete in international markets. 
Much has been said about the export orientation of East Asian 
high-growth countries. Some have emphasized the role of growth 
in export revenues. We take a different view. As discussed in 
Hausmann, Hwang and Rodrik (2007), what a country exports 
matters more and is more fundamental than how much it exports. 
What a country exports will influence the volume and value of its 
exports, their profitability and hence the willingness to invest in the 
expansion of export capacity. It is the ability to move into more 
productive activities that causes economic growth, by affecting 
inter alia, but not only, the growth of exports. For this reason, we 
will dedicate much of this chapter to study the export structure 
of the countries since it reveals the sectors in which a country 
has comparative advantage. But before we do so, we review the 
evolution of export values. 
Structural transformation in Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia
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In Figure 3, we present the dynamics of the exports of goods and 
services in per capita terms for the three North African countries 
and the three East Asian countries used as benchmarks. We 
include services, because it is often argued that East Asia may 
have a comparative advantage in the export of goods while North 
African countries, given their geography, location and history may 
have comparative advantage in services, such as tourism. Figure 3 
clearly shows that although exports per capita in Egypt, Morocco 
and Tunisia are on a rising trend, they have risen more gradually 
than the Asian benchmarks. In the late 1970s, China was well 
below all three North African countries, but by the early 2000s it 
had overtaken Egypt and Morocco, even though, as a much larger 
country, it would have been expected to be less export oriented. 
Korea and Thailand started at similar export per capita levels as 
Egypt and Morocco in the 1970s and well below Tunisia. However, 
they amply overtook all three North African countries. Hence, 
the slower three North African countries exhibited less export 
dynamism than the three East Asian benchmarks, and this is not 
due to their larger reliance on services, because we have included 
these in Figure 3. 
Figure 3 – Exports of goods and services per capita
Source: WDI 2011
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have been on a rising trend, especially in Morocco and Egypt. 
Moreover, Figure 4B shows that tourism receipts per capita are 
significantly above the levels that would be expected, given the 
income per capita of the three North African countries, indicating 
that the tourism sector is already quite large. [the label on Figure 4B 
says exports of goods and services, not tourism receipts] However, 
it is clear that, on its own, tourism will not be enough to generate 
the kind of dynamism that characterizes the three East Asian 
countries. One way to show this is to ask the following question. By 
how much would tourism exports per capita have to rise in order to 
close the current gap in per capita exports of goods and services 
with Thailand? The answer is 1381% for Egypt, 712% for Morocco 
and 184% for Tunisia. If the goal was to close the export gap with 
Korea, the equivalent numbers would be 54,330%, 30,848% and 
17,705%, respectively. This clearly shows that, while a tourism 
strategy can make a contribution to export growth, it cannot be 
either the sole or the main source of export dynamism.  
Figure 4 – Tourism exports
Source: Authors’ calculations using WDI data. 
We conclude that exports in Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia have 
lagged compared to the three East Asian countries, in spite of their 
large and dynamic tourism sectors. However, as we will argue, this 
is more a symptom than an ultimate cause of their slower GDP 
growth. The lag in exports and GDP growth reflects the much 
slower process of structural transformation. To see why this is 
so, we first need to understand the role of the composition of 
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production and exports in determining the levels and growth rates 
of these variables. We turn to this now. 
2. What you export matters: Assessing export 
composition 
The foundational models of trade theory suggest that the initial 
pattern of specialization has little to no effect on its future evolution, 
as it is merely a reflection of deeper underlying characteristics of 
the country, such as its factor endowments and technological 
differentials. In these models, the structure of the product portfolio 
of a country is of no importance and hence does not create sources 
of path dependence. Nevertheless, recent research has shown 
that the productive structure does matter, as it affects the pattern 
of development of new products, and therefore the dynamics of 
productivity and growth potential of countries.  
A first attempt to show that productive specialization matters was 
done by Hausmann and Rodrik in 2003 and Hausmann, Hwang and 
Rodrik in 2007 (HHR). These papers show that while the so-called 
‘economic fundamentals’ play a role, they do not pin down what a 
country will produce and export. To support this view, HHR develop 
a measure of export sophistication, calculating the average income 
per capita of the countries with an export basket similar to one’s 
own. They show that countries with a more sophisticated export 
basket, controlling for their initial level of income, grow faster. This 
suggests that the composition of a country’s production affects its 
future development possibilities. 
Following HHR, we construct their measure of export sophistication. 
For each good traded in world markets, we generate an associated 
income/productivity level (which we call PRODY). We then construct 
the income/productivity level that corresponds to a country’s export 
basket (which we call EXPY), by calculating the export-weighted 
average of the PRODY for that country. EXPY is our measure of 
the productivity or sophistication level associated with a country’s 
specialization pattern (see the appendix for a description of the 
concepts and calculations).
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This metric differs from traditional measures of sophistication that 
attempt to measure R&D intensity or technological sophistication. 
EXPY is outcomes-based. It exploits the fact that richer countries 
exhibit higher levels of productivity and pay higher wages. A product 
exported by such a country can be competitive at these high wages 
and hence must exhibit high levels of productivity. Poor countries 
that can make those products will have lower wages and, if they 
can emulate the levels of productivity of the richer countries, will be 
able to be more profitable and hence expand. Seen in this context, 
it is not surprising that a high EXPY, after controlling for the level of 
GDP per capita, is robustly linked to subsequent economic growth 
(Hausmann, Hwang and Rodrik 2007).
Figure 5 shows that there is a strong positive relation between 
income per capita and export basket sophistication (EXPY). While 
EXPY is highly correlated with per-capita GDP, we show that there 
are interesting discrepancies. Some high-growth countries such 
as China and India have EXPY levels that are much higher than 
what would be predicted based on their income levels. China’s 
EXPY, for example, makes us expect that it would continue to grow 
rapidly in the future since it is producing products that are highly 
sophisticated for its income level. [Perhaps a footnote would be 
useful here to discuss the possibility that China’s high EXPY is the 
result of assembly operations, and if so, whether that impairs its 
usefulness as a predictor of growth] The same is true for Egypt, 
which is significantly above the trend line. On the other hand, the 
level of sophistication Tunisia is very much on the regression line, 
while that of Morocco is below what would be expected given its 
income level.   
We explore the possibility that the high EXPY of Egypt is driven 
by the price of oil. Since many oil countries are very rich, oil gets 
assigned a high PRODY, even though the product may not be 
technologically sophisticated. Panel (b) in Figure 6 recalculates 
EXPY without including natural resources. It shows that Egypt, 
Morocco and Tunisia remain basically in the same position, 
indicating that our initial conclusion is sound: Egypt’s export basket 
is more sophisticated than expected, given its income level, Tunisia 
Structural transformation in Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia
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is in line with expectations but Morocco is below the regression 
line. 
Figure 5 
Export sophistication in 2008 and income per capita
Source: Authors’ calculations using Feenstra et al., COMTRADE data and 
WDI 
To analyze the evolution of export basket sophistication it is helpful 
to calculate EXPY with a fixed value of the PRODYs. This assures 
that movements in EXPY are not driven by changes in the income 
level of other countries that export a given good, but instead reflect 
the fact that the country in question has increased the share of 
more sophisticated products in its export basket. Figure 6 shows 
the evolution of EXPY for all six countries. It shows that all of them 
have been on an upward trend, but the three North African countries 
have significantly trailed behind the three East Asian countries. For 
example, while in 1965 Tunisia had a more sophisticated export 
package than Korea or Thailand, it was overtaken by Korea in 
the 1970s and by Thailand in the 1980s. Morocco was more 
sophisticated than Thailand in 1965 but also lost its superiority. 
This suggests that while structural transformation was at play in the 
two regions, it happened much more quickly in East Asia.    
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Figure 6 
Export sophistication in time (using PRODY of year 2000)
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Hausmann, Hwang and Rodrik 2007. 
The difference with HHR is that we use PRODY of year 2000 for the calculation 
of EXPY for every year.
Let us look now directly at the export baskets of the countries under 
study and their transformation. We do so by showing their export 
“treemaps”. A treemap is a visualization that displays data by using 
nested rectangles. Each rectangle is proportional to the share of 
a product in the export basket of a country. For each country we 
use product level data following SITC4 rev2 from UN COMTRADE. 
For simplicity, we restrict the products shown in the treemaps for 
each country to those products in which the country has significant 
presence.2 The color used in the treemaps is related to the type of 
good, and the intensity of the color varies with RCA of the product. 
Here we use Leamer’s 1984 classification of products in terms of 
their factor intensities. 
Figure 7 presents export tree maps for Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia. 
The treemaps show that between 1970 and 2008 the three countries 
saw a very significant transformation in the composition of their export 
baskets. Egypt, for example, went from being mainly an exporter of 
cotton, rice and fruits into an exporter of textiles, garments, metal 
products and chemicals. Morocco went from being an exporter of 
primary agricultural products and phosphates in 1970 to an exporter 
of garments, chemicals, and electronics. Tunisia was an exporter of 
oil, phosphates and agricultural products in 1970 but became an 
exporter of garments, electronics and chemicals by 2008. 
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2)  We say a country has significant presence in a product if it has revealed comparative advantage (RCA) greater than 
1.  We follow Balassa’s (Balassa 1964) definition of RCA as the ratio between the export share of product p in country 
c and the share of product p in the world market.
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China, Korea and Thailand experienced a more dramatic 
transformation (Figure 8). The three Asian countries started with 
exports dominated by agricultural products and light manufactures 
and are now important exporters of machinery, electronics and 
capital intensive goods.  
Figure 7 
Export of goods composition – Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia 
A. Egypt 
1970 2008 
B. Morocco 
1970 2008 
C. Tunisia 
1970 2008 
Source: Authors’ calculations using COMTRADE data.
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Source: Authors’ calculations using COMTRADE data. 
Structural transformation in Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia
Figure 8 
Export of goods composition – Comparison countries
A. China 
1970 2008 
B. Korea 
1970 2008 
C. Thailand 
1970 2008 
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3. Economic Complexity and subsequent growth 
During the last 20 years, models of economic growth have often 
included the assumption that the variety of inputs that go into the 
production of a country affects its overall productivity. There have 
been very few attempts, however, to bring this intuition to the data. 
In this section we explore the relationship between income levels 
and the diversity and ubiquity of the products exported by a country. 
These measures can tells us something about the complexity of 
the productive structure of Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia. 
Hausmann and Hidalgo 2009 introduce the idea that the productivity 
of a country resides in the diversity of its productive capabilities. 
These can be thought of as non-tradable inputs. According to this 
idea, cross-country differences in income can be explained by 
differences in economic complexity, as measured by the diversity of 
capabilities present in a country. They propose an indirect measure 
of these capabilities by thinking of them as a building block or Lego 
piece. In this analogy, a product is equivalent to a Lego model, 
and a country is equivalent to a bucket of Legos. We assume 
that countries make all the products for which they have all of the 
necessary capabilities, just like a child is able to produce a Lego 
model if the child’s bucket contains all necessary Lego pieces. 
Using this analogy, the question is equivalent to asking whether we 
can infer the nature of a country’s Lego box by looking only at the 
Lego models that it makes.
Countries differ in the variety of Lego pieces they have and products 
differ in the variety of Lego pieces they require. We define as the 
diversification of a country the number of different products that it 
makes while we define as the ubiquity of a product the number of 
countries that make it. Countries with a larger variety of Lego pieces 
will be able to make a larger variety of products. As a consequence, 
they should be more diversified. By contrast, products that require 
more Lego pieces will be made only in the countries that have 
all the requisite pieces. But these are bound to be fewer, making 
these products less ubiquitous. In addition, countries with more 
capabilities should be able to make products that require more 
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capabilities, but these products should be less ubiquitous. Hence, 
countries with a more varied set of Lego pieces should be more 
diversified and be able to make less ubiquitous products. 
This suggests that there should be a negative relationship between 
the diversification of a country and the average ubiquity of its 
products, since both are indirect measures of the capabilities 
of each country. Figure 9 suggest that this is indeed the case. 
Countries such as the US and Germany are highly diversified 
and make products of low ubiquity while the opposite is true for 
Yemen, Togo and Sudan. The figure shows that Morocco, Egypt 
and Tunisia have intermediate levels of diversification and ubiquity. 
Morocco shows the lowest diversification and the highest ubiquity, 
both indicating a relatively lower variety of productive capabilities. 
Tunisia’s export basket shows the lowest ubiquity of the three 
countries and has a level of diversification very similar to Egypt’s, in 
spite of having less than 1/6th of the population. Korea, by contrast, 
has almost the same diversification as Egypt and Tunisia, but is 
producing goods that are much less common, suggesting their 
greater complexity. China and Thailand are much more diversified 
than the three North African countries and their products are on 
average less ubiquitous. Since both diversification and ubiquity are 
indicators of a country’s diversity of productive capabilities, these 
indicators already suggest that the North African countries have 
fewer capabilities than the East Asian comparators. 
Source: Authors’ calculations using COMTRADE data. 
Structural transformation in Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia
Figure 9 - Diversification and ubiquity – 2008
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The use of diversity and ubiquity as estimates of the number of 
capabilities available in a country, or required by a product, is a 
crude approximation.  Both mappings are affected by the existence 
of rare Lego pieces. For instance, players holding rare pieces will 
be able to put together figures that few other players can make, 
not because they have many pieces, but because the pieces that 
they have are relatively rare. Consider rare natural resources, such 
as diamonds. We can see whether their low ubiquity comes from 
scarcity or complexity by looking at the number of other products 
that the diamond producers make. If raw diamonds were complex, 
meaning that they require many capabilities, the countries that make 
them should be able to make many other products. By contrast, 
if diamonds have low ubiquity because of some rare special input, 
we would not expect the countries making them to be diversified. 
This is revealed by the fact that Botswana and Sierra Leone are 
diamond exporters that make few other products.  
So diversity can be used to correct the information carried by 
ubiquity and ubiquity can be used to correct the information 
carried by diversity. We can take this one step further by correcting 
diversity using a measure of ubiquity that has already been 
corrected by diversity, and vice versa. We can do this process an 
infinite number of times. Fortunately, this process converges and 
the solution at infinity can be described simply as a vector called 
the Economic Complexity Index (see Appendix B for a description 
of the methodology). 
Figure 10 shows the Economic Complexity Index (ECI) and indicates 
that it is positively correlated with GDP per capita. This relation is 
remarkable since the ECI uses only information about the diversity 
and ubiquity of products, not their volume. As opposed to the EXPY 
measure, introduced by HHR, the ECI does not use any information 
of prices or income levels associated with the products. 
The ECI provides a clear ranking of the endowment of productive 
capabilities of the six countries. It suggests that the least complex 
economy is Morocco, followed by Egypt and Tunisia. Thailand and 
China are significantly more complex than any of the North African 
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countries and there is a big gap in complexity between China and 
Korea. 
Countries below the trend line are expected to grow faster in the 
future since they have an income that is lower than that which their 
productive capabilities should be able to support. The opposite 
is true for countries above the regression line. Hidalgo and 
Hausmann (2009) show that the distance between the country 
and the regression line is a strong predictor of future growth. This 
suggests that the three North African countries will exhibit higher 
than average growth in the next years, as they move towards the 
trend line in figure 10.
Figure 10 
Economic Complexity Index and GDP per capita for 2008
Source: Authors’ calculations using COMTRADE and WDI data.
To analyze the impact of the Economic Complexity Index (ECI) 
on future economic growth we estimate two equations where the 
dependent variable is the annualized growth rate of GDP per capita 
for the periods 1978-1988, 1988-1998 and 1998-2008. In the first 
of these equations we do not include ECI and use only two control 
variables: the logarithm of the initial level of GDP per capita in each 
period and the increase in natural resource exports in constant 
dollars as a share of initial GDP. The first variable captures the idea 
that, other things equal, poorer countries should grow faster than 
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rich countries and catch up. This is known in the economic literature 
as convergence. The second control variable captures the effect 
on growth of increases in income that come from natural resource 
wealth, which complexity does not explain. In addition, we include 
a dummy variable for each decade, capturing any common factor 
affecting all countries during that decade, such as a global boom 
or a widespread financial crisis. Taken together, these variables 
account for 28.5 percent of the variance in countries’ growth rates. 
This is shown in the first column of Table 2. 
Table 2 – Growth regression using Economic Complexity
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
 Annualized growth in GDP pc (by decade)
)8002-8991 ,8991-8891 ,8891-8791(SELBAIRAV
(1) (2)
 
Initial Income per capita, log -0.00017 -0.00638***
(0.001) (0.001)
Increase in natural resource exports 0.03960*** 0.03682***
 - in constant dollars (as a share of 
initial GDP)
(0.008) (0.010)
Initial Economic Complexity Index 
(ECI) 0.04430***
(0.009)
***17300.0-]gol ,atipac rep emocnI[ X ]ICE [
(0.001)
***15280.0***63030.0tnatsnoC
(0.008) (0.011)
192192snoitavresbO
R2 0.285 0.434
seYseYEF raeY
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In addition to the above mentioned variables, the second regression 
shown in table 2 includes the effect of economic complexity on 
growth. We do this by adding two additional terms: the ECI at the 
beginning of the decade and an interaction term between the ECI 
and the initial level of GDP per capita. The interaction attempts to 
capture the idea that the contribution of economic complexity to 
future economic growth depends on the level of per capita income. 
The second column of Table 2 shows that economic complexity 
is strongly associated with future economic growth. The negative 
coefficient on the interaction term indicates that the impact of 
complexity on growth declines with a country>s level of income. 
For example, according to the estimation in Column 2, and using 
data for 1998, an increase in the ECI of one standard deviation 
would accelerate growth by 2.3 percent per year in a country at the 
10th percentile of income, by 1.6 percent in a country at the median 
income, and by 0.7 percent for countries in the 90th percentile. The 
variables contained in Column 2 jointly account for 43.4 percent 
of the variance in growth rates. The difference between these two 
regressions indicates that the ECI increases the regression’s R2 by 
15 percentage points. This represents over a third of the explained 
fraction of the 43.4 percent of the variance in growth rates that the 
equation explains as a whole.
The estimates of the second column of Table 2 can be used to 
forecast the growth in GDP per capita.  To predict average annualized 
growth between 2008 and 2020 we make two assumptions. First, 
we assume a worldwide common growth term for the decade, 
which we take to be the same as that observed in the 1998-2008 
period. Changing this assumption would affect the growth rate of all 
countries by a similar amount but would not change the rankings. 
Second, we assume that there will be no change in the real value 
of natural resource exports as a share of initial GDP. This implies 
that we assume that natural resource exports in real terms in the 
next decade will remain at the record-high levels achieved in 2008. 
This assumption may underestimate the effect on countries whose 
volumes of natural resource extraction will increase significantly 
and over-estimate the growth in countries that will see their natural-
resource export volumes declines. A higher (lower) constant 
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dollar price of natural resource exports would improve (reduce) 
the projected growth performance of countries by an amount 
proportional to their natural resource intensity. 
Table 3 shows a summary of the economic complexity ranking 
and the expected GDP per capita growth rates forecasted by the 
growth equation shown in column 2 of table 2. Our sample of 128 
countries is sorted by growth rates, and for the sake of simplicity 
we show the top and bottom 5 countries plus the statistics for 
Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia. Taking into account in our growth 
equation the economic complexity of countries and their levels of 
income, as explained above, we expect China to lead per capita 
growth in the next 10 years, followed closely by India.  Thailand 
comes in at number 3. Given their complexity and current income, 
we expect Egypt and Tunisia to experience growth that will locate 
them among the top 20 countries, with an expected average 
increase in their GDP per capita close to 3.4% per year.  Given the 
current structure, we expect Morocco to grow at a relative slower 
pace because the gap between its level of complexity and its level 
of income is smaller, as can be seen in Figure 11.
Table 3 also shows that Egypt and Tunisia have a good position 
in terms of their ranking in the Economic complexity index. These 
countries rank 63 and 47, respectively, which are significantly better 
than their rank in terms of per capita income (90 and 80).  
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One clear message of this analysis is the importance of the 
diversity and complexity of a country’s productive capabilities. 
The question is how to increase them. We turn to this issue in the 
next section. 
4. Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia in the product space
In standard trade theory, changes in a country’s export basket 
are a passive consequence of changing factor endowments. To 
grow, countries accumulate more physical or human capital, or 
improve the way they mix them. These fundamental changes will 
be expressed in a different export mix, with the assumption being 
that there is always a product or set of products through which a 
country can express its factors of production. Put another way, 
structural transformation will be a passive consequence of a country 
increasing its education, financial resources, overall productivity, 
and so on, and we can therefore forget the world of products and 
instead focus on the underlying fundamentals. 
However, there are many reasons why export diversification may be 
more complicated than this picture suggests. Several factors may 
create market failures in changing the export mix, such as industry-
specific learning by doing (Arrow 1962; Bardhan 1970) or industry 
externalities (Jaffe 1986). There may also be technological spillovers 
among industries (Jaffe, Trajtemberg, and Henderson 1993). The 
process of finding out which of the many potential products best 
express a country’s changing comparative advantage may create 
information externalities (Hausmann and Rodrik 2003; Klinger 2007). 
These hypotheses suggest that moving to new export products 
may not be a passive consequence of factor accumulation, nor a 
smooth process that occurs along a continuum.
Hausmann and Klinger (2006 and 2007) investigate the process 
by which countries move to new export activities, and motivate the 
concept of a ‘product space’. In this space, some products are 
very near to one another, and others are far apart, and countries 
change their export mix by jumping to those new export activities 
that are near their current activities.
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This is based on the idea that every product involves a particular 
combination of capabilities. The combination is unique to the product 
but the capabilities are less unique. Other products may differ 
more or less in terms of the required capabilities. The capabilities 
required to produce wine are very different from those used in the 
production of cotton. Established industries have already sorted 
out the many potential failures involved in assuring the presence of 
all the requisite capabilities, which are then available to subsequent 
entrants in the industry. But firms that venture into new products 
will find it much harder to secure the requisite capabilities. Some of 
their need may be easy to supply. Power, water, corporate lawyers, 
human resource managers, logistic services, etc. By contrast, they 
will not find workers with experience in the manufacturing of the 
product in question or suppliers who regularly furnish that industry. 
Specific infrastructure needs such as cold storage transportation 
systems may not exist, regulatory services such as product approval 
and phytosanitary permits may be underprovided, research and 
development capabilities related to that industry may not be there, 
and so on.
Since the set of capabilities required specific to new activity don’t 
yet exist, providing them involves a chicken and egg problem. 
Capabilities that are specific to an industry will not exist until 
the industry does, but the industry will not be able to function 
until the requisite capabilities exist. This coordination problem is 
bound to be more acute if the missing capabilities are several. 
This occurs because the provision of any missing capability will 
not be enough to trigger the appearance of the industry and 
hence secure its own demand. Entrepreneurs seeking to enter 
a new export activity like fresh artichokes will not have access 
to trained agronomists with experience in artichokes specific to 
that country’s growing conditions, nor will they find the particular 
set of inputs for their new industry. But if the country already 
exports asparagus, then the entrants to the artichoke industry 
will find packing firms, rural infrastructure in the appropriate 
climactic zones for both artichokes and asparagus, regulatory 
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and customs regimes that can support either product, and so 
on.
This example highlights the fact that moving to a new industry is 
easier if the capabilities required already exist, because they are 
demanded by another industry that uses similar capabilities. The 
broad set of capabilities required for artichoke exports are rather 
similar to those required for asparagus production, and therefore 
it will be easier for firms in the country to enter one industry if the 
other already exists. Artichokes and asparagus are ‘close’ to one 
another in the product space. 
But what if firms were trying to enter the artichoke industry in a 
country that didn’t have an asparagus industry, and instead had 
a large and technologically-advanced deep gold mining industry? 
The set of engineers, deep drilling equipment, and heavy rail from 
mines to ports used in deep gold mining are not required in the 
production of artichokes and hence will provide no stepping stone. 
Artichokes and gold are therefore ‘far’ from one another in the 
product space. For this reason, it is more likely that a country will 
diversify its export basket towards artichokes if it is an asparagus 
exporter (e.g. Peru) than if it is a deep gold miner (e.g. South Africa): 
countries will move to new export activities that are near existing 
activities in the product space.
In more technical terms, the capabilities needed to produce one 
good may be more or less similar to the capabilities required to 
produce some other good. Correspondingly, the probability that 
a country will develop the capability to be good at producing one 
good is related to its installed capability in the production of other 
similar, or nearby goods from which the currently existing productive 
capabilities can be easily adapted. The barriers preventing the 
emergence of new export activities are less binding for nearby 
products that require only slight adaptations of existing capacity.
Hidalgo et al. (2007) map this product space empirically. Rather 
than attempting to define and measure the similarity of requisite 
3) The distance between any two products is the minimum of the pair wise conditional probabilities of having comparative 
advantage. See the appendix for greater detail.
4) See Hidalgo et al. 2007 for a more detailed technical description.
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capabilities directly, the authors measure the distance between 
two products simply based on the probability that if a country 
exports one, then it exports the other3. If two goods need the same 
capabilities, this should show up in a higher probability of a country 
having comparative advantage in both.
This measure gives the distance between every pair of export 
activities which creates the product space. It is important to keep in 
mind that this is measured across all countries and is a technological 
feature of products, not of countries. There is therefore one product 
space in which countries move, rather than a product space for 
each country.
Using the tools of network analysis, we can construct an image of 
the product space (Hidalgo et al. 2007). Considering the linkages 
as measured during 1995–2000, we first build the backbone of 
the space by taking each product and connecting it to its nearest 
neighbor. The next step is to overlay the strong links between 
products, and color-code the linkages depending on their 
strength.4 
Figure 11 shows the visual representation of the product space. 
Each node is a product, its size determined by its share of world 
trade. In these figures, physical distances between products are 
meaningless: proximity is shown by color-coding the linkages 
between pairs of products. A light-blue link indicates proximity 
of under 0.4, a beige link a proximity between 0.4 and 0.55, a 
dark-blue link a proximity between 0.55 and 0.65, and a red link 
a proximity greater than 0.65. Links below 0.55 are shown only if 
they make up the maximum spanning tree, i.e. they are the closes 
link between one of the products and the rest of the space. To give 
a sense of the sectors, products are color-coded based on their 
Leamer (1984) commodity group. 
Structural transformation in Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia
40
Figure 11 – The product space
This figure reveals that the product space is highly heterogeneous, 
with a core-periphery structure. There are products in the periphery 
of the product space that are only weakly connected to other 
products, and some groupings among these peripheral goods 
such as the garments cluster (the very dense green cluster at the 
bottom of the network). There is also a core of closely connected 
products in the center of the network, mainly of machinery and 
other capital-intensive goods, as well as a cluster of electronics 
(light blue products at the top-right of the space) that is well-
connected to the core.
This heterogeneous structure of the product space has important 
implications for export diversification. If a country is producing 
goods in a dense part of the product space, then the process of 
export diversification is much easier because the set of acquired 
capabilities can be easily redeployed to other nearby products. 
However, if a country is specialized in peripheral products, then 
this redeployment is more challenging because the distance in 
capability space is more substantial. Hausmann & Klinger (2007) 
and Hidalgo et al. (2007) show very strongly that countries move 
(A Hidalgo, B Klinger, A-L Barabasi, R Hausmann)
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towards nearby activities over time, and it is very infrequent to 
observe jumps across large distances in this space.
Figure 12 shows the product space for Egypt, Morocco and 
Tunisia for years 1980, 1990, 2000 and 2009. This figure helps 
us to understand the dynamics of the products in which these 
three countries have developed revealed comparative advantage 
in world markets. The opacity of a node indicates whether a 
country does not produce a product with comparative advantage. 
The product space reveals that the three countries are producing 
goods competitively in a handful of highly peripheral export sectors 
in natural resources, as well as in the garments and textile cluster. 
The presence in these clusters has been weakened because of the 
erosion of trade preferences. The graphs capture in more detail the 
findings of the Economic Complexity Index. Morocco, which had 
the lowest index, seems to be completely absent from the products 
that are in the core of the product space. Tunisia appears in a 
relatively better position, with many nodes in the Electronics sector 
and some in the Machinery sector, while Egypt has an intermediate 
position. The position of the three countries in the product space 
is consistent with the results of the Economic Complexity Index 
discussed above, with Morocco showing the weakest presence 
and Tunisia the largest. 
The footprint of China, Korea and Thailand in the product space 
for years 1980, 1990, 2000 and 2009 is presented in Figure 13. 
In general, the three countries show more dynamism in moving 
towards the dense and more connected parts of the product 
space. All countries developed a presence in the garments and 
textile clusters, but their presence there has been dwindling as 
the countries have moved on to more complex activities such as 
machinery and electronics. 
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Figure 12
Where do countries stand in the product space?
Egypt 
Year 1980 Year 1990 Year 2000 Year 2009 
Morocco
Year 1980 Year 1990 Year 2000 Year 2009 
Tunisia
Year 1980 Year 1990 Year 2000 Year 2009 
China 
Korea 
Thailand 
Figure 13
Where do countries stand in the product space? 
Comparison group
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Using the Product Space to scan the Possibility Space: 
Strategic Considerations 
We want to use the preceding analysis to understand the strategic 
options that Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia have in terms of future 
structural transformation to accelerate their growth rates. However, 
doing the analysis at the product level becomes quite unwieldy, 
since we have over 700 products using the UN COMTRADE data 
using SITC4 rev2 data. To make the analysis more tractable we 
group products into communities of related products. Instead of 
using a man-made procedure to group the products, we let the 
data organize itself by finding the families of products that are most 
likely to be co-exported. We interpret this to be an indication that 
they share many of the requisite capabilities. To group the products 
we use an algorithm introduced by Rosvall and Bergstrom (2008) 
and discussed in Hausmann etal (2011). Table 4 presents the 
communities and some trade statistics.
It is important to highlight that the concept of communities is different 
from the idea of clusters, since the later emphasize input-output 
connections in the value chain. By contrast, products belong to a 
community because their production in a given location requires 
similar capabilities. For example, we find that textiles and garments 
are quite distinct communities, because the capabilities that go 
into textiles are different from those that go into garments, even if 
the textiles themselves are used in garments, and thus belong to 
the same value chain.  
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Table 4 – Product Communities
Community Name
Number of 
Products
World
Trade
World 
Share
Top 3 Countries by 
Export Volume
Machinery 125 4.4T 20.29% DEU, USA, JPN
Electronics 52 3.6T 16.71% CHN, HKG, USA
Oil 4 2.3T 10.49% SAU, RUS, NOR
Chemicals & Health 64 1.6T 7.47% USA, DEU, BEL
Other Chemicals 24 1.2T 5.49% DEU, USA, FRA
Construction Materi-
als & Equipment
44 1.1T 5.23% CHN, DEU, ITA
Mining 48 1.1T 5.01% AUS, USA, CHL
Garments 42 1.1T 4.63% CHN, HKG, ITA
Food Processing 26 603B 2.74% DEU, ITA, USA
Metal Products 17 496B 2.26% JPN, DEU, KOR
Aircraft 10 440B 2.00% FRA, DEU, GBR
Not Classified 36 426B 1.94% USA, CHN, DEU
Cereals & Vegetable 
Oils
21 295B 1.34% USA, BRA, ARG
Home & Office 23 250B 1.14% CHN, CHE, USA
Meat & Eggs 23 242B 1.10% USA, BRA, DEU
Ships 8 232B 1.05% KOR, CHN, JPN
Petrochemicals 5 220B 1.00% DEU, USA, BEL
Boilers 14 193B 0.88% CHN, DEU, JPN
Fish & Seafood 11 191B 0.87% CHN, NOR, THA
Textile & Fabrics 32 189B 0.86% CHN, ITA, HKG
Tropical Agriculture 16 190B 0.86% IDN, NLD, MYS
Coal 6 183B 0.83% AUS, IDN, RUS
Misc Agriculture 22 170B 0.78% BRA, DEU, FRA
Precious Stones 4 170B 0.77% IND, ISR, BEL
Pulp & Paper 11 148B 0.67% USA, CAN, SWE
Agrochemicals 13 141B 0.64% DEU, USA, CAN
Milk & Cheese   7 134B 0.61% DEU, FRA, NLD
Beer, Spirits & Ciga-
rettes
  6 124B 0.57% GBR, NLD, DEU
Inorganic Salts & 
Acids
10 117B 0.53% USA, CHN, DEU
Cotton, Rice, Soy & 
others
18 96B 0.44% USA, IND, THA
Tobacco   6 64B 0.29% DEU, NLD, BRA
Leather 14 53B 0.24% ITA, USA, HKG
Fruit   4 45B 0.21% ESP, USA, CHL
Animal Fibers   7 12B 0.06% AUS, CHN, ITA
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Now, to think strategically we need to define and measure a set of 
concepts. 
• Distance (a characteristic of a country /product pair). It measures 
how “far” the product is from the country’s current productive 
capabilities. To estimate the distance to a community of products 
we calculate the average distance of the country to all the 
products in that community. 
• Sophistication (a product characteristic). It measures the weighted 
average of the GDP per capita of countries with comparative 
advantage in that product. To calculate the sophistication of 
a community we measure the average sophistication of the 
products in that community.  
• Strategic value (a characteristic of a country/product pair). It 
measures how much would the position of a country in the product 
space improve if it were to develop the capacity to make a particular 
product, say P. In other words, it measures the benefit of jumping to 
product P in terms of the reduction in distance to other products. 
We weigh this reduction in distance using the sophistication of the 
other products that the country would come closer to. As opposed 
to the other cases, to estimate the strategic value of a community 
we calculate the maximum rather than the average strategic value 
of the products that belong to that community. 
Ideally, countries would want to move to products that are at short 
distances, because this means that they are more likely to succeed, 
given that they already possess most of the requisite capabilities. 
By the same token, countries would want to move to products 
that are more sophisticated, indicating that these products are 
associated with higher levels of productivity and lead to faster 
future growth. Products with higher sophistication are made by 
countries that pay higher wages and may thus provide a cost 
advantage.  Finally, ceteris paribus, countries would rather move 
to products that have a higher strategic value because this would 
get them closer to more densely populated and sophisticated 
parts of the product space, making future diversification easier 
and more attractive. 
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The problem is that we seldom find products that are 
simultaneously near, sophisticated and strategic. This implies 
that there are important trade-offs that countries need to face 
and these lead to alternative emphasis in the search for new 
opportunities. 
Applying the product space analysis to Egypt, Morocco 
and Tunisia
We explore the strategic options for Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia 
by looking at distance, sophistication and strategic. Figure 14 
presents four different scattergrams. The circles represent the 
product communities, and their size is proportional to global trade 
in them, except in panel d. The measures presented in these figures 
depend on the position of the country in the product space and, 
therefore, are country specific. 
Figure 14a shows the trade-off between distance and sophistication. 
Ideally, we would want to move to communities on the upper left, 
meaning that these would be near the country’s current capabilities 
and of high sophistication. Instead, we find that, for Egypt, 
communities align on an upward slope. The nearby communities, 
such as Cotton, et al, and Garments, have low sophistication. In 
fact, they are below Egypt’s current average sophistication. The 
most sophisticated communities, such as Chemicals and Health 
Related Products, Electronics and Aircrafts are among the farthest 
away. The nearest communities with an average sophistication 
above Egypt’s average are Construction Materials and Metal 
Products. It is important to note also the high position, in this graph, 
of Petrochemicals and Miscellaneous Chemicals. 
Figure 14b shows distance vs. strategic value for Egypt. Again, we 
find that Electronics, Pharmaceuticals and Machinery are the most 
strategic but also the more distant. However, among the most near 
there is a large variance in strategic value. For example, Garments 
and Fruits are at a similar distance, but the former is much more 
strategic than the latter in terms of the future opportunities they 
open up. A similar comment can be said about Construction 
Materials vs. Petrochemicals. 
Structural transformation in Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia
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Figure 14 – Scanning the Possibility Space of Egypt
Source: Authors’ calculations using COMTRADE and WDI data. 
[Panel A shows the average PRODY – EXPY value and the distance to each 
community from the country’s’ current export basket. Panel B shows the 
maximum Strategic of a product inside each community and distance from 
the current productive structure. Panel C shows the average PRODY-EXPY 
and the Strategic value of the communities that are closer (distance below the 
median). Finally panel D shows the percentage of product in which the country 
has revealed comparative advantage and the export value if the revealed 
comparative advantage (RCA=1) was developed in the products in which the 
country is not present. In panels A, B and C the size of the dot is related to 
average the community share in world trade, while in panel D the size of the 
dot is related to the current RCA of the country in each community].
 
Figure 14C looks at sophistication vs. strategic value for communities 
that are relatively near. This allows us to explore the trade-off between 
these two criteria, disregarding the concept of distance. In this panel 
the ideal position is the upper right. Instead, the communities align 
in a generally negative relationship. Petrochemicals are the most 
sophisticated, but the least strategic, while Garments are the most 
strategic, but have very low sophistication. Construction Materials 
appear as a community that offers a good balance between the 
two. The final panel of Figure 14 presents the trade-off between 
communities with high presence vs. communities with high potential 
market size. We define as presence the percentage of products in 
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the community in which the country already has RCA greater than 
5. The measure of market size is the value of the increase in exports 
if the country were to reach RCA=1 in the products in which it is 
still below this figure1.  In fruits and petrochemicals, the country is 
already present in over 70 percent of the products and the amounts 
required to reach RCA=1 are limited. By contrast, the country is 
absent from the three most sophisticated communities, where the 
additional market share would be much larger. In between, we 
find that Construction Materials and Equipment, Miscellaneous 
Chemicals and Garments are in an intermediate position.
Figure 15 – Morocco in the product space
Source: Authors’ calculations using COMTRADE and WDI data. 
[Panel A shows the average PRODY - EXPY value and the distance to each 
community from the country’s’ current export basket. Panel B shows the 
maximum Strategic of a product inside each community and distance from 
the current productive structure. Panel C shows the average PRODY-EXPY 
and the Strategic value of the communities that are closer (distance below the 
median). Finally panel D shows the percentage of product in which the country 
has revealed comparative advantage and the export value if the revealed 
comparative advantage (RCA=1) was developed in the products in which the 
country is not present. In panels A, B and C the size of the dot is related to 
average the community share in world trade, and in panel D the size of the dot is 
related to the current RCA of the country in each community].
5)  RCA=1 means that the country would have a participation in this market proportional to its overall size in the global 
economy.
Structural transformation in Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia
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Figure 15 repeats the same exercise for the case of Morocco. It 
is interesting to notice that most product communities are more 
distant to Morocco’s current productive structure than they are 
to those of Egypt. This is a reflection of the fact that Morocco is 
less diversified and more peripheral in the product space. Panel A 
shows that Garments, Food Processing, Construction Materials, 
Milk and Cheese, Petrochemicals and Miscellaneous Chemicals 
are the communities closest to the desired upper left corner. We do 
not include Fish & Seafood and Animal Fibers in this list because 
Morocco already has a strong presence in these products (see 
Panel D) and they may not represent much in terms of additional 
exports.
Panel B of Figure 15 shows that Garments, Construction Materials, 
Textiles and Fabric and Food Processing have high strategic value 
and are fairly near. Panel C, which focuses on the trade-off between 
strategic value and sophistication for nearby communities, indicates 
that Garments are below the current average sophistication of the 
country, while Construction Materials, Food Processing and Textiles 
offers more balance between sophistication and strategic value, 
as they are in general more sophisticated and better connected 
to other parts of the product space. Finally, panel D of figure 15 
shows that Morocco has strong presence in a few communities 
of products – Fruits, Fish and Seafood, Garments and Inorganic 
Salts – and that producing competitively most other products will 
increase by several orders of magnitude the value of the current 
export basket. 
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Figure 16 – Tunisia in the product space
Source: Author’s calculations using COMTRADE and WDI data. 
[Panel A shows the average PRODY – EXPY value and the distance to each 
community from the country’s’ current export basket. Panel B shows the 
maximum Strategic of a product inside each community and distance from 
the current productive structure. Panel C shows the average PRODY-EXPY 
and the Strategic value of the communities that are closer (distance below the 
median). Finally panel D shows the percentage of product in which the country 
has revealed comparative advantage and the export value if the revealed 
comparative advantage (RCA=1) was developed in the products in which the 
country is not present. In panels A, B and C the size of the dot is related to 
average the community share in world trade, and in panel D the size of the dot 
is related to the current RCA of the country in each community].
Figure 16 performs the analysis of Tunisia in the product space. 
Panel A shows that Garments are the closest community, but its 
sophistication is below the average for the country. Communities 
that are closer to the upper left corner of the graph are Construction 
Materials, Petrochemicals, Misc. Chemicals, Home and Office 
Products and Machinery. However, they are, respectively, at 
increasing distance. 
Panel B of Figure 16 shows the strategic value of each community 
vs. distance. Machinery has the highest strategic value and, 
Structural transformation in Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia
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although fairly distant, is closer than was the case for Egypt and 
Morocco. Construction materials are much closer than Electronics 
and Miscellaneous Chemicals, while having similar strategic value, 
although as panel A shows, not as high a level of sophistication. 
Electronics is a community where Tunisia already has a presence 
(see figure 12). For this reason, it is closer to Tunisia’s capabilities 
than it was for the case of Egypt or Morocco. 
Panel C of figure 16 focuses on the communities that are below 
the median distance, and shows the strategic value and PRODY 
of each community. This graph highlights Construction Materials 
and Equipments as a community with a very high strategic value 
and sophistication above the average of the current export basket. 
Other communities that appear as interesting are Textile and 
Fabrics, Food processing and Boilers. As opposed to what is the 
case for Egypt, Tunisia does not find in Garments a high strategic 
value since it already has a strong presence in that community and 
its remaining products are of low sophistication. 
Finally, Panel D of figure shows the current presence of Tunisia in 
the different clusters and the gain in export value of achieving RCA 
of one in each product. Garments and Inorganic salts and acids 
are the communities where Tunisia has the strongest presence, 
accounting for revealed comparative advantage in more than 80 
percent of the products in each community. In all the remaining 
communities, Tunisia has presence in less than 50 percent of the 
products. 
5. Timing and sequencing: Learning from the East Asian 
experience 
Asian countries have had a sustained and rapid growth, and their 
economies have exhibited a very rapid structural transformation 
that underpinned sustained increases in exports. Therefore, it is 
interesting   to ask which new industries did China, Korea and 
Thailand go into, at what stage in their development process. To 
address this question, we pose the following question: at what 
point in their recent economic history were the export baskets 
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of China, Korea or Thailand most similar to that of today’s Egypt, 
Morocco and Tunisia. Once identified the time period of highest 
similarity, we ask which new industries these countries moved into 
subsequently. 
To explore this issue we studied the similarity between the export 
baskets of Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia in the period 2007-2009 
and the exports baskets of the three Asian countries for every 
year since 1962. Specifically, we took the vector of revealed 
comparative advantage of each country for year 2009. Then we 
calculate the correlation of this vector with the same RCA vectors 
of China, Korea and Thailand starting in year 1962 until 2009.  We 
standardize the measure creating a normalized index, where we 
measure similarity in units of standard deviations from the world 
average. This index helps to identify the period of time to which 
the current export baskets of the three North African countries are 
more similar. This methodology is similar to the one used in (Bahar, 
Hausmann and Hidalgo 2011) to assess the degree of similarity 
in the export baskets between pairs of countries. The results of 
this exercise need to be interpreted with caution since the policies 
and institutions that work in one country cannot necessarily be 
transplanted to others. Also, products’ quality, prices and demand 
change over time, so we cannot advise a country to follow what a 
successful country did before. 
Figure 17 presents the index of similarity with China’s history of 
exports. This figure shows that the export basket of Egypt today 
is most similar to that of China circa 1980. In fact, the similarity 
was one standard deviation above the world mean. This figure also 
shows that Tunisia has in 2009 become more similar than ever 
to the export structure of China, with a degree of similarity of 1.5 
standard deviations. This is not surprising since, as we saw in 
figure 12, Tunisia developed comparative advantage in Machinery 
and Electronics, two communities in which China has a strong 
presence (see figure 13). The current export basket of Morocco 
is mildly more similar than the world average to the exports from 
China at any point in time. 
Structural transformation in Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia
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Figure 17 – Similarity with China
In Figure 18, we present the similarity index with respect to Korea. 
The recent export basket of Tunisia is interestingly similar to Korea’s 
exports from the mid seventies to mid eighties. The similarity index 
shows that today’s Tunisia and the Korea of the 1980s are 2 
standard deviations more similar than other countries in the world. 
Morocco’s exports are similar to the ones of Korea in the same 
period of time.  Finally Egypt’s exports appear to be rather dissimilar 
to what have been the exports of Korea.
We repeated the same procedure analyzing the degree of export 
similarity with respect to Thailand, but we find that the exports of 
the three North African countries have been rather dissimilar to 
Thailand’s exports. 
In synthesis, Egypt’s current export basket is most similar to that 
of China in 1980, while Morocco and Tunisia’s export baskets are 
most similar to that of Korea circa 1985. Given these findings, 
we look at the new products that were introduced by each Asian 
country in the 5 years following the period of maximum similarity. 
This will give us an idea of the pathways through the product space 
that were taken by China and Korea at the time they were most 
similar to Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia. 
Tunisia's and
Morocco's exports 
of 2009 are similar to 
those of Korea in 
1975-1985
Egypt has a export basket in 2009 that is, on
average, close to one standard deviation less
similar to the history of Korea's trade over time
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6)  We calculate the change in the RCA of each product between two points in time, and then we calculate a commu-
nity weighted average using the world trade shares of the products in each community. 
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To perform this analysis, we group products into the communities 
described above (see table 4) and use two measures to attempt to 
capture the changes experienced in each country. A first measure 
is to calculate the increase in revealed comparative advantage 
experienced in each community.6  A second approach consists 
of measuring how many new products in each community gained 
revealed comparative advantage, in the respective Asian country, in 
the relevant five-year period. Thus, the first is an intensive measure 
while the second is extensive. 
Figure 18 – Similarity with Korea
Table 9 shows the communities in which China gained presence 
from 1980 to 1985. Electronics, Garments, Textiles and Fabrics, 
and Cotton, rice, etc. are communities of products in which China 
increased its world market share very significantly in this period. 
In terms of new products, China enlarged its presence in 12 
new products in the Textiles and Fabrics community, achieving a 
presence in 72% of the product categories of the community. As 
we saw in Figure 11, Textiles and Fabrics is a community with a 
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high strategic value and a level of sophistication much larger than 
garments. Garments is the second community in which there 
was development of new products (8), with which China gained 
presence in 90% of the products. Interestingly, while Electronics is 
the community in which China increased its revealed comparative 
advantage the most, it only gained presence in 4 products of 
the Electronics community, reaching just 15% of total presence. 
This suggests that China developed the Electronics community 
by accumulating first a big presence in a few products, before 
branching out in subsequent periods to other nearby goods. By 
2008, China reached revealed comparative advantage in 92% of 
the products in the Electronics community. 
Table 9 – China change in new products – 1980-1985
Source: Authors’ calculations  using Feenstra and COMTRADE data. 
Table 10 shows the communities in which Korea gained presence 
in the period between 1985 and 1990. Korea increased its revealed 
comparative advantage significantly in Machinery and Textiles and 
Fabrics in this period. Chemicals and Health Related Products 
was a distant third in this measure. Ranked by the number of 
new product categories that were added to the export mix, the 
electronics sector added 9 new products to reach a 60 percent 
presence in the community, while Machinery added 8 products, 
reaching only a 14 percent presence. Textiles and Fabrics added 
7 products, reaching 72 percent presence. In synthesis, between 
1985 and 1990 Korea moved into two sectors where it initially had 
a very small presence. These were the Machinery and Chemicals 
and Health Related Products, where by 1990 it only was present in 
14% and 13% of the product categories, respectively.  It continued 
57
its expansion in the Textiles & Fabrics, where it gained overall 
comparative advantage and increased its presence to reach 60 
percent of the product categories. 
Table 10 – Korea change in new products – 1985-1990
Source: Authors’ calculations using Feenstra and COMTRADE data.
What are the lessons of China 1980 for Egypt today? Considering 
all the obvious caveats and differences in context and history, it is 
interesting to note that China balanced an expansion based on 
further populating communities in which it had a high presence, 
such as Garments and Textiles & Fibers, with a successful bet 
on Electronics, which was a distant, but highly sophisticated 
and strategic sector. The lesson that emerges from Korea 1985 
for Morocco and Tunisia today is similar. Korea also expanded its 
presence in communities where it had a large presence, such as 
Textiles, but made a strategic bet on Machinery, a community in 
which it was almost absent. This suggests that diffusion to nearby 
products and jumps to farther away strategic sectors are two 
distinct and complementary strategies that these two successful 
countries followed. 
6. Policy implications
How should Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia accelerate their processes 
of structural transformation so as to support higher and more 
inclusive growth? The analysis of the position of the countries in the 
product space has allowed us to understand some of the trade-offs 
that these countries face in terms of distance, sophistication and 
strategic value. The experience of Korea and China in the period 
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after they were most similar to the three North African countries 
suggests that successful countries follow several simultaneous 
strategies.  
To better understand this finding, it is important to note that 
countries often face an important trade-off between more jobs vs. 
better jobs. A strategy that emphasizes more jobs would give less 
importance to product sophistication, meaning that it would accept 
the challenge of competing with relatively low wage countries 
because the industries involved could provide jobs that are better 
than those that many workers in the country might otherwise obtain. 
For example, if there are many low-wage workers in the informal 
sector, countries would be better off expanding their presence in 
the garment sector, even if this would mean moving towards goods 
that are less sophisticated than the current average export basket. 
Ultimately, countries need jobs for the citizens they have, not for 
the citizens they wish they had. If there are many under-employed 
low-skill workers, industries with lower levels of sophistication may 
still be the best employment alternative for them. Abandoning 
industries too early may move workers into unemployment or into 
lower productivity activities in the informal sector, lowering the 
overall productivity of the economy. By contrast, more sophisticated 
industries compete with richer countries and can afford to pay 
higher wages, making them more suited for segments of the labor 
market that are tight or for an environment of rising equilibrium real 
wages.  
Consider the following three model strategies. 
• Jobs, jobs, jobs: This strategy emphasizes the quantity and not 
the quality of the potential new jobs that structural transformation 
could generate. It puts little emphasis on product sophistication, 
meaning that it is willing to emphasize industries, such as 
garments, where international competitors are low-income and 
hence low-wage countries. This makes sense if there is ample 
involuntary unemployment or low-wage employment that is 
remunerated at rates below those that would be needed to make 
the new low-sophistication industries competitive. The strategy 
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emphasizes industries that are very near the current set of 
productive capabilities, thus making the development of the new 
products faster and less risky. 
• Parsimonious transformation: This strategy looks for products 
that are in the vicinity of a country’s current set of capabilities but 
that have higher sophistication. The strategy is willing to trade-off 
the difficulties involved with traversing greater distance against 
the benefit of having more sophisticated products that face less 
competition from low-income countries and hence would be able 
to expand in an environment of rising real wages. 
• Strategic bets: This strategy emphasizes sectors that are 
more sophisticated and provide a larger strategic value, even if 
they lie at significantly greater distance. The country may lack 
many of the requisite capabilities to support those industries 
and, therefore, the strategy must involve a concerted effort to 
coordinate the accumulation of the missing capabilities and the 
encouragement of pioneers into these industries. The strategy 
is obviously riskier and costlier than the previous ones but, if 
successful, could change the productive landscape, as it did in 
China and Korea. Machinery, electronics and chemicals (including 
pharmaceuticals) tend to be the product communities that exhibit 
the highest sophistication and strategic value, but in terms of the 
product space are distant, from what the North African countries’ 
currently produce. 
These three strategies can be brought to the data by developing 
summary indexes that take a stand regarding the relative 
importance of different goals. We can use these indexes to sort 
the relative attractiveness of the different product communities in 
the light of each strategy. We construct the indexes by measuring 
the deviations of distance, sophistication, market size and strategic 
value by using the following equation: 
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Index i = a Distance
+ a wtshare
Distance i j    - min (Distance i)
max (Distance i) - min (Distance i)
max (wtshare i) - wtshare i j)
max (wtshare j) - min (wtshare j)
(
(
)
)
+ a PRODY
+ a wtshare
max (PRODY j )   - PRODY i j
max (PRODY j) - min (PRODY j)
max (StratValue j) - StratValue i j)
max (StratValue j) - min (StratValue j)
(
(
)
)
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The three strategies introduced above can be represented as 
different weights. The indexes represent a valid comparison within 
each country, but cannot be used to compare between countries, 
because they normalize the distance to the within country 
variation. 
Table 5 shows the chosen weights to characterize each strategy. 
These weights where set arbitrarily and are just to help illustrate 
the difference between possible strategies. For the “Jobs, Jobs, 
Jobs” strategy we emphasize the need for targeting sectors that 
are close to the current productive structure, and therefore easy 
to jump products, giving less attention to the other dimensions 
that characterize the product space. In the “Parsimonious 
Transformation” strategy we assign less weight to the distance and 
we give more weight to the sophistication and strategic value of 
products. Finally, the “Strategic Bets” approach focuses mostly on 
the sophistication and strategic value of products. Table 6 through 
8 ranks the different product communities for the three strategies 
and countries. 
Table 5 – Weights in the three strategies
 Jobs, jobs, 
jobs
Parsimonious
Transformation
Strategic
Bets
Distance 0.70 0.50 0.20
PRODY 0.10 0.20 0.30
World trade share 0.10 0.10 0.10
Strategic Value 0.10 0.20 0.40
61
Table 6 – Strategies for Egypt
Table 7 – Strategies for Morocco
Table 8 – Strategies for Tunisia
The tables are self-explanatory. The product communities are 
ranked according to the score in the relevant index. The “Jobs, 
Jobs, Jobs” strategy prioritizes nearby communities where there 
is already a large presence, such as Garments. The “strategic 
bets” approach puts an emphasis on more distant communities 
with more sophisticated and well connected products, such 
as Machinery. Interestingly, the intermediate approach ranks 
Construction Materials and Equipment first for Egypt, Garments as 
first for Morocco and Machinery first for Tunisia, a reflection of the 
different levels of complexity that each country has achieved.
Structural transformation in Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia
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Ultimately, countries develop by being able to increase the number 
of different activities that they can successfully engage in and 
by moving towards activities that are more complex. The policy 
message for most countries is clear: create an environment 
where a greater diversity of productive activities can thrive and, 
in particular, activities that are relatively more complex. To do this, 
countries need to be able to identify the missing capabilities that 
slow economic transformation and address them. For this task, 
the product space is a map that helps chart the opportunities 
and rewards available to each country. These are maps that are 
specific to them and do not represent one-size-fits-all development 
advice. A map empowers by describing opportunities that would 
not be obvious in the absence of it. If the secret of development is 
the accumulation of productive knowledge, at a social more than 
at the individual level, then the process necessarily requires the 
involvement of many explorers, not just a few planners. 
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Appendix: Technical Details
PRODY and EXPY
EXPY is calculated by first measuring the sophistication of each 
product, PRODY, as the revealed comparative advantage (RCA)-
weighted GDP per capita of each country that exports the good:
where xvali,c,t is the value of exports of good i by country c in year 
t,  Xc is the total exports by country c, and Yc is the GDP per 
capita of country c. This product-level measure of sophistication 
is then used to measure the sophistication of a country’s export 
basket as a whole. This measure, EXPY, is simply the weighted 
average of the PRODY of each good (i) that the country c exports, 
with the weights being the shares of each good in the country’s 
export basket (Xc). It represents the income level associated with a 
country’s export package.
Distance
Proximity is the inverse of the distance between goods i and j in 
year t. It is defined as: 
where for any country c,
and where the conditional probability is calculated using all countries 
in year t. This is calculated using disaggregated export data across 
a large sample of countries from the World Trade Flows data from 
Feenstra and others (2005) and UN COMTRADE.
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Open forest
It is calculated first by measuring the density of the current export 
basket of a country around any good. This is the distance of good 
i from country c’s export basket at time t, calculated as the sum 
of all paths leading to the product in which the country is present, 
divided by the sum of all paths leading to the product. Density 
varies from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating that the country has 
achieved comparative advantage in many nearby products, and 
therefore should be more likely to export that good in the future.
Hausmann and Klinger (2007) show that this measure of density is 
indeed highly significant in predicting how a country’s productive 
structure will shift over time: countries are much more likely to move 
to products that have a higher density, meaning they are closer to 
their current production. 
We then aggregate this measure of density, which is for a 
country around any single product, to an overall measure of the 
connectedness of a country’s export basket. This country-level 
measure is called “open forest”. A higher value indicates that the 
current export basket is a part of the product space that is well 
connected to other new and valuable opportunities for structural 
transformation. In other words, a high open forest indicates that 
the country is located in a dense part of the product space. A low 
value of open forest indicates the country is specialized in a sparse, 
unconnected part of the product space. In essence, this number 
summarizes the visual analysis conducted above with the product 
space maps.
Open forest is calculated as follows:
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Strategic value 
It is the change in open forest in country c and time t if product i 
goes from being absent to being present. Some products are in a 
dense part of the product space, meaning that they are intensive in 
capabilities that are easily deployed to a wide range of other goods. 
The implication is that successfully producing these goods would 
create capabilities with significant value for other new products. On 
the other hand, other products are located in the periphery, or in a 
part of the product space where the country has already achieved 
comparative advantage and acquired the requisite productive 
capabilities. Therefore, these products have a low strategic value, 
as successfully producing them would offer little in terms of future 
structural transformation, even if they are highly valuable in their 
own right (i.e. have a high PRODY).
Economic Complexity Index
We define Mcp, as a matrix that is 1 if country c produces product 
p with revealed comparative advantage (RCA>1), and 0 otherwise, 
we can measure diversity and ubiquity simply by summing over the 
rows or columns of that matrix. Formally, we define:
To generate a more accurate measure of the number of capabilities 
available in a country, or required by a product, we need to correct 
the information that diversity and ubiquity carry by using each one 
to correct the other. For countries, this requires us to calculate 
the average ubiquity of the products that it exports, the average 
diversity of the countries that make those products and so forth. 
For products, this requires us to calculate the average diversity of 
the countries that make them and the average ubiquity of the other 
products that these countries make. This can be expressed by the 
recursion:  
Diversity = k c,o = Mcp 
p 
Ubiquity = k p,o = Mcp 
c
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We then insert (4) into (3) to obtain
and rewrite this as :
where
We note (8) is        satisfied when                    This is the 
eigenvector of which is associated with the largest eigenvalue. 
Since this eigenvector is a vector of ones, it is not informative. 
We look, instead, for the eigenvector associated with the second 
largest eigenvalue. This is the eigenvector that captures the largest 
amount of variance in the system and is our measure of economic 
complexity.  Hence, we define the Economic Complexity Index 
(ECI) as:
kc,N   kc,N-2  1.= = Mcci
ECI = eigenvector associated with the second largest eigenvalue of               (9)Mcci
where         is given by   (8).Mcci
kc,N =
1
kc,O p
Mcp kp,N-1Σ
kp,N =
1
kp,O pΣMcp kc,N-1
(3)
(4)
k
1
p,Op
Mcpkc,N =
1
kc,OΣ ΣM p k ,N-2
kp,O
Mcpkc,N = kc,OΣ Σ M pk ,N-2
(5)
(6)
Mkc,N    =Σ lkc , N-2
M l =Σ
p
McpM pl
kc,0 kp,0
(7)  
(8)  
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Country Specific Context 
Review of existing policies and identification 
of constraints
Jieun Choi and Kaouther Abderrahim
1. Introduction
The issues of production capacity and competitiveness are critical in shaping a country’s ability to generate the economic and financial resources required to tackle social 
challenges, such as unemployment and poverty. Competitiveness 
is becoming an important issue in the debate on international 
development, particularly owing to  the continued marginalization 
of some developing countries, especially African countries, in 
international trade. Despite the reforms and improvement in the 
economic performance of African economies in the last few years, 
the continent continues to experience a strong decrease in its share 
of international trade. 
Despite the economic progress in the region, Egypt, Morocco 
and Tunisia countries are experiencing significant development 
challenges related to insufficient economic and social inclusion. 
Economic growth has thus been limited to some sectors and its 
fruits unevenly distributed among the populations.  Moreover, and 
despite relatively high growth rates, job creation has not kept pace 
with new entrants in the labor market and unemployment rates 
have thus remained sticky high, above 10 percent in the region and 
higher than in most other developing regions.
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Economists have traditionally focused on how government can 
encourage development by improving the fundamental determinants 
of investment and productivity growth: education and health 
services, infrastructure, governance. In this view, the transformation 
of a country’s economy to produce more sophisticated goods that 
embody higher technology, and concomitant increases in incomes, 
depends on improving these fundamentals, and not on the set of 
goods that the economy initially produces.  Thus policies can focus 
on the fundamentals, and ignore the structure of production that 
results.  By contrast, Hausmann (2005) shows that technological 
progress requires policies that looks beyond the fundamentals, for 
two reasons.  First, the initial structure of production influences 
future productivity growth.  In particular, countries with a more 
sophisticated export basket grow faster, even controlling for the 
initial level of income (Hausmann 2009).  Second, market failures 
such as  industry-specific learning by doing, knowledge spillovers, 
and the potential for coordination failures means that government 
has a key role in enabling firms to produce more sophisticated 
goods, and thus foster future growth. 
This view may offer important insights for the North African 
economies. While export growth has been rapid (averaging 15 
percent in Egypt, 7 percent in Tunisia and 5 percent in Morocco 
over the last decade), the structural transformation that typically 
accompanies rapid economic growth (Kuznets, 1955; Chenery, 
1986) has been limited. And the three countries did not improve 
their relative position in the world in terms of income per capita 
in the decade to 2009. Traditional products comprise a large 
proportion of exports, and the industry structure has remained 
largely unchanged over the past decade, even with the high growth 
rate. In turn, there was little technological progress or knowledge 
spill-over from more sophisticated industry. As a result, export 
growth did not lead to an adjustment of the industrial structure 
towards more sophisticated industries.  
Matters have not been helped by the slowdown in demand from 
key European markets over the past three years; the unrest of early 
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2011 in Egypt and Tunisia will create further short-term uncertainties 
even if the longer term result is renewed reform dynamism. 
Several trade strategies and export promotion policies have been 
undertaken by the governments of Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia; 
however, export sophistication is still below expectations. A strategic 
review of government policies in potential export industries is crucial 
to identify gaps and obstacles encountered in reforms initiated over 
the past decade and to address constraints which hinder Egypt, 
Morocco and Tunisia from improving the sophistication of their 
export products.  
The next chapter formulates policy recommendations to address 
the constraints limiting export performance in Egypt, Morocco 
and Tunisia, from three country studies. Each study describes 
the export sector, including the impact of previous governments’ 
export promotion policies and the current trade environment; 
the contribution of major stakeholders; and the effect of trade 
agreements. The studies conclude by identifying constraints that 
discriminate against exports, and recommending policies that would 
improve export sophistication in each of the three countries. 
Review of existing policies and identification of constraints

75
2. How to move up to higher growth in Egypt
Reforms beginning in 2004 to improve the business environment 
and facilitate trade boosted real export growth to 17 percent from 
2005-09, despite the 2009 decline (in nominal terms) with the global 
financial crisis (Table 1 and Figure 1). This remarkable growth rate 
is about three times higher than average growth in the region and 
in countries with similar levels of income. Exports are now falling 
with the political turmoil in the Arab states. However, the Ministry of 
Trade and Industry expects that exports will recover quickly once 
political disruptions subside, particularly given the destruction of 
productive capacity in Libya and Yemen. 
Review of existing policies and identification of constraints
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Source: Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics
Table 1: Real growth in total exports (goods and services, %)
1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2009
Egypt, Arab Rep. 3.53 10.38 17.42
Tunisia 3.96 4.18 4.63
Morocco 5.94 6.85 6.19
South Korea 17.09 12.41 5.22
MENA simple average 5.45 5.44 6.58
Lower Middle Income 
simple average 6.02 9.41 5.76
High income OECDs sim-
ple average 8.15 5.60 3.08
Source: WTI 2010, World Bank
Despite the impressive export growth for the recent years, exports 
are still not a major driver of growth in Egypt.  Exports equaled only 
34 percent of GDP in 2005-09, well below the levels of 57 percent 
in Tunisia, 45 percent in Korea, about 50 percent in MENA, and 43 
percent in other lower middle income coutnries (Table 2).  And the 
correlation between export and GDP growth from 2004-10 is only 
-.07 and 0.27 if the years affected by the global economic crisis 
(2009 and 2010) are excluded (Figure 2). This correlation is well 
below levels in most countries, for example 0.78 for Tunisia for 0.59 
for South Korea.  
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Table 2 - Export of goodds and services as % of GDP
1995-99 2000-04 2005-09
Egypt 18.57 21.98 33.71
Tunisia 42.84 45.70 57.50
Morocco 26.76 29.17 35.51
S. Korea 34.47 37.02 44.74
MENA 30.21 35.64 49.45
Lower Middle Income 37.81 40.98 43.50
OECD 39.83 45.65 50.41
Source:  WTI 2010, World Bank
The implications of this disconnect between exports and output 
are unclear.  The low level of exports relative to GDP may indicate 
considerable potential for further export expansion. 
Figure 2 - GDP and Export growth, 1961-2000
Source: COMTRADE 
The low correlation between the growth of exports and GDP, while 
not unprecedented given the low level of exports, may indicate that 
the recent export expanion reflects short-term effects rather than 
fundamental economic changes.
 
Thus important questions remain about Egypt’s export perfromance. 
Was the recent export boom driven by policy reforms? Is rapid 
export growth sustainable? What is the potential for upgrading 
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the product mix? This chapter considers whether the previous 
government’s export promotion policies were successful, and 
reviews in detail the current trade environment, including the 
contribution of major stakeholders, the experience with free trade 
zones,  and the impact of trade agreements. The overall goal is 
to formulate policy recommendations to address the constraints 
limiting export performance.    
Industrial Policy: Historical Background
Egyptian governments have undertaken active industrial policies 
since the 1960s, although the objectives and content have differed 
(Table 3). 
Table 3 - Industrial policies over time in Egypt
Period Contents of Industrial Policies Attitude towards exports
1960s
Centralized economy : nationalism, protec-
tionism and import substitution. Large pub-
lic investment in heavy industries, such as 
iron, steel and chemical industries.
Domestic production 
oriented, exports are 
not a priority
1970s
Openness euphoria : liberalizing trade and 
payment systems. However, import sub-
stitution was pervasive and manufactured 
exports remained stagnant.
1980s
Efforts to dismantle central planning and 
free zones and tax holidays used as invest-
ment incentives. However, openness was 
limited at the initial stage.
1990s 
- 2003
Structural adjustment program and eco-
nomic reforms: price and trade liberaliza-
tion, privatization, reforms in subsidies, tax, 
financial sector and unified exchange rate 
(but still pegged to the dollar).  Policy regime 
more market oriented than previously, but 
some controls remained. Some industrial 
parks were built.
Transitional period 
2004 
Trade regulation reforms, reduction in 
tariffs, floating exchange rate regime, 
business environment improvements, fiscal 
and banking sector reforms, more trade 
agreements and industrial parks, industrial 
policies shift from sector specific policies to 
overall policies, support for SMEs
Export oriented 
growth is a key priority, 
however, not as much 
as East Asia 
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Industrial policies 1960s - 2003
1960s
Egypt had a highly centralized economy under Gamal Abdel 
Nasser, who became the second President of Egypt in 1956. The 
first industrialization program, initiated in 1957, abandoned the 
unsuccessful efforts of the previous government to encourage foreign 
investment through tax incentives. The government nationalized 
large-size firms involved in services and  manufacturing, raised 
import barriers, subsidized production of some products (in part 
by allocating access to scarce imports), and increased investment 
in public enterprises, in particular in heavy industries, such as iron, 
steel and chemical industries. The economy performed relatively 
well, thanks to successive increases in the price of oil, although 
market prices remained distorted. 
1970s
Anwar Sadat, president from 1970 to 1981, initiated the Open Door 
Policy in 1974 (referred to as ‘Openness Euphoria’), which involved 
various reforms to accelerate growth and improve efficiency, 
including simplifying business regulations and liberalizing the trade 
and payments system to encourage foreign investment. 
The results, however, were disappointing. While the Open Door 
Policy involved some liberalization of the economy, the development 
strategy continued to be based on import substitution. Manufactured 
exports, other than textiles and clothing, remained virtually stagnant. 
Moreover, these policies did not contribute much to productivity 
growth. Page and Handousa (1986) found an important asymmetry 
in the impact of the reforms between the rapidly expanding import 
substitution sector with high productivity growth and the stagnant 
traditional export sector. Much of the observed productivity growth 
of the import substitution sector may be ascribed to improvements 
in capacity utilization, which were not sustainable.
1980s 
Vice President Hosni Mubarak ascended to the presidency after 
President Sadat’s assassination in 1981. The new Government 
dismantled the central planning apparatus and increased incentives 
Review of existing policies and identification of constraints
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for investors by creating free zones with tax holidays. However, the 
extent of reforms to open the economy was limited, while economic 
performance suffered from high international interest rates and the 
global recession in the early 1980s, plus the fall in the crude oil 
export price from $34 a barrel in 1981 to $12 in 1986.  As a result, 
the budget deficit averaged 18 percent of GDP over the decade, the 
current account deficit mushroomed, and external debt increased 
from $22.1 billion in 1980 to $31.1 billion in 1990. Inflation topped 
20 percent and unemployment reached 10 percent by 1990.
1990-2003 
In response to this crisis, a Paris Club agreement considerably 
reduced the country’s debt service burden, while a standby 
agreement was concluded with the IMF and a structural adjustment 
program with the World Bank. As a result, the current account and 
BOP deficits were reduced and turned to surplus over time. 
During this period Egypt relaxed price and interest rate controls, 
reduced subsidies, reduced inflation, and partially liberalized 
trade and investment. Also, the government started its first 
steps towards privatization. In turn, manufacturing became less 
dominated by the public sector, especially in heavy industries. 
These policies helped produce a gradual reduction in economic 
distortions and increased growth. As a result, Egypt graduated 
from the low income category to lower middle income category, 
according to the World Bank Country Classification. However, 
many features of the initial industrial policy remained in place – 
pervasive public ownership, high tariffs, and implicit subsidies of 
inputs, especially of energy.  
Assessment of industrial policies before 2004
Egypt’s structural deficit – failure to create jobs in productive 
sectors
Economic policies consistently aimed to promote industry, but 
the progress of structural transformation was slow. The shares of 
industry in GDP and employment have changed little since 1965 
(Figure 3). Agriculture’s shares of output and employment have 
fallen, with the decline in employment share less than the output 
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share, indicating that productivity in agriculture has not kept pace 
with other sectors. The decline in agriculture’s share of GDP and 
employment has been absorbed by the service sector. However, 
employment in high-productivity service activities, such as banking, 
insurance and finance, has grown very slowly, while employment 
in low-wage, low-productivity (and largely informal) sectors such 
as informal trade (e.g. street vendors) and small scale repair shops 
has grown rapidly (Page 2011).  
Figure 3
Economic structure and employment changes over time
Source: WDI 2010, World Bank 
Egypt’s experience contrasts sharply with that of South Korea, 
where the service and industry sectors have increased over time 
and nearly absorbed the agriculture sector. Interestingly, industry’s 
share of total employment has fallen slightly in South Korea, despite 
the increasingly important role of the industrial sector. This implies 
that productivity has increased more in industry than in agriculture 
and services. 
Review of existing policies and identification of constraints
82
Unproductive manufacturing sector and low manufacturing 
exports - Failure to industrialize 
Several studies have found that structural transformation is crucial 
for economic growth. Economies which increased their income 
level from the low income to high income typically have experienced 
economic structural transformation (Kuznets, 1955). Countries that 
are able to upgrade their production and exports by moving into 
new and more complex economic activities tend to grow faster 
(Hausmann, 2009). In Egypt, structural change has been limited; in 
particular the contribution of manufacturing to output and exports 
remains low. 
Table 4
Manufacturing export and manufacturing value added
Manufactures exports
(% of goods exports)
Manufacturing, value added
(% of GDP)
Country\
Year 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
 Egypt 27.12 10.95 42.47 38.43 36.65  N/A 12.25 17.76 19.39 13.90 
Morocco   9.68 23.51 52.25 64.09 65.45  N/A  16.87 18.99 17.46 16.05 
 Tunisia 19.11 35.72 69.11 77.00 75.37   8.40 11.79 16.89 18.25 15.00 
 Korea 76.53 89.55 93.52 90.75 89.59 17.79 24.45 27.26 28.26 27.68 
Lower 
middle
income 
16.98 22.76 43.99 51.56 48.35 14.67 16.18 17.77 17.01 17.13 
OECD
members 69.62 69.27 76.28 79.46 73.22  N/A 24.95 22.12 18.95 16.08 
Source: WDI. 2010 figures are substituted with the latest year figures for Tunisia, 
Korea, MENA and OECD.
 
Egypt’s share of manufacturing in goods exports is about half the 
share in net oil importers such as Morocco, Tunisia and South 
Korea (Table 4). Trends in the share of manufacturing in exports 
and GDP are difficult to interpret given the extreme variability in 
the price of Egypt’s oil exports. Thus the share of manufacturing 
in exports rose with the drop in the oil price in the 1980s, to a 
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peak of 42 percent 1990, although the rise in the oil price in the 
past decade resulted in only a modest decline in manufactures’ 
share. The difference between Egypt and other countries in the 
share of manufactures in GDP is much smaller than in the share 
of manufactures in exports. This implies that manufacturing 
production in Egypt is probably more for the domestic than the 
international market, compared to Morocco and Tunisia. This 
might result from the early years of the industrial policies, such 
as import substitution in the 1960s, which focused on domestic 
production, rather than exports. As a result, Egypt exports less 
than $100 in manufactures per capita, which is particularly low 
compared to other countries.
Lagging diversity and sophistication – failure to set the stage 
for future growth
Recent researches find that not only the volume of exports, but 
also the kinds of goods exported, matters for economic growth. 
Economies with more diversified export structures tend to have 
higher incomes per capita (Cadot, Carrere, and Strauss-Kahn, 
2011), and countries which export more sophisticated products 
tend to grow faster (Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik, 2007).
The weak development of manufacturing production and exports 
in Egypt was accompanied by little change in diversity and 
sophistication of exports.  Egypt’s export basket is less diversified 
than Korea’s exports, and even less than Tunisia’s and Morocco’s 
(Table 5). More importantly, the level of concentration has not 
decreased for several decades, while it has been slightly reduced 
in Tunisia and Morocco. Egypt’s top 5 export items, which make 
up 55 percent of exports, are petroleum and related items, natural 
gas, iron and chemical products. 
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Table 5 - Export product concentration index
1995-
1999
2000-
2004
2005-
2009
Egypt, Arab Rep. 26.42 30.07 29.66
Tunisia 21.88 19.93 18.07
Morocco 18.39 17.35 15.74
South Korea 14.78 15.28 15.82
MENA simple average 46.56 48 46.72
Lower Middle Income simple average 40.26 42.46 42.49
High income OECDs simple average 12.90 14.12 14.27
Source : WDI 2010, World Bank
Figure 4 shows Egypt’s export basket sophistication over time, using 
Hausmann’s measurement for the country’s export sophistication 
index (EXPY)7. The level of export sophistication has stagnated since 
the 1960s, except for the rapid increase in the mid-1970s and the 
slight rise since 2004. In contrast to Egypt, Asian countries, such as 
Korea, China and Thailand, rapidly increased the sophistication level 
of their export items over the same period. For instance, Thailand 
had a less sophisticated export basket than Egypt in 1960s but its 
current EXPY level is much higher than Egypt.  
7) The level of export sophistication (EXPY) can be indirectly measured by examining the wages of those countries pro-
ducing them. A product is considered more sophisticated if it is exported more intensively by high-income countries, 
and a product is considered less sophisticated if it is exported more intensively by low-income countries. Thus the 
sophistication of a country’s exports is revealed by the income content of the exports. Please see more details of EXPY 
in Chapter I. 
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As mentioned above, the current level of export sophistication can 
be a good proxy for future GDP growth. The current Egyptian export 
basket shows that previous industrial policies failed to increase the 
sophistication of exports, which could lead a lower level of future 
growth. Chapter II of the study investigates the implications of the 
diversity and sophistication of exports.  
Preferences for targeted industries have not improved 
performance - Failure of industrial policy  
Galal and El-Megharbel (2005) find that total factor productivity 
growth from 1980-2000 in 16 industries was modest, although 
the results exhibit significant variations across sectors and over 
time (Table 6). Moreover, they conclude that indicators of industrial 
policies, including effective rates of protection, subsidies, and 
barriers to entry, are negatively related to sectoral performance, 
while industries that operated in less competitive markets performed 
worse than industries that faced greater competition.  In short, the 
selective provision of incentives failed to improve the performance 
of targeted sectors. 
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Table 6 
TFP in Manufacturing Industries in Egypt, 1980-2000
Source: Galal and El-Megharbel (2005)
Still large public sector – failure to provide incentives for the 
private sector 
Over time, Egypt moved towards a more market-oriented economy. 
The Government implemented structural reforms, including fiscal 
and monetary adjustment, privatization, and reducing business 
regulation. However, many features of the initial industrial policies 
remain, particularly the preeminent role of the public sector in 
output and employment.  Excluding agriculture, over 40 percent 
of the economy is owned by the public sector, with a hefty chunk 
controlled by the army. Like other MENA governments, after 
independence Egypt encouraged formal schooling by offering 
explicit job guarantees for high school and university graduates. 
Employment in the public sector doubled from 16 percent of the total 
in 1960 to 32 percent by 1981 (Assaad, 1997).  Public employment 
exceeds 9 percent of the population in Egypt, about 50 percent 
higher than the average in the region and among countries with 
similar levels of income (Table 7). The numerous and secure public 
sector jobs reduced incentives for workers to look for jobs outside 
of the public sector or create their own business. 
Sector
Food Processing
Spinning and Weaving
Readymade Garments
Leather and Leather Products
Footwear
Wood and Wood Products
Furniture
Paper and Printing
Chermicals
Rubber, Plastic and Related Products
Porcelain, China and Ceramics
Glass Products
Non-Metal Products
Steel, Iron and Metal Products
Machinery and Equipement
Means of Transportation
Mean
Standard Deviation
-0.46
-0.04
0.67
1.61
-1.25
0.46
1.72
0.55
0.96
1.30
0.10
0.57
1.55
1.76
-0.06
1.29
0.67
0.84
1.48
0.96
2.16
-0.27
0.62
-0.30
0.75
-0.30
5.39
2.40
2.33
0.30
-1.56
-1.29
1.92
0.86
0.96
1.64
1.42
1.72
1.89
-0.90
2.44
1.70
-0.42
1.11
-0.57
2.78
3.01
0.88
-0.75
0.85
1.91
-0.48
1.04
0.26
0.67
0.59
0.59
1.32
0.77
5.44
1.17
1.06
-0.24
-0.65
-2.48
-0.14
-0.92
0.02
-1.38
-0.-96
0.30
0.67
0.75
0.81
1.33
0.44
0.65
1.83
0.81
0.61
1.39
1.47
0.47
0.40
-0.42
0.34
0.60
0.18
0.75
0.53
TFP Growth
1980/81-
1994/85
1985/86-
1990/91
1991/92-
1995/96
1996/97-
2000/01
1980/81-
2000/01
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Table 7 - Total Public Employment, 1996-2000
Egypt MENA
Non-Gulf 
states
Middle 
income
Total Public Employment (% of 
population, simple average) 
9.6 6.3 6.3 6.1
Source : UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA)
Ongoing efforts to shift industrial activity from the public to the private 
sector have achieved only partial success. Whereas in the mid-70s, 
the public sector dominated employment and output, by the 1990s 
the private sector contribution to output and the share of private 
value added rose to about 40 percent (Table 8). However, public 
sector ownership remained pervasive in capital intensive industries. 
Table 8 - Distribution of some industrial indicators between 
private and  public sectors
 1970-1974 1975-1991 1992-1997
No. of Firms
Public 19 16.2 12.9
Private 81 83.8 87.1
Total 100 100 100
Capital
Public 96.7 86.7 72.4
Private 3.3 13.3 27.6
Total 100 100 100
Output
Public 86.7 78.1 60.7
Private 13.3 21.9 39.3
Total 100 100 100
Value Added
Public 90.3 81.3 58.8
Private 9.7 18.7 41.2
Total 100 100 100
Source: Abdellatif (2003)
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Industrial policies since 2004
A cabinet reshuffle in 2004 was followed by a reform of the trade 
regime.  The government implemented its WTO commitments and 
reduced tariff rates on several imported items, including capital 
goods.  The average weighted tariff rate fell from 21 percent in 
1997 to 5.5 percent in 2009, with an average tariff rate of 5 percent 
on capital goods. As a result, Egypt’s Trade Tariff Restrictiveness 
Index (which indicates the uniform tariff rate that would maintain 
import levels unchanged) is below the level in Morocco, Tunisia, 
and Korea.
Figure 5- TTRI (MFN applied tariff)- All Goods
Source: International Trade Center, 2011
Egypt introduced a more flexible exchange rate regime in 2003 
to address concerns about overvaluation and unify the foreign 
exchange market. The Egyptian currency depreciated about 30 
percent against the dollar, which has contributed significantly to 
the recent export boom (Figure 6). 
89
Figure 6 - Exchange Rate and Export Volume
Source: WEO 2010, IMF 
Significant reforms have been implemented to simplify trade 
regulations and customs. Egypt has passed and amended over 
15 legislative acts since 2004, and customs procedures and 
firms’ registration and licensing processes have been simplified. 
The institutional and legislative framework for adopting technical 
standards has improved significantly. The national body in charge 
of technical standards, the Egyptian Organization for Quality 
(EOS), has played a major role in raising exporters’ and importers’ 
awareness of commitments under the Technical Barriers to Trade 
Agreement. Egypt is currently rolling out its TradeNet electronic trade 
document system to connect all agencies to a single electronic 
point of transaction. 
The Ministry of Trade and Industry established the Industrial 
Development Strategy in 2005, focused on enabling the industrial 
sector to be the engine of growth through the expansion of exports 
and job opportunities. Under the IDS, the Government identified 
strategic sectors to promote and set up public sector institutions 
to strengthen domestic capabilities through i) deepening human 
resources and entrepreneurship, ii) implementing national innovation 
and quality systems, iii) providing finance, iv) building infrastructure 
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and v) supporting enterprise-based competitiveness programs. 
The IDS also aimed to deepen Egypt’s integration into the global 
economy by promoting FDI and exports, and by enhancing social 
values conducive to development, while maximizing the social and 
environmental impact of industrialization. More detail of the strategy 
is given in Box 1.
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BOX I - Egypt’s Industrial Development Strategy, Industry: the Engine of 
Growth
 
The Ministry of Trade and Industry developed the Industrial Development 
Strategy in 2005, to focus on enabling the industrial sector to be the engine of 
growth through the expansion of exports and job opportunities. The strategy is 
centered around three major axes:
• Achieving higher growth in industrial production through encouraging 
regional and global integration through the aggressive promotion  of exports 
and FDI inflows
• Effecting a leapfrog in industrial productivity through a carefully-designed set 
of policies and programs aiming at leveraging industrial competitiveness
 Achieving a gradual shift in the industrial structure from resource-based and 
low-tech activities to medium- and high-tech industries.    
Targets 
Indicator
2005 
(Baseline)
2025 
(target)
Real growth rate in industrial production (%) 3.3 9.0
Share of Industry in GDP (%) 17.1 22.6
Foreign Direct Investment (LE Bn) 7 (for 2006) 27
Nominal investment in the industrial sector (LE Bn) 12 229
Direct Jobs Created (in Thousands) 101 1911
Export Propensity (Manufactured Exports % of MVA) 19.6 40
Manufactured Exports (LE Bn) 18 291
Targeted Sectors: IDS proposes the promotion of medium and high technology 
activities as new industrial niches for the Egyptian manufacturing industries. 
Engineering machinery and equipment (renewable energy);• 
Labour-intensive consumer electronics;• 
Automotive components;• 
Life sciences;• 
Biotechnology; and• 
Ethnic products• 
Selecting these strategic sectors does not imply discarding existing activities 
in the resource-based and low-technology category, but rather supporting the 
development of other sectors that will ensure the long-run competitiveness of 
the whole industrial sector. 
Cf) Traditional sectors : engineering, electrical machinery, food processing, 
chemicals and pharmaceuticals, textiles and garments, building materials, 
furniture, and paper and paperboard.
Review of existing policies and identification of constraints
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Assessment of recent industrial policies 
It is difficult to judge the impact of recent industrial policies on 
output and exports.  Egyptian economic performance was severely 
affected by the global financial crisis of 2008-09 and the 25th of 
January Revolution, and several years may be required for the full 
effects of reform to be seen. Nevertheless, it is remarkable that 
export volume growth exceeded 20 percent from 2004-08 (before 
the financial crisis), among the highest rates in the world (Figure 
7). The share of exports in GDP rose from 30 percent of GDP in 
2003/04 to 57 percent in 2008/09.
Figure 7 - Exports of Goods and Services ( annual % growth)
Source: WDI 2010, World Bank 
Since 2004, the overall business environment has improved. The 
World Bank’s Doing Business report has nominated Egypt three times 
as one of the world’s top ten performers in implementing reforms 
concerning government regulations to attract foreign investment. 
For example, the number of days to register property fell from 193 
days in 2008 to 72 days in 2011. However, competitiveness has 
not been improved over the same period, in comparison to other 
countries. Egypt has received a score of about 4 from the World 
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Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Index from 2006-10 
(Table 10)8, although the 25th of January Revolution’s impact on 
economy reduced the competitiveness ranking slightly in 2011.
Table 10
Global ranking, Competitiveness and business environment
Year GCI Score GCI Ranking Doing Business Ranking
2006 4.1 52 (117) 165 (175)
2007 4.1 63 (125) 165 (175)
2008 4 77 (131) 126 (175)
2009 4 81 (134) 114 (175)
2010 4 79 (133) 106 (183)
2011 3.88 94 (142) 94 (183)
Source: GCI Report & Doing Business 2011, World Bank 
Meanwhile, FDI inflows increased from an annual average of 0.9 
percent of GDP in 2000-04 to 8.9 percent in 2006-09. The current 
level of Egypt’s FDI is much higher than that of comparators (table 
11). FDI is focusing in the dominant extraction industries (i.e., 
oil, gas, iron and phosphates) and related up-stream processing 
(e.g., petro-chemicals and chemical fertilizers). However, FDI also 
is increasing in manufacturing and services. Highly subsidized 
electricity favors investment in the energy-intensive industries, and 
low labor costs attract investment in labor-intensive sectors. In case 
of the textile industry, for example, where Chinese labor costs about 
$150 per month, Egyptian labor costs between $46 and $100. 
Moreover, the Free Trade Zones and Trade Agreements, as well 
as proximity to the European and Middle Eastern markets, make 
Egypt an attractive country from which to source manufactured 
exports to other countries. However, foreign investment to produce 
for the domestic market remains low, and has not reached the point 
where foreign firms re-export their productions from Egypt to other 
countries.
Review of existing policies and identification of constraints
8) The Global Competitiveness Index score ranges from 1, the worst, to 6, the most competitive. The 2011–2012 Report 
covers 142 major and emerging economies. Switzerland received highest score, which is 5.74 while Chad received the 
lowest score, 2.87.
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Table 11 – FDI inflows, 2006-2009 average
Morocco Tunisia Egypt Korea
FDI inflows (% of GDP)  2.74  4.62 8.87  0.24
Source: WDI 2010, Word Bank 
Interestingly, Egypt has recently become an important destination 
for investment from emerging economies, such as China and 
India. In 2009, China was the largest foreign investor in Egypt, 
with investments exceeding $500 million. In October 2010 some 
22 agreements were signed between companies from Egypt 
and Guangdong, China, concerning investments totaling more 
than $250 million. The Egyptian Government actively encourages 
investment from China and India.  Egypt has developed Free 
Trade Zone for Chinese investors while a FTZ for Indian investors 
is under consideration. More than 1000 Chinese companies are 
now established and incorporated in Egypt. An additional 180 
Chinese companies are currently awaiting approval to participate 
in a designated FTZ near the Suez Canal. Investments totaling $3.5 
billion are expected from the latter, alongside the creation of some 
40,000 jobs.
However, less progress has been achieved in increasing the 
sophistication of exports. High-tech exports accounted for only 
1 percent of goods exports in 2009, compared to 7.1 percent 
for Morocco, 6.1 percent for Tunisia and 32 percent for Korea.9 
Moreover, structural transformation, in terms of employment and 
value added by sector, has not been noticeable since 2004, except 
for the decrease in industrial sector value-added after the global 
financial crisis (Figure 8)
9) The measure of high-technology exports includes products with high R&D intensity, such as in aerospace, computers, 
pharmaceuticals, scientific instruments, and electrical machinery.
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Figure 8 – Employment and Sectoral Composition Trend
Source: WDI 2010, World Bank
Exports are not a main driver of growth in Egypt. As discussed 
above, the correlation between export growth and GDP growth 
was minimal over this period.  Recent output growth was mainly 
driven by domestic demand. Even when net exports made a 
significant contribution to growth (in 2008/09),  it was driven by 
reduced  import demand during the economic crisis (Figure 9). 
Figure 9 - Contribution of Domestic Demand & Net Exports 
to GDP Growth 
Source: Ministry of Economic Development, 2010
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In summary, the reform program did achieve strong export growth 
before the financial crisis.  But the lack of structural transformation 
may mean that growth was a one-time response to exchange rate 
depreciation and import liberalization, rather than a fundamental 
improvement in export potential. 
Moreover, progress in improving the sophistication and 
competitiveness of the six sectors identified for support under 
the IDS has been uneven.  The identified sectors are roughly the 
same as identified as “strategic bets” in Chapter 1 of this study. 
As discussed,  this strategy emphasizes sectors that are more 
sophisticated and provide a larger strategic value, even if the 
Egyptian economy  may lack many of the requisite capabilities 
to support those industries. This strategy involves significant risk, 
but, if successful, could change the productive landscape, as it 
did in Korea. For this strategy to succeede, concerted efforts are 
requried to promote the accumulation of missing capabilities and 
to encourage pioneers in  these industries. 
Table - 13 Strategic sectors identified by IDS and its matches 
to product communities
Strategic sectors identified by IDS Product Communities
Engineering machinery and equipment (renew-
able energy) Machinery
Automotive components
Life sciences Chemicals and health re-
lated productsBiotechnology
Labour-intensive consumer electronics Electronics
Ethnic products N/A
Table 14 shows the strategic industries which were identified in 
Chapter I, based on different criteria:  jobs (near the current set 
of productive capabilities), parsimonious transformation (country’s 
current set of capabilities but with a higher sophistication) and 
strategic bets (provide a larger strategic value but might require 
new capabilities). 
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Table 14 - Strategic sectors identified in Chapter I
Figure 10 shows the performances of the strategic industries which 
were idenfied in the Industrial Development Strategy (IDS). The left-
hand graphs show the sophistication relative to the current export 
basket. Since 2005, relative sophisitcation improved in most of 
the identified sectors. For instance, in the life science and biology 
sector, sophistication has gradually improved and reached a peak 
last year. However, in engineering machinery and equipment, the 
current level of sophsitication is about the same as in the 1990s. 
The sophistication of labor-intensive consumer electronics recently 
fell below the level of the middle of the last decade. 
The right-hand graphs show the percentage of products inside 
each product community in which the revealed comparative 
advantage index (RCA) is less than one (see Chapter 1). The 
idea is to give a sense of how many products are produced with 
high competitiveness. In most sectors, the products with a RCA 
greater then one is just 6 percent of the total, meaning that the 
sectors are much below their potential. 
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Figure 10 – sophistication and competitiveness trends in 
strategic sectors
Engineering machinery and equipment (renewable energy)
Source: Authors calculations
Labour-intensive consumer electronics; 
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Key actors and institutional elements of Egypt’s industrial 
policies
In line with the active industrial policies since the 1950s, Egypt 
has numerous governmental and non-governmental agencies 
working on export issues. Here is a short summary of the key 
stakeholders. 
Support institutions in the Government
Top-level political commitment: Political commitment 
has supported and strengthened institutional co-ordination 
mechanisms. Ministerial committees, like the Ministerial Economic 
Policies Committee, have been formed to co-ordinate trade policy 
formulation, while others co-ordinate implementation by area of 
trade. However, it is not clear that co-ordination mechanisms are 
functioning well, especially since the Revolution. 
Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI): MTI monitors the legal and 
regulatory framework to promote trade and investment, including 
export and investment laws, public private partnership laws, the 
capital market law, and the export promotion law. MTI also provides 
various services, such as trader registration and licensing, training, 
and supervising economic zones. 
• Egyptian Export Development Strategy: In 2000, MTI developed 
the Export Development Strategy and identified export promotion 
as its priority. Under this strategy, new laws were established to 
promote export competitiveness and improve the coordination 
among ministries. Also, several entities were established to tackle 
specific barriers in trade, promote industrial transformation, and 
increase exports. 
The Ministry of Finance (MOF): The MOF oversees overall 
macroeconomic policies in order to increase Egypt’s competitiveness 
in international markets. At the micro-level, MOF is also directly 
engaged in supporting SMEs and preparing the framework for 
PPPs. 
Review of existing policies and identification of constraints
100
• Support for SMEs: MOF developed a strategy to promote SMEs 
in 2004 and offered special tax treatment to SMEs, financed 
through the Social Development Fund. SMEs account for more 
than 80 percent of employment in the non-agricultural private 
sector. 
• Support for Public Private Partnership (PPP):  MOF adopted a 
new policy of pursuing partnerships with the private sector to 
increase infrastructure investments. The GOE has taken the 
initiative to introduce a PPP program through the establishment 
of the PPP Central Unit within the Ministry of Finance.: 
The General Authority for Investment and Free Zones (GAFI): 
GAFI is the principal governmental authority concerned 
with regulating and facilitating investment. While it largely 
focuses on helping to establish new business, it indirectly 
promotes exports through various channels. Its functions 
include developing Industrial Zones, promoting Egypt’s 
potential sectors, attracting new investments and promoting 
re-investments and expansions, and providing services to 
investors through expanding GAFI’s “One Stop Shop”. Prior to 
the 25th of January Revolution, GAFI was under the Ministry 
of Investment. The Ministry has been abolished since the 
Revolution, and GAFI is currently supervised by the Deputy 
Prime Minister. However, this change has not had much impact 
on GAFI’s role in promoting exports. 
Export promotion agencies
Several government agencies support exporters in marketing, 
training, funding and market research. However, there are too 
many agencies playing similar roles, and not all agencies are cost 
effective. Lederman, Olarrega and Pyto (2009) found that export 
promotion can have a positive impact on export growth, although 
the impact increases with income per capita. Exports of goods and 
services per capita in Egypt are much lower than in countries with a 
similar level of per capita expenditures on export promotion. Some 
of the export promotion agencies are listed in Box I. 
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Box II. Export promotion agency 
The Egyptian Export Promotion Center (EEPC):•  The EPPC is a national 
export promotion agency that provides services for exporters ranging from 
marketing to funding. It also oversees the export councils and commodity 
councils. 
Export Councils:•  Export Councils are in charge of achieving the Ministry’s 
export targets. The Board Members identify and discuss problems in each 
sector and make recommendations to MTI. In 2005, MTI appointed a core 
group of 10 to 12 leading manufacturers per sectors and exporters. 
The Industrial Modernization Centre (IMC):•  Jointly funded by the EU, the 
Government and the private sector, the IMC’s Export Development Program 
provides support to exporters in organizing and participating in international 
exhibitions. The program is non-discriminatory for manufacturing sectors. 
For the services sector, only ICD and industry related services (e.g. transport) 
are covered at the moment. 
The Industrial Development Authority (IDS):•  IDS was established in 
2005, to maximize the contribution of Egyptian industry and to develop 
manufacturing strategies. IDS’s activities include studying the legislation 
connected with industry and drawing up industrial development studies. 
Egyptian Commercial Service (ECS):•  Under MTI, the ECS support exporters 
in obtaining business intelligence and organizing trade fairs through its offices 
around world.  
Foreign Trade Training Center (FTTC):•  The FTTC is an independent not-
for-profit training institute established under the MTI. 
Federations of Industries and Business Associations: • Federations of 
Industry oversee the operations and jointly tackle the barriers facing each 
industrial sector. Sixteen Industrial Chambers represent the most active 
sectors within the business C\community, and 10 commodity councils 
operate in different sectors.  
The Egyptian Bank for Exports Development: • The Bank was established 
in 1983 to provide trade finance to exporters, including short and medium 
term loans and guarantees. It currently offers six financing programs. For 
instance, its Agriculture Sector Development Program provides export 
loans of up to EGP 5 million to agricultural companies. However, its current 
functions are more like other commercial banks, rather than EXIM banks in 
other countries. 
The Egyptian Export Fund:•  The Export Fund was established under the 
Ministry of Finance to prove financial support to exporters. However its 
budget was reduced last May, when the Government cut the deficit target.
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Free Zones 
Egypt has established Free Zones since the 1970s to increase 
exports, attract foreign investment, introduce advanced technology, 
and create more job opportunities. Free Zones are considered 
offshore areas, and firms in Free Zones can be exempted from 
custom duties, sales taxes, or other taxes. Trade from free zones has 
increased over time (Table 13). Currently, investors operating inside 
the Free Zones export more than 50 percent of their production. 
In 2007/08 Free Zones accounted for 20.3 percent of Egypt’s total 
exports, and FDI in free zones represented 9.5 percent of Egypt’s 
total FDI, with nearly 136,000 employed. 
 
Table 13 – trade performance in free zones, 1997-2007
Source: CAMPAS 2011
Free Zones reduced related red tape and simplified administrative 
procedures. Some Free Zones offer complete exemption from 
private and corporate income taxes; financial incentives also take 
the form of low land rental and utilities rates. However, the incentives 
offered by Egyptian Free Zones have not been as diverse as in other 
countries. For instance, in Morocco and Tunisia, the free zones 
offer relaxed labor market regulations, while techno pole in Tunis 
provides training through collaboration with a local university. 
1997 481 1039 -558
1998 617 1029 -412
1999 505 884 -379
2000 600 853 -253
2001 947 1355 -408
2002 1228 1205 23
2003 1486 1322 164
2004 2308 2040 268
2005 3530 3160 370
2006 4167 3505 662
2007 5240 4839 401
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Recently there has been a trend to move away from traditional free 
zones, which tended to focus on importing goods and re-exporting 
to other destinations, to special economic zones or industrial zones, 
which provide diverse services to upgrade the industrial structure 
and boost exports.  Since 2007, Egypt has focused on industrial 
zones and investment zones, which depend more on facilitating 
administrative procedures and quality infrastructure (Box III).
Box III. New generation of Free Zones 
Industrial Zones:•  IZs are targeted at specific economic activities, say 
media or textiles, with infrastructure adapted accordingly. In 2006, the 
Government restructured its IZ Development Program to assign long term 
land development, management, and operation rights to private sector 
entities within PPP arrangements. In 2008, the first private industrial zones 
were established. Currently, there are 21 industrial zones in the new cities, 
and 75 industrial zones in the existing governorates. 
Investment Zones:•  Investment zones were created in 2007 under Law 
no.19, which allowed the establishment of investment zones as per a Prime 
Ministerial decree.
Qualifying Industrial Zones (QIZ):•  QIZs allow duty-free access between 
Egypt, Israel, and the United States. There is no quota in U.S. markets on 
goods manufactured in the QIZs, no restrictions on project ownership, and 
no time limits or renewal requirements. Also, imported materials are not 
subject to customs duties.
Trade Agreements and Trade Partners
Egypt has signed 8 trade agreements and 69 Bilateral Investment 
Treaties. The trade agreements greatly contributed to the recent 
increase in trade. For instance, trade with EU increased to 26.4 
percent of Egypt’s total trade in 2009/10 from 7.4 percent 2001/02 
when the Egypt-EU association agreement was signed. Also, Arab 
countries represented a 10.2 percent share of Egypt’s total trade in 
2009/10, up from 5.9 percent in 2005, when the GAFTA agreement 
was ratified (Figure 10). 
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Figure 10 – Export trend and FTA
Source: DOT 2010, IMF
However, Egypt’s share of trade with partners with trade agreements 
is still less than those of Morocco and Tunisia (Figure 11). This 
might be because Egypt’s trade partners are more diversified than 
Morocco and Tunisia. But this might also imply that there is more 
room to improve trade with partners with trade agreements such 
as Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and Custom Union (CU).
Figure 11- Trade with FTA/CU Partners (2005-09 average)
Source: Ministry of Trade and Industry
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Despite the high number of trade agreements, the outcome of 
each trade agreement varies a lot and not every trade agreement is 
fully utilized. One of the good examples is the Qualifying Industrial 
Zones (QIZs), allowing Egyptian goods to enter the US duty-free. In 
2005, the QIZs started operating with 397 qualified companies in 
7 designated industrial locations. The QIZs have rapidly expanded 
to encompass over 15 industrial zones with around 700 qualified 
companies, amounting to more than $1 billion in annual revenues. 
As a result, there has been a more than tenfold jump in Egyptian 
textiles and ready-made garments exports to the United States in 
the first four years of operation (Figure 12)  
                                 
In contrast to QIZs, there has been no increase in trade under the 
Agadir Declaration, which established a free-trade zone between 
Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia and Morocco. Though the customs 
agreement was fully enacted in 2007, the trade volumes among 
Agadir countries are insignificant. One of the issues raised by 
an exporter was that there is no direct shipment among Agadir 
countries, so transportation costs are higher than in trading with 
European countries, a view confirmed by PÉIDY (2007).  Thus it 
is important for Egypt to provide the trade facilitation measures 
needed to benefit from trade agreements. 
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BOX IV - Egypt’s Trade Agreements.
•  Egypt-EU partnership: EU opened their markets to Egyptian manufactured 
goods, while Egypt is phasing in access for similar European products. Each 
party enjoys Most Favored Nation status from the other for trade in services. 
The agreement specifies the creation of a free trade area over 12 years. 
•  Egypt-EFTA Partnership: EFTA (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and 
Switzerland)-Egypt Free Trade Agreement covers trade in industrial products and 
basic agricultural products. By 2020, customs duties on all industrial products 
will be eliminated. 
•  Qualifying Industrial Zones (QIZ):  QIZs allows duty-free access to the 
United States. 
•  Agadir: A free-trade zone between Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia and Morocco 
offers member states tariff- and quota-free access, as well as a rules-of-
origin advantage. The customs agreement was fully enacted in 2006 and 
2007. 
•  Greater Arab Free Trade Agreement (GAFTA): GAFTA has been ratified 
by 22 Arab nations for the phasing out of customs and duties, and the 
elimination of all non-tariff barriers including administrative, financial and 
technical barriers. 
•  Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA): COMESA 
is a full free-trade area among its 19 member states, providing Egypt with 
duty-free access to a market of more than 400 million consumers.
•  Egypt-MERCOSUR Agreement: Signed in August 2010, this agreement 
aims to establish clear, predictable and lasting rules to promote the 
development of reciprocal trade and investments with Latin American 
countries.  
•  Egypt has also signed a Free Trade Agreement with Turkey as well as 69 
Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), agreements between two countries 
for the reciprocal encouragement, promotion and protection of investments 
in each other’s territories by companies based in either country.  
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Thanks to these many trade agreements; Egypt has more diversified 
trade partners compared to neighboring countries.  The EU has 
about 30 percent and the United States 10 percent of Egyptian 
exports. Other trade partners include South East Asian and Arab 
countries. Egypt’s export market also has become more diversified 
over time (Table 14). Egypt’s main export regions are EU, Arab and 
Asian countries. At a country level, Italy, the United States, Spain, 
Syria and Saudi Arabia are the largest export markets, with around 
35 percent of total exports. Since 2006, exports to Arab, European 
and Asian countries have increased by 2-4 times, while exports to 
NAFTA countries have stagnated. 
Table 14 - Export Market Concentration Index
1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2009
Egypt, Arab Rep. 24.19 23.75 18.93
Tunisia 38.48 41.03 36.55
Morocco 35.93 39.33 31.04
South Korea 26.77 29.14 26.27
MENA simple average 37.09 35.21 35.05
Lower Middle Income simple 
average 44.87 44.14 39.42
OECDs simple average 32.43 31.97 28.06
Source: UCTAD 2011 
However, trade with neighboring countries is limited. Intra-regional 
trade in North Africa is less than 2 percent of foreign trade, the 
lowest ratio in the world, despite the existence of the trade 
agreement in the region. As mentioned above, one of the reasons 
why intra-regional trade is so low in North Africa is due to the high 
cost of trade among these countries. Therefore, increasing intra-
regional trade requires more than reducing tariffs; it also requires 
trade logistics and coordination. 
Intra-regional trade could create important benefits for North African 
countries. Free trade among Maghreb countries could result in a 
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gain in regional trade flows of over $1billion (Eizenstat and Hufbauer, 
2008). Also, intra-regional trade will give the countries greater 
weight in commercial and political negotiations with international 
partners. Moreover, weak regional integration prevents countries 
from integrating into global production chains because regional 
barriers to trade limit the scope for cross-border movement and 
two-way trade in parts and components. The location decisions of 
multinationals are crucially affected by the scope for sourcing inputs 
and moving them quickly and freely across national boundaries 
(Brenton, Baroncelli and Malouche, 2006). 
Constraints to increasing export sophistication 
Sustained growth, of the type of Asian coutrnies have managed to 
generate, requires something more than macroeconomic stability 
and openness. It requires active policies that promote economic 
diversification and foster structural change from low-productivity 
activities to mostly tradeable higher-productivity activities. 
Recent research finds that there is indeed unconditional convergence 
in individual manufacturing industries, meaning that industries that 
start at lower levels of labor productivity experience more rapid 
growth in labor productivity, regardless of domestic policies or 
institutions. Even within manufacturing some of the “escalators” 
move up more quickly than others. The trick is to get a toehold 
in automatic-convergence industries and to expand domestic 
employment in them (Rodrik, 2011). 
Rodrik argues that developing countries can reap productivity 
gains by supporting industries that benefit from unconditional 
convergence. While the Egyptian government has identified sectors 
that are quite similar to those selected by Rodrik as likely to enjoy 
rapid productivity gains (almost identical to the sectors identified by 
Hausmann as “strategic bets”), these gains have not been evident 
in Egypt over the past few decades.  An important question is why 
there has not been sufficient growth in sectors that have enjoyed 
rapid productivity gains in other countries?  What should the 
government do to foster greater growth in productivity?
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To encourage private sector activities in automatic-convergence 
industries, Government policies should focus on supporting 
activities which have a clear potential for providing technology 
spill-overs within these sectors. The Government should play a 
catalytic role to prevent coordination failures, in order to encourage 
firms to undertake actions they otherwise would omit due to the 
prohibitive cost, rather than providing preferential treatment which 
artificially raises the industry competitiveness. Also, the Government 
should focus on labor productivity, rather than providing capital 
accumulations in specific industries. The government also should 
not reduce the private sector competitiveness with existing red-
tape and corruption. Moreover, the energy subsidy should be 
diminished or better targetted to better allocate resources in 
strategic industries. 
 
A comprehensive approach is needed. 
 
The Government can play a catalytic role to reduce coordination 
failures, in order to encourage firms to undertake actions they 
otherwise would omit due to the prohibitive cost. However, 
supporting exports should be approached holistically. This issue is 
more complex than just signing a trade agreement or establishing 
an export promotion agency. Export-led growth should be 
prioritized as a national strategy and should be supported by 
various complementary activities. Macroeconomic stability, trade 
finance, R&D investment and trade logistics are only some of the 
examples. 
The key is to build institutional capacity to monitor export activities, 
identify the constraints, and effectively solve the problems. As 
discussed in the previous section, although there are numerous 
government entities and export promotion agencies, the 
coordination among government agencies and between the public 
and private sector is weak. Moreover, the government consultations 
with the private sector are needed to better target its efforts in the 
area of trade policy. 
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In the case of South Korea, the Government identified export-
led growth as the national priority and held a monthly Economic 
Committee meeting, chaired by the President. The Committee 
invited not only high-ranking Government officials, but also 
owners of private companies. During the Committee meetings, 
the Government reviewed the firms’ monthly export target, jointly 
identified the constraints to exports, and if the target was not met, 
attempted to solve the constraint jointly with line ministries. This 
works like the human body’s nerve system, which gives us a signal 
of sickness when our body goes wrong, so that we can solve the 
problem. What is missing in Egypt is the coordinating mechanism 
among institutions that would play the role of a nerve system.
Moreover, the principles underlyiing Egypt’s selection of industries 
to promote has differed greatly from those in South Korea. 
Korea’s industrial policies aimed to create new industries such 
as automobiles, electronics, and steel that were subject to 
considerable economies of scale.  By contrast,  Egypt protected 
industries and products that were already produced locally. Korea 
created its comparative advantage while Egypt is reinforcing the 
exiting one. Moreover, in Korea, the provision of incentives was 
based on an open competion, while the performance of subsidized 
firms in meeting export targets was continously monitored by the 
highest level of Government. Export targeting arrangements were 
specified in detaill by issuing licenses to individual companies 
allowing them to produce particular products, conditional on the 
compnay achieving specified export targets. This system helped to 
ensure that subsidies were allocated to firms that could contribute 
to Korea’s development.
Labor productivity should be improved
One of the reasons that Egypain exports are below potential is 
low growth in labor productivity, which results in low TFP growth. 
Abdellatif (2003) demonstrate that TFP growth was poor from 
1980-2000, and the major driver of growth during the open-door 
period (when manufacturing achieved rapid growth) was capital 
accumulation.  Kheir-El-Din and Moursi (2001) confirm that capital 
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accumulation was the main driving force of growth during 1960-
89. Egyptian industry was characterized by low levels of qualified 
workers, while restrictive labor laws made it almost impossible to 
fire unproductive workers. Thus previous growth driven by capital 
accumulation, wihtout acocmpanied by productivity growth. 
Reliance on capital accumulation to spur growth in Egypt is not a 
sustainable strategy. Hevia and Loayza (2011) illustrate that in the 
absence of improvements in productivity (through technological 
innovation, improved public management, and private-sector 
reforms), rapid growth would require a highly unrealistic incresae in 
national savings. Thus skilled labor shortages represent a binding 
constraint on economic growth in Egypt.  The above-mentioned 
QIZs provide an example of how low labor productivity limits export 
success, as shown in a recent workshop (box IV). 
Egypt needs to develop suitable educational and training programs 
to improve labor productivity. One practical approach is to offer 
vocational training for different groups of employees, including 
managerial level, middle managerial level and unskilled labor, and 
including informal sector workers (informal sector employment is 
55 percent of non-agricultural employment).  In addition, reforms to 
improve labor market flexibility are essential.  The competitiveness 
of Egypt’s labor market is a real concern in Egypt, which ranked 
last among a survey of 134 countries in the Global Competitiveness 
Report 2009. 
Transparency and accountability need to be enhanced 
Trancparency & accountability have worsened since 2000, as 
measured by Word Govenance Indicators has worsened since 
2000, as measured by World Governance Indicators (Table 15). 
Public procurement rules are often opaque. The 25th of January 
Revolution provides a golden opportunity for Egypt to tackle this 
issue.
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Table 15 - World Governance Indicators
1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2008
2006-09 
Latest
Government 
Effectiveness  -0.33  -0.33  -0.45  -0.37
Regulatory Quality  -0.02  -0.45  -0.35  -0.17
 Rule of Law  0.03  -0.01  -0.08  -0.09
Control of Corruption  -0.09  -0.41  -0.55  -0.67
Political Stability / Ab-
sence of Terrorism  -0.60  -0.65  -0.77  -0.67
Source: World Governance Indicator 2011 
In 2009 Egypt was ranked 111 out of 180 countries, as measured 
by the Corruption Perceptions Index. Private firms are strangled 
with corruption, which hampers economic development. The 
percentage of firms identifying corruption as a major constraint was 
45.2 percent, compared to 27 percent in Morocco and 8.5 percent 
in Korea (Table 16). 
Table 16- Enterprise Survey
Egypt All coun-tries
% of Firms Expected to Pay Informal Payment to 
Public Officials 15.23 27.5
% of Firms Expected to Give Gifts to Get an 
Operating License 13.45 15.56
% of Firms Expected to Give Gifts In Meetings 
With Tax Officials 5.28 16.51
% of Firms Expected to Give Gifts to Secure a 
Government Contract 32.04 25.26
% of Firms Identifying Corruption as a Major 
Constraint 45.2 36.25
Source: Enterprise Survey, World Bank 2008
Transparency and accountability is particularly low in tax and 
customs administration. A variety of factors contribute to corruption 
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there, including the complexity of laws and procedures, and the 
level of control and discretion granted to officials. 
In 2004, the new cabinet announced reforms in the tax and 
customs systems. In an effort to enhance transparency, the Ministry 
of Finance, the Egyptian tax authorities and the customs authority 
introduced simplified procedures and reduced personal contact 
between public officials and taxpayers. Efforts were also undertaken 
to improve the training of officials. Nevertheless, the government 
carried out no systematic review of integrity in either the tax or 
customs departments (OECD). According to the Doing Business 
Report 2009, bribery within the Egyptian customs authorities is 
still extremely widespread, particularly in lengthy import and export 
procedures. 
The strong ties between the state and the private sector impede 
efficient industrial policies. In particular, the protection of industry 
and targeting has been misused in Egypt. While protection in 
Egypt was formally uniform, in reality producers with access to 
political power and/or connections often had preferential access to 
incentives (El-Haddad, 2008). Thus targeted sectors often became 
even less efficient due to the lack of international competition 
and the support of the wrong players, in marked contrast to the 
experience of targeted support to boost exports in South Korea. 
The South Korean Government also adopted e-government to 
simplify tax and customs administration and reduce corruption, 
which resulted in a great success. This is discussed in Chapter III 
on South Korea’s experience.
 
The energy subsidy should be removed or at least better 
targeted
Despite the fiscal reforms implemented since 2004, subsidies still 
remain large. In fiscal year 2011/12, subsidies, including food and 
fuel, are expected to account for LE 133 billion of government 
spending, or about 10 percent of GDP, resulting in a serious fiscal 
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problem (the deficit target for 2011/12 is 8.6 percent of GDP). 
Addressing subsidies, in particular energy subsidies, will create fiscal 
space, improve social justice (since the benefits from subsidies are 
mostly captured by the well-off), and provide incentives for more 
rational use of the country’s natural resources.
Moreover, energy subsidies distort resource allocation. Valdés and 
Foster (2011) demonstrate that although trade liberalization since 
the late-1990s has reduced protection of some industries, some 
sectors, such as the food and tobacco sector, remain relatively 
highly protected, due to tariff and nontariff barriers, and energy 
subsidies. Energy subsidies are not formally sector specific but do 
favor sectors that are energy intensive. 
In Egypt, energy pricing is part of a strategy to promote certain 
industries by offsetting the implicit taxation that results from tariffs 
on intermediate inputs. For instance, in the cement sector, energy 
subsidies appear to almost exactly offset the negative impact of 
tariffs and indirect taxes. The fertilizer sector has zero nominal 
tariffs, benefiting agriculture, and thus a negative effective rate of 
protection due to tariffs on intermediate inputs. However, the fertilizer 
sector ends up with a very positive total effective rate of protection 
due to energy subsidies. Therefore, gradually reducing subsidies 
or better targeting the beneficiaries will improve the efficiency of 
resource allocation, which could improve the overall industrial 
sector competitiveness and channel resources to industries which 
are more strategic industries for economic growth (those industries 
which were identified as strategic bets in chapter I).
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Box V. Lessons from the ready-made garment industry
Despite the impressive success of the ready-made garment industry in QIZs, 
the sector growth rate has decreased rapidly over time, due to the low labor 
productivity growth. There is demand for skilled labor, but there is a failure 
to supply education and training. A recent workshop drew the following les-
sons:  
In order to address the productivity challenges in labor market
-  Identify how top management can better organize and run their factories
-  This focus should be at all levels, but particularly mid-level skills; mid-level 
management, industrial engineers, line supervisor, work-planners; and top 
management
-  Short-term training should focus on technical issues, including operator 
skills, engineering, production management, and quality control systems. 
-  Medium-term training should be in the areas of basic education (literacy, nu-
meracy, critical thinking) and soft skills (personnel management, motivation, 
health& nutrition)
In order to attract a reliable workforce
 
-  Improve the compensation package
-  Shift from the production of low-value clothing to high-value design produc-
tion
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3. How to move up to higher export growth in Morocco
After independence in 1956, Morocco adopted a restrictive 
import-substitution industrial strategy in order to foster industrial 
development and generate substantial transfers to national 
producers. By the early 1980s these policies led to a deteriorating 
macroeconomic environment, with rising inflation, budget deficits, 
and external debt.  The government responded with policies to 
restore macroeconomic stability, open the economy, and promote 
exports. 
Nevertheless, rapid export growth has remained elusive.  Morocco’s 
exports have increased at just above 6 percent per year since 
the mid-1990s (Table 1), a slightly higher rate than the MENA 
average but well below that of Egypt and the successful East 
Asian exporters. Over the past decade, Morocco’s share of world 
exports has stagnated at about 0.12 percent, and its trade deficit 
has widened steadily (Table 2). 
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Table 1 -Real growth in total exports (goods and services, %)
1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2009
Morocco 5.94 6.85 6.19
Tunisia 3.96 4.18 4.63
Egypt, Arab Rep. 3.53 10.38 17.42
MENA simple average 5.45 5.44 6.58
Source : WDI 2011, World Bank.
Table 2-Trade Balance as % of GDP, 2005-2010
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Morocco -8.7 -8.0 -7.6 -8.7 -11.4 -13.8 -15.0 -22.0 -21.9 -18.1 -21.4
Tunisia -11.6 -12.8 -9.2 -8.3 -7.8 -6.1 -7.3 -7.4 -8.9 -8.5 -10.9
Egypt -11.7 -10.4 -8.5 -8.0 -9.9 -11.6 -11.2 -12.5 -14.4 -13.3 -11.5
Source: WDI 2011, World Bank 
Despite some increase from the 1990s, Morocco’s exports still 
equal about 35 percent of GDP (Table 3), well below levels in Tunisia 
and South Korea (the relatively high ratio in MENA is due to the 
very large export revenues in the major oil exporters). Also, Tunisia 
and Egypt, Morocco’s main regional competitors, have achieved 
a higher level of sophistication and diversification of their export 
products (Hausmann 2011).
Table 3 - Export as % of GDP
 1995-1999 2000-2004 2005-2009
Morocco 26.76 29.17 35.51
Tunisia 42.84 45.70 57.50
Egypt 18.57 21.98 33.71
S. Korea 34.47 37.02 44.74
MENA 30.21 35.64 49.45
Source:  WDI 2011, World Bank
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Despite the geographic position of Morocco, the conclusion 
of free trade agreements (FTAs), improvements in the quality of 
infrastructure, and efforts to promote exports, the quality and 
quantity of exports remain below government expectations. This 
chapter aims to understand why Morocco has not fully achieved 
its trade potential. In order to identify constraints to improving 
Morocco’s exports, the success of the previous Government’s 
policies to promote exports is analyzed and the institutions created 
to support exports are reviewed. The chapter concludes with a 
discussion of the major constraints on Moroccan exports, including 
human capital, the business environment, the quality of logistics, 
and policies that discriminate against exports.     
Industrial policy: Historical Background
Activist industrial policy (1956-1980)
Since its independence in 1956, the government has intervened 
in favor of specific private entrepreneurs, firms, industries and 
regions. In the 1960s and 1970s, the government adopted an 
import substitution strategy, which accorded investment incentives 
and tariff protection to key sectors.  Government ownership of most 
financial institutions facilitated the allocation of subsidized credits 
and loans10 to selected sectors, including manufacturing, tourism, 
housing, and agriculture. The agricultural sector was the highest 
priority for government support.11  The process of “Marocanisation” 
(the transfer of ownership of firms from foreigners to nationals), 
which was completed by 1975, resulted in the nationalization of 
a important number of existing firms, while the government also 
created state enterprises in new sectors, such as automobiles and 
chemicals.
Review of existing policies and identification of constraints
10) Refers to loans with a long credit repayment period, and fixed interest rate, with 60-70 percent of investment financed 
through governmental loans.
11) As reported in the second economic development plan adopted in 1965.
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Evolution of industrial strategies and the changing pattern of State 
intervention 
1959-1980 
1981-2005 
2006-up 
to now 
These policies led to a sharp rise in investment (particularly public 
investment) as a share of GDP in the late 1960s and 1970s (figure 
1).  They also resulted in a rise in external debt to 69 percent of 
GDP, in the current account deficit to 12 percent of GDP, and in 
inflation to 12.5 percent (table 4), which prompted the government 
to embark in 1983 on an Economic Reform Structural Adjustment 
Program (ERSAP).
■ Import-substitution industrial strategy through means 
such as according investment incentives and custom 
protection for industrial goods and services. 
■ Credit policy: benefits to private investors in selected 
sectors of the economy, including manufacturing, 
tourism, agriculture, housing. 
■ «Marocanisation» process: transfer of ownership 
from foreigners to nationals. 
■ Diversification strategy: creation of new firms in 
several sectors of the economy (chemical industry; 
motor vehicle industry).
■ Structural Adjustment Policies (ERSAP): Open 
market and export oriented system to achieve 
macroeconomic stabilization and higher growth 
rates. 
■ Trade liberalization  
■ Privatization 
■ Sectoral policies, ranging from agriculture, 
manufacturing to services (especially  tourism and 
textile industry)
■ «Emergence» Program: export-led growth strategy 
based on: (1) clusters creation and (2) industry 
modernization process. 
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Figure 1 - Investment as % of GDP, 1960- 1980
Source: Word Development Indicators 2011, World Bank
Table 4 - Selected Macroeconomic indicators 1975- 1981
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
GDP growth (annual %) 7.6 10.8 6.1 2.2 4.8 3.6 -2.8
External debt stocks 
as % of GDP 29.6 35.1 50.8 52.3 51.6 51.7 69.2
Current account 
balance (% of GDP) -5.6 -14.3 -16.5 -9.9 -9.4 -7.5 -12.0
Inflation, consumer 
prices (annual %) 7.9 8.5 12.6 9.7 8.3 9.4 12.5
Source: WDI 2011, World Bank
The opening of the economy in the 1980’s
The ESRAP was intended to restore macroeconomic stability and 
promote export-led growth.  Restrictive fiscal and monetary policies 
led to a sharp fall in inflation (to below 2 percent), a sharp reduction 
in the fiscal deficit from 11.6 percent of GDP in the 1980s to 3.8 
percent in 2003, and a significant surplus in the balance of payments 
(due mainly to tourism and transfers of Moroccans residing abroad). 
In 1993 the government initiated a privatization of public enterprises 
that through 2003 covered 66 (out of 113 planned) entities, and 
abolished price controls and marketing monopolies for almost all 
goods and services except certain transport (rail transport, port and 
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airport services etc.) and crude phosphates. The trade regime was 
liberalized in 1996 through the replacement of quantitative import 
restrictions with tariffs on the majority of products. Steps were 
taken to promote private sector investment (especially for export 
production) through fiscal, customs, and financial incentives; the 
adoption of a new Investment act in 1995 (see below) and the 
establishment of free trade zones.
        
The government also continued to pursue selective industrial 
policies. The Hassan II Fund for Economic and Social Development 
was set up in 2000 to provide financial assistance (30 percent of 
the cost of professional buildings and 10 per cent of the cost of 
capital goods) to investment projects in four specific industrial 
sectors. Other instruments were used to support various sectors, 
in particular the textile and clothing industry, which is the country’s 
largest export industry and biggest employer. The National 
Agency for SME promotion launched several programs including 
“Mossanada12”, “Imtiaz” and “programme de mise à niveau”, to 
support small and medium-sized enterprises and help upgrade 
their managerial, technological and organizational infrastructure.
The Emergence Plan, announced in November 25 2005, is an 
integral part of the Government’s economic development program. 
The Plan is a target-oriented industrial strategy designed to raise 
GDP by 91 billion MAD and create up to 220,000 jobs. This 7-year 
strategy (2009-2015) is expected to reduce the trade deficit by 
50 percent and increase GDP growth by 1.6 percentage points 
per year. While supporting Morocco’s traditional textile and agro-
business sectors (which account for 50 percent of industrial value 
added), the new plan focuses mainly on new growth motors, 
especially high value added industries.
The Emergence Plan has essentially three goals: (i) attracting foreign 
investment; (ii) developing more sophisticated and competitive 
products in emerging sectors; and (iii) reorienting key manufacturing 
exports toward markets with potential for expansion. The Plan 
12) Arab word which means support
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proposes an export-led industrial strategy based on two pillars: 
(1) the active targeting of six growth engines that should constitute 
the future world-class jobs in Morocco (Off shoring, Automobile, 
Aerospace, Electronics, Textile, and Food); and (2) an industry 
modernization process, through programs such as “Mossanada” 
(support), “Imtiaz” (Excellence)  and an up-grading program.
The Emergence Plan is a national pact for industrial emergence 
involving the commitment of public and private actors. The public 
institutions involved in this new strategy are the Ministry of Justice, 
Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Economic and Finance, Ministry 
of Agriculture, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Employment and 
Vocational program, Ministry of Industry, Trade and ICT, and Ministry 
of Foreign Trade. The professional group of banks of Morocco and 
the General Confederation of Moroccan Enterprises represent the 
private sector
Assessment of the industrial policies
Industrialization strategy - difficulty to emerge from an 
agricultural economy
Morocco’s industrial policies aimed to promote industry, from the 
import substitution in the 1960’s to exporting industries in 1980’s 
and after that to sectoral policies in 2000’s. Laabas (2009) found that 
most Arab countries follow a primary production led industrialization 
strategy. He noted that only Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco and Tunisia 
are considered to have a manufacturing based industrialization.
Over the period 1990-2010, industry’s contribution to GDP has 
stagnated, while the share of industry in total employment decreased 
from 36.4 per cent in 1990 to 21.7 percent in 2008 (Figure 2). This 
implies that the growth of productivity per employee has increased. 
In terms of trade, manufacturing exports represented 65.5 percent 
in 2010 compared to 23.5 percent in 1980. However, during the 
period of 1990-2010, the manufacturing export has relatively 
stagnated (Table 5).
Review of existing policies and identification of constraints
126
Table 5 - Manufacturing export % of total export, 1970-2010
 
Manufactures exports
(% of goods exports)
Country\Year 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
 Morocco      9.68    23.51    52.25    64.09    65.45 
 Tunisia    19.11    35.72    69.11    77.00    75.37 
 Egypt    27.12    10.95    42.47    38.43    36.65 
 Korea    76.53    89.55    93.52    90.75    89.59 
 Lower middle income    16.98    22.76    43.99    51.56    48.35 
Source: WDI 2011, World Bank
The progress of structural transformation was relatively slow. The 
size of agricultural sector has not changed much relative to output. 
For the period 1980-2009, the average agriculture contribution to 
GDP was 16.7 percent, much higher than Tunisia, where agriculture 
contribution to GDP was 7.8 % over the same period.  However, 
the agriculture’s share of employment has strongly increased; in 
2008 more than 40 percent of employees worked in the agricultural 
sector. This implies that the growth of productivity per employee 
has been lower in agriculture than in other sectors. 
Figure 2  - Economic Structural Changes in Morocco, 
1990-2008
Source: WDI, World Bank 2001
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The annual economic growth rate of about 4.8%, recorded over the 
last five years is volatile and strongly dependent on meteorological 
conditions (Figure 3). Indeed, climatic factors have had a major 
impact on the performance of the strategic agricultural sector and 
consequently on the country’s economic growth rate trends, partly 
because of the fragile nature of cereals which constitute the main 
crop in Moroccan agriculture. Over the 1990’s, droughts have 
become a recurrent phenomenon in Morocco. While this impact 
has been relatively mitigated over the last five years, meteorological 
conditions still remains a crucial factor in the country economic 
development. For example, and despite the 2008/2009 financial 
crisis, the economic growth rate decreased only from 5.6 percent 
to 4.9 percent thanks to the significant rainfalls in the country in 
2009, meaning that agricultural sector still play an important role in 
the Morocco’s economic development.
Figure 3 - Trend of GDP growth rate, 1990-2010
Source: WDI 2011, World Bank
Lagging diversity and sophistication – failure to reach higher 
and sustainable growth rates
The results of ESRAP have not been fully satisfactory. Until the 
beginning of the 2000’s, economic growth was led by domestic 
demand than exports. The limited growth and small size of 
Morocco’s exports are described in the introduction. Morocco’s 
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exports are highly concentrated (Figure 4) in sectors (e.g. agriculture, 
phosphate and tourism) that are subject to major price and volume 
fluctuations. Moreover, the concentration in traditional products 
limits the potential for knowledge spillovers that can be generated 
in more sophisticated sectors. The industrial policies have not 
completely succeeded in transforming the supply structures and 
placing the Moroccan economy on the new path to growth in which 
the non agricultural sector and technology-intensive exports play a 
more central role.
Figure 4
Herfindahl Index of Diversification of Exports 1995 and 2010
Source: UNCTAD, 2011
Morocco is perceived as a low-cost platform for products destined 
for European companies. It is clear that this positioning will need to 
be changed towards the production of more sophisticated products. 
While Morocco has achieved some increase in the sophistication 
of exports since 1960 (Figure 5), structural shortcomings are 
hampering export growth and preventing Morocco from exploiting 
its comparative advantages. 
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Figure 5 - Export sophistication Index (EXPY), 1960-2010.
Source: Hausmann (2011) 
In contrast to Morocco, Asian countries, such as Korea, China and 
Thailand, rapidly increased the sophistication level of their export 
items over the same period. For instance, Thailand and Egypt had 
a less sophisticated export basket than Morocco in 1960s but its 
current EXPY level is much higher than Morocco. 
 
In order to achieve sustained development, Morocco needs to 
increase its exports and change the structure of its economy. The 
current level of export sophistication may determine future growth 
(Hausmann 2011), thus Morocco needs to act now to improve export 
sophistication to achieve more rapid growth over the next decade.
Emergence plan - A plan to provide larger strategic value
Table 5 - Hausmann’s Strategies for Morocco
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Table 5 shows the strategic industries which were identified in 
Chapter I, based on different criteria:  jobs (near the current set 
of productive capabilities), parsimonious transformation (country’s 
current set of capabilities but with a higher sophistication) and 
strategic bets (provide a larger strategic value but might be a new 
capabilities). 
Table 6 
Recent industrial strategy: Emergence plan 2009-2015
Objective for the period 
2009-2015
Targeted 
Sectors
Product Communities
Create sustainable industrial 
employment and decrease 
urban unemployment;
Automobile Machinery
Increase industrial contribution 
to GDP;
Aerospace Aircraft
Reduce Trade deficit; Electronics Electronics
Support industrial investment 
both national and foreigner.
Textile
Textile & Fabrics/Gar-
ments/ Leather
Food industry
Food Processing/ Meat 
and eggs/ Milk & cheese
Table 6 relates the strategic sectors identified by the Emergence 
Plan and the product communities introduced in Chapter 1. The 
sectors selected in the Emergence Plan are close to the ones 
identified by Hausmann as “strategic bets”, that is, sectors that are 
more sophisticated and provide a larger strategic value. This strategy 
is riskier than focusing on sectors that are closer to the country’s 
current production, but if successful, could change the productive 
landscape, as in Korea. To promote this strategy, concerted efforts 
are requried to coordinate the accumulation of the missing capabilities 
and to encourage pioneers in these industries. 
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Figure 6 - Evolution of export products within each selected 
sector of the Emergence Plan
Source : International Trade Center 2011.
Note: value exports in million USD
It is clearly too early to evaluate the impact of the Emergence Plan. 
However, one positive sign is that machinery and electronics exports 
increased after the 2008-09 financial crisis (Figure 6); in 2010 exports 
of machinery and electronics overtook textiles as the second largest 
export sector, accounting for 18 percent of total exports.
   
Figure 6 shows the performances of three of the strategic industries 
which were idenfied in the Emergence Plan. The left-hand graphs 
show the sophistication relative to the current export basket. Since 
1990’s,  relative sophisitcation improved in most of the identified 
sectors. For instance, in the Machinery and electronics sector, 
sophistication has gradually improved and reached a peak in 2009. 
However, in garment and leather industries, the current level of 
sophsitication strongly decresed  since 1990.
 
The right-hand graphs show the percentage of products inside 
each product community in which the revealed comparative 
advantage index (RCA) is less than one (see Chapter 1). The 
idea is to give a sense of how many products are produced with 
high competitiveness. Morocco has a presence in the Textile & 
Fabrics and Leather product communities and Machinery and 
Electronics products communities below 40 percent, which suggest 
that there is some room for developing these products.
Review of existing policies and identification of constraints
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Figure 7 - Sophistication and competitiveness trends 
in strategic sectors
Textile and Leather
Source : Authors’ calculations
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The main actors and institutional elements of Morocco’s 
industrial policies
To carry out its export promotion strategy, the government has 
created institutions to support trade, improved the necessary 
infrastructure for firm activity (in particular exporting firms), and 
concluded FTAs with its main trading partners.  
Support institutions
The Government has accompanied its opening to the global 
economy by creating institutions to help emerging exporters 
overcome information and other market failures that impede entry 
into new markets. Moroccan authorities have played a useful role 
in helping domestic producers to raise their exports and improve 
the quality of their products, to better cope with the increased 
competition from global markets. Here is a short summary of the 
key stakeholders.  
Export Promotion Center: Maroc Export 
Created in 1976, Maroc Export Center supports SMEs in the export 
of industrial, artisanal and food products by providing business 
information and organizing promotional activities and meetings 
with potential trade partners. With a wide range of services and an 
international professional network, Maroc Export aims to enhance 
the position of Moroccan products in international markets.  Maroc 
Export subsidizes the participation of groups created under the 
program of export consortia, by providing grants of up to 85 percent 
of the cost of participation in international fairs and exhibitions. 
Maroc Export works closely with the national Foreign Trade Council 
(CNCE), the Moroccan Company of Credit Export Insurance (SMAEX), 
and the Moroccan Association of Exporters (ASMEX).  The center is 
under the supervision of the Ministry of Foreign Trade.  
National Agency for SMEs Promotion (ANPME)
Since its creation in 2002, the National Agency for Promotion 
of SMEs (ANPME) has been at the heart of Moroccan business 
Review of existing policies and identification of constraints
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support. Its main missions are to: (i) raise the competitiveness level 
of SMEs through various support programs (Imtiaz and Moussanda), 
and (ii) contribute to improving the general environment of SMEs. 
The agency hosts the Project Management Unit of the Industrial 
Modernization Program financed by the European Union. Since 
the creation of export consortia, the ANPME provides technical 
support to groups of companies wishing to establish and / or 
develop an export consortium13, covering the costs of expertise 
needed to carry out targeted consulting actions, promotion and 
technical assistance.
Box I. The UNIDO export consortia program: the case of Morocco
Since 2004, UNIDO has been supporting the Moroccan Ministry of 
Foreign Trade and the Moroccan Exporters Association (ASMEX) in 
establishing an export consortia initiative with funding by the Italian 
Development Cooperation. Important results have been obtained thanks 
to the efforts undertaken to create a national incentive framework for 
export consortia
Both public and private players are strongly committed to ensure the 
sustainability of the export consortia initiative after UNIDO project’s 
completion: the Ministry of Foreign Trade is dedicated to improving the 
legal and incentive framework for export consortia and the Moroccan 
consortia have established an association following the example of the 
Italian Federation of Export Consortia (Federexport).
The export consortia project in Morocco was assessed in 2008 by an 
independent evaluation. The project was considered to be extremely 
relevant to Morocco’s national priorities, as underlined by an active public 
private partnership throughout its implementation. In Morocco, export 
consortia are now viewed as an effective tool for boosting SME’s exports 
and promoting enterprise upgrading, with member companies recording 
benefits in both areas.
Source:  OECD
13)  A voluntary alliance of firms with the objective of promoting the export of goods and services through joint actions.
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Figure 8 - Mission and functions of the agencies under 
supervision of the Ministry of Foreign Trade
Source: Authors 
Since independence Government has involved numerous 
governmental and non-governmental actors in developing the 
export sector, and has spent a large portion of the budget on 
these agencies. Thus it is important to evaluate the impact of these 
agencies on export growth.  Lederman, Olarrega and Pyto (2006) 
found that export promotion can have a positive impact on the 
export growth, but that results have been disappointing in MENA 
region. They estimate that one dollar invested in export promotion 
can yield up to $227 in exports in Asia and $137 in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, but only $96 in MENA.  The Tunisian Export Market Access 
Fund (FAMEX) was estimated to generate only $20 of additional 
exports.  
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Source: Authors 
Promotion ObservatoryEvent
• Targeting products  
• Targeting markets 
• Implement measures and 
accompany activities to make 
Study Perspective markets,  
• Arranging B-B meeting and B-
G meetings,  
• Caravane mission – seminar 
for sellers in Africa and Arab 
countries 
•  Communication activities 
• Sectorial promoting campaign, 
helping companies in auditing 
• Formulating an advisory 
opinion on any matter relating 
to external trade relations; 
• Making suggestions to 
enhance the competitiveness of 
Moroccan products and 
services  
• Preparing an annual an 
assessment on the evolution of 
foreign trade 
• Awarding annual prizes of 
national export 
• Organizing exhibitions, 
conferences and business 
meetings
•   Strengthening the role of 
professional fairs to improve 
the image and reputation of 
Morocco at international 
levels.
Ministry of Foreign
Trade
Morocco Export
Promotion Center
(Maroc Export)
Office of fairs and
exhibitions
National Foreign
Trade Council
(CNCE)
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Box II. Export promotion agencies
■ Moroccan Company of Credit Export Insurance (SMAEX):  SMAEX 
is a public-private company created in 1989 as one of the main in-
struments of the Moroccan export promotion strategy.  SMAEX pro-
vides credit insurance, which protect exporters against the risk of 
non-payment, and public export insurance, which provides guaran-
tees against political risks, catastrophic and non-transfer.
■ National Foreign Trade Council (CNCE):  The CNCE was estab-
lished in 1996 to implement synergies between public and private 
sectors. Its main functions are: (i) providing advice on matters relat-
ing to external trade; (ii) making suggestions to enhance the com-
petitiveness of Moroccan exports; (iii) publishing an assessment of 
the evolution of foreign trade; and (iv) awarding annual prizes (export 
trophies) to the most deserving exporters in view of their business 
performance in foreign markets. 
■ General Confederation of Moroccan Enterprises (CGEM): Cre-
ated in 1947, the CGEM is a private association of Moroccan entre-
preneurs. More than 95 percent of its members are small enterprises. 
The CGEM aims to rule on various perspectives of SMEs develop-
ment in various sectors, including incentives for the creation of SMEs 
export consortia.
■ Moroccan Association of Exporters (ASMEX): The Moroccan As-
sociation of Exporters is a private association created in 1982 of indi-
viduals and firms involved in exporting. The ASMEX works to amplify 
the voice of the private sector on international trade issues. 
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Trade agreements
Since the 1980’s, Morocco has formally signed a number of 
integration agreements. The Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA) 
was concluded with the 22 Arab League members in 1981, and has 
been effective since 1998. Morocco also has concluded bilateral 
FTAs with some of its GAFTA partners, notably Jordan, Egypt and 
Tunisia in 1999.  Morocco is a member of the Arab Maghreb Union 
(AMU) with Algeria, Mauritania, Libya and Tunisia, and the European 
Union has provided institutional and financial support to economic 
cooperation among these countries. 
The signing of the Euro-Med Agreement with European Union and 
its implementation in 2000 imparted a powerful momentum to 
Moroccan exports (Figure 8). Morocco now exports more than 60 
percent of its total exports to Europe, especially to Western Europe 
countries. 
Morocco signed a FTA with the United State and a bilateral FTA with 
Turkey in 2004. The US-Morocco FTA is expected to give increased 
export opportunities to Moroccan producers in the agriculture and 
services, while the Turkey-Morocco FTA should enable Moroccan 
firms to use Turkish textiles in clothing production, without losing 
preferential access to the EU Market.  FTAs with the United States 
and with Turkey have rebalanced the Euro-Med Agreement signed 
earlier which does not cover agricultural and services products (see 
Appendix 1, Table 1) 
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Figure 9 - Morocco’s Trade in per cent of GDP, 1980-2010
Source: UNCTAD 2011
By concluding preferential trade agreements with bilateral and 
regional trading partners, Morocco has increased its trade (imports 
plus exports) from an average of 57 percent of GDP in 1990’s to 70 
percent in 2000’s.  Also, FTAs have been an important argument 
to attract foreign direct investment. The Moroccan Investment 
Development Agency points to free trade access to the one billion 
consumers of Morocco’s trade partners as the third top reason to 
invest in Morocco.
Unfortunately, the exclusion of agriculture and services sectors in 
most of the PTAs and FTAs limits their benefits.  The government 
needs to include services (55 percent of GDP) into current and 
future trade agreements. 
 
Economic infrastructure
Industrial parks- Key element for sectoral policies
In the industrial economic literature, the development of industrial 
zones is considered an instrument of great importance in economic 
and industrial planning. Towards the end of the 1970s, Morocco 
launched a program to develop industrial zones. However, owing to 
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structural changes that affected the economy at the beginning of the 
1980s which involved the implementation of ERSAP, the program 
did not really achieve its objective. With the Emergence Plan, the 
government has developed industrial parks, technoparks and free 
trade zones to serve both domestic and foreign investors. 
 
Morocco has about 70 industrial zones, of which roughly half are 
operational, two operational free trade zones, and seven technoparks. 
Created in 2001, the Casablanca technopark is the first Moroccan 
industrial park specialized in ICT. Other technoparks are still under 
construction and some of them are not totally operational, so an 
assessment of their performance would be premature. 
Figure 10 - Technoparks and Ports in Morocco
Source: Authors 
Attract more FDI in industry 
The government has taken several steps to attract foreign investment. 
The new investment Figureer introduced in 1995 gives foreigners 
the right to invest in Morocco without prior authorization and the 
right to transfer profits and repatriate capital without limits on the 
Review of existing policies and identification of constraints
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amount or duration. In the context of the privatization program, full 
foreign ownership of Moroccan companies was allowed in certain 
sectors (especially manufacturing). 
Measures have been taken to improve the legal environment and 
the so-called “Welcoming Services” for foreigners. In 2007 the 
government adopted a series of measures and legal provisions to 
simplify procedures and secure appropriate conditions for investment. 
The Moroccan Investment and Development Agency (MIDA) were 
created in 2009 to oversee the promotion of investment. MIDA is a 
financially autonomous public institution which provides guidance 
for investors. Combined with actions carried out by the Hassan II 
Fund14 for development, these measures have contributed to the 
rapid increase in foreign investments in Morocco (Figure 10). 
As noted above, the FTAs concluded by Morocco have had 
a positive impact on FDI inflows. Morocco is considered as a 
springboard for foreign investors to re-export to Europe and MENA 
region. The French car factory Renault in Tanger aims to produce 
500 000 cars/ year by 2015 and export 90 percent of the total 
production to more than 52 countries which have concluded FTAs 
with Morocco. 
Figure 11: Foreign Direct Investment, stock of net inflows 
1980-2010
Source: UNCTAD 2011
14) Created in 2007, Hassan II Fund for Economic and Social Development allocates US 12.9Mn to development pro-
jects
-
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Over the period of the 1980-2010, Morocco was one of the most 
important recipients of FDI inflows in the MENA region. However, 
more than 25 percent of Moroccan FDI was in telecommunications, 
owing to the sale of mobile licenses and the opening of Maroc 
Telecom to foreign investors since 1999.  Overall, FDI remains 
concentrated in services, including tourism, telecommunications 
and banking (Figure 11).
   
More efforts need to be made to attract FDI into the industrial 
sector, especially in high value added industries. To this end, the 
government of Morocco is developing the infrastructure needed 
for sophisticated industries, such as technoparks and adapted 
industrial zones. More than 13 percent of the Emergence Plan 
budget has been dedicated to develop infrastructure.  
Figure 12- FDI inflows by Sector, 2000-2010
Source: Moroccan Investment Development Agency (MIDA)
Constraints and policy recommendations
The industrial sector competitiveness of Morocco is undermined 
by a series of constraints at different levels, namely: the structural 
environment and production costs. The structural environment is 
characterized by low domestic demand, unwieldy and complex 
administrative procedures and formalities, and a very cumbersome 
tax system. Production costs are characterized by: the non-optimal 
logistical means of reaching Europe, very high energy costs, and 
limited or tariff-controlled access to raw materials. 
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Vigorous efforts are required to address constraints to export 
production. The East Asian experience highlights the importance 
of investing in human capital, creating a supportive business 
environment, maintaining a competitive exchange rate, and building 
the institutions to support exports as critical to success.
  
Limited human capital
Despite initiatives to improve human capital, a shortage of skilled 
workers remains an important constraint on development. Only 
11.8 percent of the population has completed tertiary education, 
well below levels in Egypt and Tunisia (Table 7). Moreover, according 
to an enterprise survey conducted by the World Bank in 2007, 31 
percent of Moroccan firms have identified labor skills as one of their 
major constraints. This situation is a major constraint that makes 
it difficult to attract the skill-intensive and technology-intensive 
activities that abound in the world economy.
Moreover, the current workforce is not adequate to meet the needs 
of the strategic sectors identified under the new industrial policy. 
The government is establishing training institutes for each industry 
identified under the Emergence Plan, and more than a third of the 
Emergence Plan budget is dedicated to training and vocational 
programs. 
Table 7 - Education in Morocco, 2006-2008*
Variable Name Morocco Tunisia Egypt
Primary School ratio 106.9 107.6 99.7
Pupil / Teacher 26.5 18.2 27.1
Secondary School ratio 55.8 90.2 86.2
Pupil / Teacher 18.7 15.9 16.6
Tertiary School ratio ** 11.8 32.4 28.7
Sources:  ADB Statistics Department; UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS) 
Database, February 2010; Various Domestic Authorities.
Notes: * Latest available data, ** 2006-2008
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Business regulations need to be simplified
 
While Morocco is perceived as a low cost platform for goods 
destined for European companies, its workforce is relatively 
expensive.  According to the recent report on wages (2010-2011) 
of the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the minimum 
wage in Morocco is the highest in Africa, 2,110 MAD per month 
(210 EUR) or 10.64 MAD per hour.  Morocco cannot compete 
successfully in the production of labor intensive manufactures 
when Tunisia, for example, offers a cheaper workforce with a 
higher skill level.  
Enabling people to do business was one of the main contributions 
to Asian economic success (H. Ben Hammouda, 2004). Despite 
government efforts to establish a healthy business environment, 
high tax rates increase the cost of doing business, while 
Morocco is ranked well below Tunisia and Egypt in the ease of 
doing business, with particularly bad rankings for the difficulties 
involved in starting a business and registering property, and for 
the protections accorded investors (Table 8). According to the 
enterprise survey conducted by the World Bank in 2007, more 
than 55 percent of Moroccan firms identified tax rates as a major 
constraint. Morocco also ranks below regional comparators in 
the environment for cross-border trade, particularly in the time 
and documents required to import (Table 9). The government 
needs to ease regulations that increase labor costs while 
supporting production in more sophisticated industries. Several 
tax relief policies have been launched to enable the country to 
take advantage of the new investment opportunities. However, 
Morocco needs to continue with these reforms to encourage the 
emergence of an enabling business environment.
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Table 8 - Ease of Doing Business Rank, 2011
 Variable Name Mo-rocco Tunisia Egypt Korea, Rep
Ease of Doing Business Rank 114 55 94 16
Starting a Business 82 48 18 60
Dealing with Construction Permits 98 106 154 22
Registering Property 124 64 93 74
Getting Credit 89 89 72 15
Protecting Investors 154 74 74 74
Paying Taxes 124 58 136 49
Enforcing Contracts 106 78 143 5
Closing a Business 59 37 131 13
Trading Across Borders 80 30 21 8
Source : Doing Business 2011, World Bank
Table 9 - Trading Across Borders – Doing Business, 
2006-2009 (Latest)
Variable Name Morocco Tunisia Egypt
Korea, 
Rep.
Trading Across Borders Rank 80 30 21 8
Documents to export (number) 7 4 6 3
Time to export (days) 14 13 12 8
Cost to export (US$ per container) 700 773 613 790
Documents to import (number) 10 7 6 3
Time to import (days) 17 17 12 7
Cost to import (US$ per con-
tainer) 1000 858 698 790
Source: World Trade Indicators 2011, World Bank
144
145
Import restrictions impart a strong anti-export bias
Morocco’s restrictive trade regime undercuts efforts at export 
promotion.  Complex import restrictions can negatively affect the 
volume of exports: the higher the domestic market protection is, the 
stronger the anti-export bias (Walkenhorst & Malouche, 2006).  In 
Morocco, imports are particularly essential in the industrial sector, 
where large amounts of semi-finished products are imported and 
later re-exported after processing. More than 85 percent of exporting 
firms use imported materials (Enterprises Survey-World Bank, 
2007). Reductions in tariff rates would enhance the effectiveness of 
the government’s trade promotion policies and foster restructuring 
in value-subtracting firms.
The anti-export bias has been exacerbated by adverse exchange 
rate movements.  The strong link of the dirham to the euro when the 
euro was strengthening against the dollar resulted in an appreciation 
of the real exchange relative to some competitor countries whose 
currencies were floating (e.g. Tunisia) or more closely linked to 
dollar (e.g. Egypt, Turkey, China).  From 2000, when the euro was 
created to 2007, the year before the financial crisis, the correlation 
between the dirham/dollar exchange rate and Morocco’s export 
volumes was significantly negative (-.86). Inflexible labor markets 
make it even more difficult to manage a fixed exchange rate 
system, by removing one means of possible adjustment to losses 
in competitiveness.
Logistics quality and transport cost - constraints and 
challenges
Morocco is establishing itself as a regional transport logistics hub. 
Therefore, the quality of transport and trade logistics constitutes 
a central element of Morocco’s competitiveness. Supported by 
geographical proximity to Europe, Morocco has successfully 
responded to the increasing demands of its trading partners in 
terms of timing, reliability and quality of deliveries. The government 
has made a substantial effort to improve the quality of trade logistics 
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and especially of sea transport, in order to increase its exports and 
take full advantage of its geographical position.
More than 98 percent of Morocco’s external trade relies on shipping. 
Building the Tanger-Med Port was thus a critical step to improving 
export performance. Beginning operations in 2007, Tanger’s port 
handled 2.1 million containers in 2010 and 2.6 million containers 
in 2011. In 2013, it is forecast to handle 3.5 million containers and 
become the biggest port in Africa in terms of trans-shipment. With 
a coastline over 3,000 km line, Morocco has eleven other cargo 
ports: Nador, Kenitra-mehdia, Mohammedia, Casablanca, Jorf-
lasfar, Safi, Agadir, Tan-tan, Laayoune and Dakhla. The Kingdom 
also has a highly-developed highway network that connects all 
cities exceeding 400,000 residents. 
Morocco signed an open skies agreement with the EU in late 2006 
that has thrown the air transport market wide open. Logistical 
support for airfreight is also being improved, while the state aviation 
authority is preparing to transform into a commercially viable entity 
as it considers partnerships with the private sector to manage 
certain platforms at particular airports.
Despite improvements in the quality of trade logistics, the poor 
performance of some logistics chains, procedural complexity 
and poor information management continue to result in delays 
between entry and exit of imported goods in the Moroccan ports. 
Also, port charges and handling costs in Morocco’s main port are 
very high compared with other Mediterranean ports. According to 
the World Trade Indicators report 2009/2010, Morocco’s scores in 
terms of infrastructure quality and transport costs are well below 
Tunisia’s scores and the MENA average (Table 10). 
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Table 10 - Logistic Performance Index 
(Low= 1; high= 5), 2006-2009 (Latest)
 Variable Name Morocco Tunisia Egypt Korea, 
Overall   2.38  2.84  2.61  3.64
Efficiency of customs and 
other border procedures  2.20  2.43  2.11  3.33
Quality of transport and IT 
infrastructures  2.33  2.56  2.22  3.62
International transport 
costs  2.75  3.36  2.56  3.47
Logistics competence  2.13  2.36  2.87  3.64
Trackability of shipments  2.00  2.56  2.56  3.83
Domestic transportation 
costs  2.38  3.20  2.83  2.73
Timeliness of shipments  2.86  3.57  3.31  3.97
Source: World Trade Indicators 2011, World Bank
For a country like Morocco whose comparative advantage is linked to 
its geography, the quality of transport and trade logistics constitutes 
a central element of competitiveness. The New Tangier Harbor was 
fully completed in 2010. But its initial operational efficiency has been 
low and it has not reduced the cost or transit time to Europe. The 
sea crossing to Spain is about twice as expensive as sea crossings 
of similar distance from other countries. More resources should be 
deployed to speed the provision of licenses to shipment firms in 
order to reduce transport prices. 
Exports not only depend on reducing tariff and non-tariff restrictions 
and improving the institutional environment, but also on formalities 
in port logistics, customs clearance, and quality and safety control, 
all of which affect transaction costs. Improving the trade regime 
without addressing basic trade facilitation issues may maintain 
excessive costs and delays in goods shipment, diminishing the 
benefits of trade liberalization.
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Thus, the success of an export-led growth strategy will require a 
host of improvements to the institutions and services that support 
trade.  Reducing tariffs, concluding free trade agreements, and 
easing regulatory barriers are necessary but not sufficient to boost 
exports.  Complementary efforts will be required to strengthen the 
institutions that support exports, improve logistics, provide finance, 
increase the efficiency of infrastructure, and improve the skills of 
the labor force to achieve rapid export growth.   
By adapting a risky strategy such as the Emergence Plan, the 
government of Morocco needs to imperatively address the problems 
and challenges cited above; which could hinder the country from 
optimizing the impact that the recent industrial strategy could have 
on the export sector.
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Appendix I
Table 1. Top 20 of Moroccan exported products
Share in % of 
total exports Rank 
2006 2010 2006 2010
Articles of apparel, accessories, not knit or cro-
chet 19.2   10.7   1 3
Electrical, electronic equipment   15.1    16.4   2 1
Inorganic chemicals, precious metal compound, 
isotopes   8.2    7.8   3 4
Articles of apparel, accessories, knit or crochet  6.4     4.7   4 7
Fish, crustaceans, molluscs, aquatic inverte-
brates nes  5.5   2.8   5 12
Salt, sulphur, earth, stone, plaster, lime and ce-
ment  5.0    5.4   6 6
Fertilizers 4.1   10.7   7 2
Meat, fish and seafood food preparations nes   3.9    3.1   8 10
Mineral fuels, oils, distillation products, etc  3.8   3.7   9 9
Edible fruit, nuts, peel of citrus fruit, melons    3.1    3.8   10 8
Edible vegetables and certain roots and tubers 2.3    5.7   11 5
Footwear, gaiters and the like, parts thereof 2.2     1.6   12 15
Ores, slag and ash  1.3   1.8   13 13
Vehicles other than railway, tramway 0.9   1.1   14 17
Animal, vegetable fats and oils, cleavage prod-
ucts, etc 0.9   1.1   15 18
Pearls, precious stones, metals, coins, etc 0.9   3.1   16 11
Machinery, nuclear reactors, boilers, etc  0.7     1.3   17 16
Lead and articles thereof  0.4     1.0   18 20
Other made textile articles, sets, worn clothing 
etc   0.3   1.0   19 19
Aircraft, spacecraft, and parts thereof 0.1   1.6   20 14
Source: TradeMap2011, International Trade Center
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Table 2:  Preferential Trade Agreements concluded by 
Morocco
Agrrement/Part-
ner (Chronologi-
cal Order)
Signed 
in 
Effec-
t i v e 
since
Products Liberalization 
Schedule 
Coverage of 
Agricul-
ture
Servic-
es
Free Trade Agreements
Greater Arab Free 
Trade Area (GAF-
TA)
1981 1998
10% annually during 
1998-02, 20% in 2002-
05. Removal of non-tariff 
barriers, but licensing
Yes No
Arab Maghred 
Union (AMU)
1989 not yet
Zero tariffs, but uniform 
compensatory import taw 
of 17.5%
Yes No
European Union 
(EU)
1996 2000
Three dimantling sce-
narios: immediate, over 
4 years for goods not 
produced locally; over 10 
years starting in 2003 for 
goods produced locally.
Some
neg. 
ongoing
European Free 
Trade Area (EFTA)
1997 2000
B i l i t e r a l 
a r r a n g -
ments
No
Egypt 1998 1999
Positive List for immediate 
phasing-out; over 5 years 
if tariffs < 25%; Tariffs set 
at 25% if current >25%; 
then phase-out over last 
7 years.
No No
Jordan 1998 1999 No No
Tunisia 1999 1999
Four Lists for Morocco 
and three lists for Tunisia; 
Three product groups: 
zero duty; 17.5% duty; 8 
year-phase-out
No No
United Arab Emir-
ates
2001 2003
Two negative lists . Dis-
mantles Arab League tar-
iffs by 10% annually
Yes No
Agadir Agreement 
(Tunisia, Egypt, 
Jordan)
2004 2007
Zero tariffs when agree-
ment becomes effective 
Agreement will supersede 
previous bilaterals
Yes No
United States 2004 2006
twenty-one different dis-
mantling schedules
Yes 
Yes, with 
neg.lists
Turkey 2004 2006
Three dismantling sched-
ules
No No
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Conditional Tariff Agreements
Senegal 1963 1972
Exemptions with license, 
one positive list per coun-
try
No No
Saudi Arabia 1966 1988 Exemptions with license No No
Iraq 1976 1983 Exemptions with license No No
Mauritania 1986 1986
Exemptions with license, 
one positive list per coun-
try
No No
Algeria 1989 1990 Exemptions with license No No
Libya 1990 1990 Exemptions with license No No
Guinea 1997 2000
Exemptions with license, 
one positive list per coun-
try
No No
Source: P. walkenhorst & M. Malouche, 2006 (World Bank) 
Table 3 - Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), 2011
 Morocco Tunisia Egypt Korea
Time Period 2006-09 Latest
Government Effectiveness  -0.09  0.35  -0.37  1.26
Regulatory Quality  -0.03  0.11  -0.17  0.73
Rule of Law  -0.11  0.24  -0.09  0.79
Control of Corruption  -0.26  -0.04  -0.67  0.45
Political Stability / Absence of Terrorism  -0.47  0.29  -0.67  0.41
Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), 2011
Table 4 - Export Restrictions, 2006-2009 (Latest)
Variable Name Mo-rocco Tunisia Egypt Korea
Export taxes (as a percent of goods 
exports)  0.57  0.11  0.00  ..
Export taxes (as a percent of tax 
revenues)  0.45  0.15  0.02  ..
Export License usage  1  1  0.00  1
Export tax usage  1  0.00  0.00  0.00
Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), 2011
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4. How to move up to higher export sophistication in 
Tunisia
Introduction
The government has recognized the importance of exports to 
economic development since the mid-1970s. The government 
of the day adopted an export-led growth strategy by providing 
incentives for investment by domestic firms, welcoming foreign 
investment, and building infrastructure. These policies have 
achieved substantial success. Tunisia’s exports are larger, relative 
to GDP, than regional comparators (Table 1), despite the fact that 
the country lacks mineral resources (the high level of exports 
to GDP in Egypt and many MENA countries reflects large oil 
revenues).
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Table 1 - Export as % of GDP
 1995-99 2000-04 2005-09
Tunisia 42.84 45.70 57.50
Morocco 26.76 29.17 35.51
Egypt 18.57 21.98 33.71
S. Korea 34.47 37.02 44.74
MENA 30.21 35.64 49.45
Source:  WDI 2011, World Bank
The Tunisian economy has undergone some structural change 
since the mid-1960s. The share of industry in Tunisia’s output 
and employment has increased (Figure 1) Since the end of the 
multifiber agreement in 2005, and to face the global competition 
in the textile sector, Tunisia has shifted its specialization toward 
higher technology products. Thus, Tunisia’s exports have become 
somewhat more sophisticated (see Chapter 1), as the share of 
textile exports has stagnated over the past five years, while the 
share of mechanical and electronic industries rose from 24 percent 
in 2005 to 34 percent in 2010 (Table 2). 
Figure 1- Economic structural changes in Tunisia 1984-2009
Source: National  Institute of Statistics of Tunisia, 2011
Nevertheless, considerable potential remains for further structural 
change. Traditional products (Mining industry) still comprise 24 
percent of exports, and industry remains dominated by labor-
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intensive production (textiles) and assembly operations (Figure 
2). Upgrading production to more advanced sectors would help 
reduce the volatility of export revenues, and lay the groundwork for 
more rapid productivity growth.
Figure 2 - Structure of Tunisia’s export in 2010
Source: National Institute of statistics – Tunisia, 2011
This chapter aims to explain why Tunisia has not managed to 
export more sophisticated products and thus reap greater gains 
from export-led growth. In order to identify constraints to improving 
Tunisia’s exports, the success of the previous Government’s policies 
to promote exports is analyzed and the institutions created to support 
exports are reviewed. The chapter then turns to a discussion of 
policies that would improve the sophistication of Tunisia’s exports. 
 
Industrial Policy: Historical Background
Tunisia’s industrial policies have achieved respectable results over 
the past two decades. The Tunisian economy has transitioned 
smoothly from a semi-closed and inward-oriented economy into 
an outward-oriented and export-fuelled market economy, based 
on manufacturing production and run by private entrepreneurs. 
Importantly, Tunisia has done better than many analysts predicted. 
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Over the past five decades, trade policies and industrial strategies 
have changed depending on the challenges which the Tunisian 
government faced. Government policies also have been influenced 
by regional (European Union) and international actors, particularly by 
major economic and financial institutions (World Bank, International 
Monetary Fund under the ERSAP15). 
This section analyzes industrial policies under Bourghiba’s Republic 
(1956-1986) and Ben Ali’s era (1986-2011), which allowed Tunisia 
to achieve GDP growth rates and welfare gains well above the 
regional average. 
Table 2 - Evolution of industrial strategies and the changing 
pattern of State intervention
1956-1969
Nationalization: Trade and ‘strategic sectors’ were under State 
control. Industry and tourism were the responsibility of the pri-
vate sector.
1970-1986 Export industry promotion strategy (special benefits to exporting firms) and policy of industrial import substitution.
1986-2008
Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Program (ERSAP); 
open trade policy and  proliferation of regional trade agreements 
(EMP; GAFTA GATT, EMFTZ)
2008- 2011 ‘Horizon 2016’16. New industrial strategy adopted in 2008.
1956 - 1969: The socialist experience
After independence in 1956, the priority of the Tunisian government 
was the decolonization of the economy. According to Bourghiba’s 
vision, the State should take control of some sectors, and at the 
same time build an economy based on investment and international 
trade promotion. 
During the five years after independence, the economy had to cope 
with massive sales of properties and farms by settlers leaving for 
Europe, and the cessation of major activities undertaken previously 
by the colonial state. The government offered tax incentives and 
15)  Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Program
16)  Horizon 2016 expects to double exports and triple investment betwen 2008-2016
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credit facilities in order to motivate the domestic private sector to 
play a greater role in investment. However, the success of these 
initiatives was limited, and domestic investment was not sufficient 
to offset the departure of foreigners. 
In response to this situation, Ahmed Ben Salah17 implemented his 
vision of a public sector led, import substitution-based economy. 
This involved a peculiar combination of import substitution, the 
nationalization of key firms, and export promotion. The number of 
the state-owned enterprises increased from 25 in 1960 to about 
185 in 1970. 
Figure 3 - Investment as % of GDP 1960- 1980
Source: World Economic Indicators 2011, World Bank.
However, the socialist policy of collectivism launched by Ben Salah 
challenged the vital interests of elite groups and major wealthy 
farmer/land owners, and led to widespread discontent, large 
demonstrations and political instability. Under popular pressure 
the president Habib Bourguiba dismissed Ben Salah in 1969. The 
minister was arrested on charges of high treason, and sentenced 
to ten years of hard labor.
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Private sector development and export industries promotion: 
from protectionism to a mixed economy
As a consequence of the failure of collectivism, the new Prime 
Minister Hedi Nouira began a new strategy that combined import 
substitution, private sector development and export promotion. 
There was a particular focus on manufacturing (mainly textiles) and 
services (mainly tourism) where Tunisia was supposed to enjoy 
major comparative advantages. These sectors promised a rapid 
return on capital employed and did not require a skilled workforce. 
However, the government made it clear that the lead role in key 
sectors (heavy industry, transport, water and electricity) should be 
reserved for the public sector, while offering more opportunities to 
the private sector (textiles and tourism). 
The strategy was implemented through new institutions and incentive 
programs. The support institutions API (Agence de promotion de 
l’industrie) and CEPEX (Centre de promotion des exportations) 
were established in 1973 to provide technical and financial support 
to exports and industry through high external tariffs, strict import 
quotas, restrictive licensing practices, preferential credits, and 
subsidized inputs.  New laws were enacted to enhance domestic 
and international investments. Law 72-38 provided a host of 
incentives to foreign investors for approved industrial projects, 
largely for export production.  Incentives included a wide range of 
tax concessions (e.g. exemption from corporate income tax during 
the first ten years of operation and repatriation of profits free of tax), 
and duty-free import of capital equipment, raw materials and semi-
processed goods(Offshore regime). In 1973 the government created 
the Industrial Land Agency (AFI) responsible for establishment and 
management of industrial zones (box 1).
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Box I. Why are industrial zones no longer attractive to 
firms?
From 1973 until 2006, Tunisia’s Industrial Land Agency has launched 83 
industrial zones, 16 of which are in Grand Tunis, 34 in coastal areas and 
33 in the Western and Southern provinces. The Bourguiba government 
intended that these zones would accelerate industrial development by 
increasing investment and promoting international trade. The creation 
of industrial zones played a fundamental role in Tunisia’s industrial 
policies until the 1990’s.
Industrial zones have been less successful in recent years. According 
to figures provided by the Ministry of industry and GTZ ReCapZI 
Project (Renforcement des Capacités de la gestion durable des Zones 
Industrielles), 57 percent of participating firms are not satisfied with 
Tunisia’s industrial zones, and only a few zones operate according to 
approved international standards.
One of the main problems in industrial zones is inadequate management 
and maintenance.  Almost half of industrial zones in Tunisia still have no 
special management or maintenance arrangements. Only 42 special 
management units are responsible for maintaining more than eighty 
industrial zones. Very few industrial zones are managed by the private 
sector. Techno parks provide better services through private sector 
management and public sector provision of basic infrastructure (roads, 
water and electric power).
The mixed policies of public sector control of the commanding 
heights of the economy coupled with incentives for private sector 
production achieved substantial economic progress over the 1970’s: 
GDP growth averaged 7.5 percent per year, important investments 
in infrastructure were realized, exports kept pace with GDP through 
preferential policies, and the private sector grew rapidly under the 
protection of import restrictions (Figure 4). But these policies were 
ultimately unsustainable.  High public sector deficits resulted in rise 
in external debt from 25.6 percent of GDP in 1975 to 65.9 percent 
in 1986 (Table 3).  Investment fell to only 25 percent of GDP from the 
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peak of 32 percent in 1982, thus despite the generous incentives 
system and targeted actions for export activities and the setting-
up of offshore regime. The government, facing high unemployment 
and public rioting, and unable to service its debt or finance imports, 
embarked on a comprehensive structural adjustment program 
(ERSAP) in 1986. 
Figure 4 - Trends of Exports and investment during the 1970’s
Source : WDI 2011, World Bank.
Table 3 - Selected Macroeconomic indicators, 1970- 1986
 Variable Name 1975 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
GDP growth 
(annual %) 7.2 7.4 5.5 -0.5 4.7 5.7 5.6 -1.4
Exports of goods 
and services (% of 
GDP)
31.0 40.2 41.4 36.9 34.4 33.0 32.1 30.2
Gross fixed 
capital formation 
(% of GDP)
25.7 28.3 31.0 34.0 31.8 32.1 28.1 25.0
External debt 
stocks.% of GDP 25.6 40.3 42.8 46.4 48.6 49.6 58.1 65.9
Source: WDI 2011, World Bank.
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The 1986 Structural Adjustment Program (ERSAP)
In 1986 the prime minister of Tunisia, Rachid Sfar, concluded an 
agreement with the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund to support the Economic Recovery and Structural Adjustment 
Program. The ERSAP involved the reduction of tariffs and easing of 
quantitative restrictions on imports, the introduction of a value added 
tax and reductions in personal income taxes, a devaluation of the dinar, 
negotiations with creditors that extended the maturity on the country’s 
$10 billion foreign debt, and a privatization program resulting in total or 
partial privatization of some 160 state-owned enterprises.
  
The government took further steps to improve the trade regime and 
support investment.  Tunisia acceded to the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1990, became a member of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995, and entered into an “Association 
Agreement” with the European Union (EU) in 1996 which provided 
for the removal of tariff and other trade barriers on most goods 
starting from 2008. A 1992 law provided several benefits to 
exporting firms through offshore and free trade zones, and a 1994 
law provided new investment incentives.  The Foreign Investment 
Promoting Agency and Agricultural Investment Promotion Agency 
were set up in 1995 to promote investment.
Tunisia’s economic reform program has been lauded as a model 
by international financial institutions. Macroeconomic stability was 
restored and the external debt burden fell. The ERSAP led to a 
sharp fall in inflation (to below 5 percent in less than 10 years) and a 
reduction in the current account deficit from 7.8 percent of GDP in 
1986 to 2.4 percent in 1996. GDP growth averaged 5 percent over 
the 1990’s. Supported by a favorable environment and geographical 
proximity to Europe, Tunisia’s exports jumped from $3.7 billion in 
1990 to over $16.9 billion in 2010. 
Less progress has been observed on microeconomic issues. 
Unemployment remains among the highest in the region (14.2 
percent of the labor force in 2008), and economic growth has been 
Review of existing policies and identification of constraints
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limited to traditional sectors (primarily textiles, garments, footwear, 
leather work and mechanical and electrical appliances) and mass 
tourism. Tunisia needs to move towards more sophisticated sectors 
with higher added value to absorb new entrants to the workforce, 
reduce the volatility of export revenue, and promote technological 
catch-up.  
A knowledge–intensive and innovation-oriented economy: a 
new area begins in 2008
It was recognized that achieving the 6.1 percent annual rate of 
GDP growth targeted in the 11th Development Plan (2007-11) 
would require a shift from traditional sectors to more technologically 
advanced industries. In 2008, the government adopted a new 
industrial policy called ‘Horizon 2016’ based on a study initiated 
by the Ministry of Industry, Energy and Small/Medium Businesses 
entitled National Industrial Strategy for the Years Leading Up to 
2016.18 The new policies were designed to create a quality-
based, innovation-oriented and knowledge-intensive economy. 
The declared objectives were to double exports, triple industrial 
investment and raise the average annual GDP growth rate from 5 
to 6 percent during 2008-2010 by promoting know-how-intensive 
sectors and thereby raising total factor productivity.  
Assessment of the industrial policies
After a half century of rapid growth, the economic structure of 
Tunisia has changed. The share of industry in output increased 
during the 1970s and 1980s and has remained stable since.  The 
share of services also rose, while agriculture declined19 (Figure 1, 
Appendix I). The share of manufactures products in total exports 
has reached 75 percent, up from 35 percent in 1980; 6.1 percent 
of total exports were high-technology products in 2010.  In June 
2010, there were 5840 industrial companies registered with API20, 
18) The study, which involved one-on-one discussions with key economic decision makers in Tunisia and abroad and 
analysis by sectoral specialists and working groups, was monitored by a steering committee chaired by the Tunisian 
Union for Industry, Trade and Handicrafts (UTICA). It was drafted by a team of three international and two national 
experts, under the supervision of the Industrial Promotion Agency (API) and the management unit of the Industrial 
Modernization Program (UGPMI). 
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48 percent of which exported all of their production (offshore 
sector). Major structural shifts within the manufacturing sector have 
contributed to the development of Tunisian industry and promotion 
of “Made in Tunisia” in the foreign market. 
Figure 5 - Tunisia Export per group of sectors: 1993 & 2010
Source: Tunisian National Institute of Statistics (INS). 2011
Thus Tunisia has gone at least some way towards becoming an 
industrial economy.  Tunisia’s current positioning is perceived as 
Europe’s back office or near shore for industry and services. This 
approach has helped Tunisia build a high-performing, competitive 
industry, compared to other countries of the region. Nevertheless, 
the economy’s continued dependence on low-cost production 
and traditional export sectors makes it vulnerable to low-cost 
competitors.  Tunisia could achieve higher growth and absorb its 
high-skilled unemployed by moving up to more sophisticated, high-
technology products.
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19) The share of services as percent of GDP increased to about 62%, up from 50-54% two decades ago.
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Table 4 - Tunisian Industry composition, June 2011
Sectors TE* OTE* Total %
Manufacture of food products 182 854 1,036 17.7%
Manufacture of construction products. ce-
ramic and glass 28 422 450 7.7%
Manufacture of mechanicals and basic metals 189 425 614 10.5%
Manufacture of electric and electronic equipment 247 133 380 6.5%
Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 122 393 515 8.8%
Manufacture of textile and wearing apparel 1,714 321 2,035 34.8%
Manufacture of wood and wood products 32 172 204 3.5%
Manufacture of leather and footwear 225 72 297 5.1%
Other manufacturing 67 242 309 5.3%
Total 2,806 3,034 5,840 100%
*: TE: Totally exporting
OTE: Other than totally exporting 
Source: Agency for the Promotion of Industry and Innovation - June 2011 
Figure 6 - Export sophistication Index (EXPY), 1960-2010.
Source: Hausmann (2011) 
Tunisia needs to increase the level of export sophistication, which 
is a good predictor of future growth (Hausmann 2011). The level 
of export sophistication stagnated from the 1960s to 2010 (figure 
7), according to Hausmann’s measurement of Tunisia’s export 
sophistication index (EXPY). By contrast, China, Korea and Thailand 
started from the same level as Tunisia in the 1960s, but had doubled 
their EXPY by 2010. Looking at these Asian countries’ experience 
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can illuminate policies that Tunisia should adopt to achieve similar 
success. 
Table 5 - Hausmann’s Strategies for Tunisia
Source: Hausmann (2011) 
Table 6 provides a comparison of the sectoral composition of 
industrial strategies identified by Hausmann (Table 5) and those 
identified in the Horizon Plan.21 The Horizon Plan list of sectors 
is close to the strategy identified by Hausmann as “parsimonious 
transformation” (Table 6).  This strategy focuses on products that 
are in the vicinity of a country’s current set of capabilities, but that 
have higher sophistication. By adopting this relatively prudent 
strategy (compared with Hausmann’s “strategic bets” strategy), 
Tunisia chooses to move “slowly but surely”.  
Review of existing policies and identification of constraints
Jobs Strategic bets Parsimonious Transformation 
21)  See chapter 1 for a discussion of Hausmann’s strategies.
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Table 6 - Recent industrial strategy: Horizon Plan
Objective for the period 2009-
2015 Targeted Sectors
Product 
Communities
Growth- Double export and 
Triple investment by 2016 from 
their initial level 
Automobile Machinery
Aerospace Aircraft
Diversification- Establish a bal-
anced portfolio of activities for 
Tunisia, with new activities hav-
ing virtually the same share as 
traditional sectors in terms of 
industrial exports.
Electronics Electronics
Textile Textile & Fabrics/Gar-ments/ Leather
Food industry Food Processing/ Meat and eggs/ Milk & cheese
Figure 7- Evolution of export of the traditional selected sector 
of Horizon Plan
Source: TradeMap, ITC 2011
The Horizon plan was launched only in 2008 and coincided with the 
onset of the global financial crisis, so it is difficult to evaluate its impact. 
One hopeful sign is that following the collapse of global demand in 
2009, Tunisia’s exports of machinery and electrical products resumed 
their rapid growth since 2003, to become the Tunisia’s largest export 
sector. In addition, Tunisia’s exports of electronics and machinery 
remain below 20 percent of total exports (Figure 8), which suggests 
that there still is room for developing these products. 
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Figure 8 - Sophistication and competitiveness trends in 
Mechanical /electrical/ electronic sectors
Source: Authors calculations
The main actors and institutional elements of Tunisia’s 
industrial policies
Since independence in 1956, Tunisian governments have 
consistently promoted a vision of export-led growth, especially Ben 
Ali’s government (1987-2011), which fully endorsed the main tenets 
of ‘open regionalism’. Export development has been essential for a 
small economy like Tunisia (less than 11 million people) to achieve 
scale economies and thus encourage investment.
Tunisia deployed important efforts in creating trade support 
institutions, improving the necessary infrastructure for company 
establishment, especially exporting firms. The Tunisian export 
promotion policy is mainly the responsibility of the Ministry of 
Industry, Energy and SMEs and the Ministry of Trade, Tourism and 
Handcraft.
Support institutions
The Tunisian authorities have played a useful role in helping the 
private sector cope with increased competition from global markets. 
The government has accompanied the opening of the industrial 
sector with the Up-grading Program (Programme de mise à niveau: 
PMN) and the Industrial Modernization Program (PMI). Moreover, in 
order to help emerging exporters overcome information and other 
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market failures related to penetrating new markets, the government 
created several trade support institutions.
Governmental institutions
Industry promotion agency (API): Created in 1973, API is a public 
institution responsible for the implementation of the government’s 
industrial promotion policies. API is organized into 5 support centers, 
and offers services from its headquarters and 24 regional offices. 
API assists investors and promoters with the administrative and 
legal formalities necessary for company incorporation in Tunisia. It 
also takes care of providing logistical support, and manages more 
than 30 operational incubators.
Export promotion center (CEPEX): Created in 1973, CEPEX has 
developed considerable know-how in enhancing the position 
of Tunisian products in international markets. CEPEX provides a 
wide range of services and an international professional network 
to support and advise Tunisian exporters, to provide business 
information to foreign importers, and to organize promotional 
activities and meetings between potential partners. CEPEX works 
closely with professional bodies including UTICA, UTAP, the club 
of exporters, technical centers, Chambers of Commerce and 
Industry, and other entities. The center is under the supervision of 
the Ministry of Trade, Tourism and Handcraft
Up-grading Office: The national upgrading program (PMN), 
supported by the European Union under 1995 the Euro-
Mediterranean free trade agreement, has become the key tool for 
helping Tunisian companies face international competition. The 
fundamental objective of the program is to improve the productivity 
of the manufacturing sector and to increase the export share of 
manufactured products, to meet the competition from European 
companies after the total dismantling of customs barriers planned 
for 2008. The program provides support to private sector firms 
that have room for growth, who plan to grow, and who face an 
expanding market. The goal is to restructure 4000 firms in ten 
years. 
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Several institutions have provided support for the upgrading program. 
These include the EU (industrial modernization program provides 
coaching and quality control services to firms), UNIDO (diagnosis 
and assessment of the program), GTZ (financial support to BMN, the 
upgrading office, and technical assistance to firms), KFW (financial 
support to firms) and AFD (financial restructuring of firms). 
The program has achieved considerable success, with some 
reservations.  According to the 7th survey of enterprises conducted 
by the BMN, 69 percent of firms assert that PMN assistance 
was satisfactory. However, more than 45 percent of firms report 
that receiving the premium payment is rather difficult, while only 
27 percent consider it rather easy.  Surveys also report that the 
PMN serves more offshore companies at the expense of on-
shore companies, which has helped to widen the gap between 
the two groups.   Since the launch of the upgrading program in 
1996, more than 3,500 applications were approved, and only 18 
were rejected. The success of the PMN thus indicates the implicit 
acknowledgment by Tunisian authorities that their manufacturing 
firms were, and are still, in need of major support to make them 
ready for international competition. 
Private Sector- Key role in Tunisia
Tunisian Union for Industry, Trade and Handicrafts (UTICA): 
Created in 1947, UTICA is the voice of private sector in Tunisia. 
UTICA informs its members of new opportunities to grow and 
promote their enterprises, and reports information on the concerns 
they face. UTICA has offices throughout the country, covering all 
economic sectors. It has 17 national sectoral federations, 200 
national union chambers and 24 regional unions. Membership is 
automatically provided to all companies paying contributions to the 
social security system.
Arab Institute of Business Manager (IACE): The IACE was created 
in 1984 on the initiative of a group of business leaders. The number 
of members has steadily increased from 150 in 1985 to over 450 
members in 2009. All sectors (public and private) and industries 
are represented. Since its creation, the Institute has concentrated 
Review of existing policies and identification of constraints
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its efforts primarily on the preparation and organization of Business 
Days to shed light on issues facing the private companies that 
deserve state support. 
Main financial institutions
National Guarantee Fund (FNG): FNG was established in 1981 to 
insure loans, particularly for export production, to small businesses. 
The Fund aims to correct perceived market failures by which small 
borrowers, regardless of credit worthiness, lack access to credit 
resources available to large borrowers. 
  
Capital risk investment companies (SICAR): The Tunisian financial 
sector has witnessed the creation of several capital risk investment 
companies, both public and private, since 1990. Today, more 
than 26 SICARs are operational in Tunisia. The main objective of 
SICAR’s creation is to promote private investment, particularly in 
SMEs, through equity participation in Tunisian companies. SICAR 
interventions are generally more oriented to industry and services, 
and finance investments in the context of the national upgrading 
program or high value added projects. 
Export Development Project: Key Support to the Tunisian 
Trade Strategy
In 1999, with the assistance of the World Bank, Tunisia launched 
an export development project (EDP1) aimed at raising the level 
of the country’s exports and smoothing trade logistics. In 2004, 
the authorities concluded a second export development project 
(EDP2) with the World Bank to continue the program. The EDP 
supports all exporters with a special focus on resident firms that 
export a part of their production.
The largest component of the EDP is the export market access 
fund (EMAF), which was launched in 2000 to provide technical 
and financial assistance to export companies and professional 
associations. It was implemented by the Centre for Export Promotion 
(CEPEX). Its original objective was to assist 350 firms, but ultimately 
550 firms have benefited from EMAF services. Entrepreneurs 
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consider this fund as a guarantee; they feel that export risks are 
shared with the government as loans. The EMAF plays the role of 
an export-import bank.
The EMAF has benefited from strong leadership and private sector 
management. It has increased exports as of the end of May 2010 
by $319 million, 33 percent from new exporters, and sustained 
employment estimated at about 98 500 jobs for the firms involved, 
55 percent of which have been permanent full-time positions. 
However, it is estimated that one dollar invested in EMAF generated 
only $20 of additional export revenues (CEPEX), well below average 
estimates of other export promotion agencies (Ederman, Olarreaga 
and Pyto 2006 find that one dollar in export promotion yields $227 in 
Asia, $137 in Sub-Saharan Africa, and $96 in MENA, on average). 
The second major component of the EDP is an export finance 
guarantee facility to encourage financial institutions to provide pre-
shipment financing. This component has increased exports by 
more than $98 million. (World Bank)
The project also supported the automation of customs procedures 
to reduce costs and processing time. Most documentation is now 
transmitted via a single computer system (Tunisia Trade Net--TTN) 
common to all operators. According to the World Bank, which 
oversaw the customs automation project, the time taken to clear 
goods through Tunisian ports has fallen considerably. 
The export development programs have increased Tunisian exports 
by more than $400 million from 2005 to 2009. The World Bank’s 
Development Impact Evaluation unit conducted an evaluation 
exercise to assess the effect of the EDP on Tunisia’s exports from 
2005 to 2009. The evaluation involved surveying over 600 firms, half 
of which benefitted from the export market access fund. Preliminary 
results suggest that beneficiary firms were more successful than 
others at diversifying their export portfolios. The World Bank has 
expressed satisfaction at the results of the project, and plans to 
export the Tunisian experience to other African countries.
Review of existing policies and identification of constraints
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Regional Trade Agreements- Failure to diversify trade 
partners
Tunisia has signed several regional preferential trade agreements 
with its major trading partners. The Arab Maghreb Union trade 
agreement (AMU) was formally signed in 1989 by Algeria, Mauritania, 
Morocco, Libya and Tunisia, with institutional and financial support 
for the AMU provided by European Union.  Tunisia was among 
the first wave of Arab countries to join the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership (EMP) in 1995. Tunisia also is encouraging greater 
trade with Arab neighbors through membership in the Arab-
Mediterranean Free Trade (Agadir Agreement, signed in 2004) and 
the Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA, effective since 2005).
  
Tunisia’s trade policy needs to reflect the goal of diversifying 
markets. While Tunisia’s participation in the Euro-Med free trade 
area has helped to boost exports, the European Union accounted 
for almost three quarters of Tunisia’s exports in 2010 (Table 7), with 
the bulk of these exports destined to France, Spain, Germany and 
Italy. By contrast, less than 30 percent of Tunisia’s exports go to 
other developing countries. 
It is possible that improving access to other developing countries’ 
markets could help improve the sophistication of Tunisia’s export 
basket, because Tunisian exporters would not face the same 
degree of competition as in developed country markets22 Thus 
the government is promoting “Made in Tunisia” in Eastern Europe, 
and is negotiating free trade agreements with the West African 
Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA).  There may be further 
opportunities for free trade agreements with other African Economic 
Communities (UEA, CEDEAO, and CEEAC). 
22) Borrowing from a model due to Romalis (2004) where the pattern of bilateral trade is fully determined in a two region 
world, J. Regolo demonstrated that bilateral trade between Southern countries is more sophisticated than bilateral 
trade from Southern to Northern countries.   “.... the more trading partners are similar in terms of endowments in 
physical capital, human capital and land the more their exports are diversified,” 
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Table 7 - Main destination of Tunisian Exports
 Destination 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
European Union 89.5 77.4 78.6 83.1 81.5 81.2 73.4
Libya 0.8 1.0 3.3 3.9 4.5 4.9 6.2
Algeria 2.6 4.1 2.4 2.6 0.7 1.4 2.4
Morocco 0.1 0.4 0.7 0.6 0.5 1.2 1.7
Egypt 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.6 0.1 0.4
Source: Direction of Trade 2011, IMF
Infrastructure and education
The 10th Development Plan of Tunisia called for building 
infrastructure and increasing human capital. Special efforts were 
made to modernize the road network, enhance development of 
industrial zones, and upgrade ports and airports. 
Table 8 - Research and development expenditure (% of GDP)
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Tunisia 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.7 1.0 1.0
Source: WDI 2010, World Bank 
The National Industrial Strategy for the Years Leading up to 2016 
(see above) argues that the creation of a quality-based, innovation-
oriented and knowledge-intensive economy requires greater 
investment in education. Tunisia has long devoted considerable 
resources to education and training: the number of students 
in school has multiplied ten-fold since 1990 (to more than 357 
thousand). The government used to finance training, including 
English and computer sciences programs for university students, 
through its specific funds for vocational training. The allocation for 
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the Ministry of High Education and Scientific Research increased 
from 3.6 percent of the total budget for the academic year 
1999/2000, to 6.1 percent for 2009/2010. Numerous technological 
institutes have been established to increase the number of mid-
level managers and to adapt training resources to the country’s 
needs, while expenditures on research and development tripled as 
a share of output from 1996-2005 (Table 8). 
Technological parks
Efforts to move towards a knowledge-based economy, as enunciated 
in the 10th Development Plan (2002-2006), have included the 
building of Technopôle (technological parks) to support firms involved 
in advanced manufacturing and services. The technological parks 
host activities in the field of training, scientific and technological 
research, as well as production and technological development, 
and help create links between companies, universities and research 
centers. The first technological park, named pôle El Ghazala des 
technologies de la communication (Communication technology El 
Ghazala Pole), was set up in 1999. Seven technological parks are 
now at least partially operational 
Public-private partnerships launched in Tunisia for the management 
and maintenance of techno-parks have been very successful. 
However, the legal framework for public-private partnerships needs 
to be updated.  During AfDB’s mission to Tunisia to conduct the 
study, private sector representatives operating in a technological 
park pointed out that Tunisian law allowed only public investment 
in industrial parks. Private techno-poles are a new concept in 
Tunisia and there is no legal framework applicable to public-private 
partnerships, which has delayed the launching of techno-parks. 
Adapting the legal framework for PPPs is essential to achieve the 
potential of technological parks.
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Table 9 - Techno-Parks in Tunisia
Technopole Specialization Situation
 El Ghazala (Tunis) C o m m u n i c a t i o n technological Operational since 1999
Borj Cedria (Tunis) Renewable energy and biotechnology. Operational since 2008
Sidi Thabet (Tunis) Biotechnology and Pharmaceutical Industry Operational since 2008
Sousse Technological Park Mechanical. Electronic. informatics Operational since 2006
Sfax Technological Park Informatics & multimedia Operational since 2008
El Fejja (Monastir) Textile & clothing Operational in 2011
Bizerte technological park Food Industry Operational in 2010
Competitiveness Centre of 
Gafsa Mining Industry Operational in 2012
Source: Authors 
Investment incentives policies - Encouraging foreign 
investment
The Tunisian government has also been relatively successful in 
creating an attractive environment for export-oriented foreign 
investors. The Foreign Investment Promotion Agency (FIPA) 
was established in 1995 under the supervision of the Ministry of 
Development and International Cooperation to promote foreign 
investment. In September 2003, FIPA was certified ISO9001: 200 
by VERITAS Quality International (BVQI)23.
Review of existing policies and identification of constraints
23) Bureau Veritas SA (EPA:BVI) is a multinational company providing conformity assessment, certification and consulting 
services to industry, government and individuals (http://www.bureauveritas.com)
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Table 10 - Tunisia ranked 23 the most attractive off-shoring 
destination in the world (50 countries)
Rank Country
Financial 
Attractive-
ness
People
Skills & 
Availability
Business 
Environ-
ment
Total Score
1 India 3.11 2.76 1.14 7.01
2 China 2.62 2.55 1.31 6.49
3 Malaysia 2.78 1.38 1.83 5.99
4 Egypt 3.1 1.36 1.35 5.81
5 Indonesia 3.24 1.53 1.01 5.78
6 Mexico 2.68 1.6 1.44 5.72
7 Thailand 3.05 1.38 1.29 5.72
8 Vietnam 3.27 1.19 1.24 5.69
9 Philippines 3.18 1.31 1.16 5.65
10 Chile 2.44 1.27 1.82 5.52
23 Tunisia 3.05 0.81 1.37 5.23
37 Morocco 2.83 0.87 1.26 4.96
Source: The A.T. Kearney Global Services Location Index™. 2011
FDI inflows increased to more than 10 percent of GDP in 2006 
(thanks to the privatization of Tunisie Telecom), and the stock 
of FDI has increased by a third since 1980 (Figure 9). Tunisia is 
becoming an attractive destination for European investment due to 
geographical and cultural proximity.  But even firms from the BRICs 
and North America are increasing their investments, in part due 
to Tunisia’s entry into a free trade area with the European Union 
since January 2008.  In 2010, firms from the United States and 
Canada invested about $190 million in Tunisia, and more than 99 
North American companies employ some 14 thousand people. 
Nevertheless, Tunisia faces a challenge in diversifying FDI from 
energy sector (60.8 percent of FDI went to energy in 2010) to 
manufactures (26.5 percent of total FDI inflows in 2010).
JI HONG KIM
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Figure 9- Foreign direct investment stock in million dollars, 
1980-2010
Source: WDI 2010, World Bank.
Since the introduction of the offshore regime in 1972, Tunisia 
multiplied incentives for foreign investors and firms to develop 
its industry. As a result, the offshore sector is well developed; it 
represents more than 48 percent of the manufacturing sector (Table 
4). The textile industry is largely dominated by the offshore sector (84 
percent of textile companies); followed by electronics and electrics 
industry (65 percent of electronics & electrics-related companies).
The offshore regime has successfully attracted FDI and contributed 
to developing a competitive manufacturing industry; 85 percent of 
companies’ foreign participation are in the offshore regime, and 61 
percent of them are wholly owned by foreigners (source: FIPA24).  Most 
FDI inflows are under the offshore regime, while the onshore regime 
is relatively neglected. The concentration of FDI in the offshore sector 
limits the technology spillover effects of the competitive export sector 
to the rest of the economy.  Tunisia needs to encourage further foreign 
participation in the onshore regime, so that the domestic economy 
can better enjoy from benefits of foreign investment (spillovers)
Policies to improve export sophistication
According to the Africa Competitiveness Report 2009, the Tunisian 
economy is one of the most robust performers in Africa. GDP growth 
The Korean Experience and Policy Implications for North African Economies
24)  Foreign Investment Promotion Agency, Tunisia
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averaged more than 5 percent per year from 1990-2009, and the 
government has maintained macroeconomic stability and achieved 
considerable social progress. Nevertheless, traditional products 
comprise a large proportion of Tunisian exports, the share of industry 
in output has changed little over the past decade, and technological 
progress has been limited. Export growth has averaged under 5 
percent since 1980, significantly below comparators (Table 11). The 
Tunisian economic model has reached its limits, and it is time to 
move towards economic strategies that enhance competitiveness 
and encourage the production of more technologically advanced 
products (Hausmann and Rodrik, 2006).25
However, adopting a strategy designed to create a knowledge-
intensive economy without addressing basic and traditional 
challenges (such as trade tinance, risk culture and voice and 
accountability issues) may maintain dependence on low-cost 
production and high unemployment, thus diminishing the benefits 
of an export- led growth strategy.  Looking at some Asian countries’ 
experience can illuminate policies that Tunisia should adopt to 
achieve similar success. 
Table 11 - Exports of goods and services (annual % growth)
Country
Name 1970-1979 1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2009
Tunisia 11.98 4.85 4.83 4.09
Morocco 3.40 6.92 6.95 5.85
Egypt 6.97 6.07 4.28 13.10
Korea, Rep. 22.85 11.52 14.16 9.96
Source: WDI 2010, World Bank
Strengthen Voice and accountability 
The results of programs adopted to promote innovation and 
technologically-advanced industries need to be evaluated. 
According to the World Governance Indicators Report, in 2009 
25)  Hausmann and Rodrik « What you Export Matters », 2006
Tunisia was ranked behind its regional competitors, Egypt and 
Morocco, and very far behind South Korea in terms of Voice 
and Accountability (Table 12). Poor governance can erode the 
effectiveness of export development programs and make it difficult 
for stakeholders to report their concerns effectively. A Results 
Based Accountability practice26 could help improve performance 
of innovation programs and services offered by public trade support 
institutions and industrial promotion agencies. 
The PMN has benefited from rigorous evaluation. Under the 
supervision of Office of the upgrading program (BMN), the Tunisian 
Institute of Competitiveness and Quantitative studies (ITCEQ) 
assesses the effectiveness of the PMN through semi-annual surveys 
of two samples:  enterprises served by the upgrading program and 
a control sample of enterprises not served.  This assessment seeks 
to measure the efficiency of the PMN and whether it is reaching 
its primary objective of providing Tunisian companies with the 
tools needed to improve their competitiveness. The adoption of 
recommendations provided by this evaluation has been one of the 
key factors in PMN’s success. Undertaking similar evaluations for 
other government programs could have similar, beneficial results.
Table 12 - Voice and Accountability (Rank, close to zero: 
worst governance), 2000-2009
Country
Name 1996 1998 2000 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Tunisia 24 26 26 20 23 24 20 13 12 13 11
Egypt 20 24 24 19 20 20 23 14 13 15 15
Morocco 30 43 33 35 28 27 27 27 26 26 27
Korea,
 Rep. 63 67 67 70 70 71 72 68 68 67 68
Source: WDI 2010, World Bank
26)  Results Based Accountability (RBA) is a management tool that can facilitate collaboration among human service 
agencies, as a method of decentralizing services, and as an innovative regulatory process. At a minimum, the term 
implies that expected results are clearly articulated, and that data are regularly collected and reported to see whether 
results have been achieved.
181The Korean Experience and Policy Implications for North African Economies
182
Develop entrepreneurship culture
In 1974, during an interview with Marc Nerfin, Ahmed Ben Salah 
said that the Tunisian is not focused on investment; he remained, 
as in the time of the Phoenicians, a merchant. He negotiates any 
way, driven by the desire to get rich quick….No investments. Where 
is all the money earned by all importers of Tunisia, all exporters, all 
those who had more or less real monopoly? Where did they put 
their money earned many years ago? Who has built something? Or 
created a business?
It is difficult to quantify, but there is a sense that private sector activity 
is limited and less dynamic in Tunisia than in many other economies. 
The government has tried to spur entrepreneurship through 
providing technical and financial support and educating students (in 
2001 a compulsory module on entrepreneurship was introduced in 
all business and management schools).  However, the majority of 
Tunisian businessmen are only prepared to invest in relatively simple 
and low-risk activities which promise quick and secure profits, while 
government financial support gives businessmen little incentive to 
risk their personal fortunes to invest.  A lack of risk taking contributes 
to the failure of the Tunisian economy to generate technologically-
advanced products, which often involve significant risk. The 
government needs to make more of an effort to improve the credibility 
of its economic policies and the efficiency of its business services, 
which would lower perceived risk of engaging in new activities.
The second challenge relates to the capacity of the educational 
system to train youths who wish to engage in self-employment, 
after a long experience with salaried employment, especially in 
the public service. Hence, the educational system is expected 
to contribute in preparing the graduates of this system for better 
integration into the labor market. To that end, the government 
should match school syllabuses with real labor market needs.
Financial System - Provide financial assistance to exporters
The Tunisian financial system is dominated by the banking sector 
and characterized by heavy State involvement. Apart from the capital 
market which comprises a list of 55 companies (2011), the financial 
system is supervised by the Central Bank of Tunisia (BCT). Many 
of the measures implemented have led to an improvement of the 
institutional framework of the financial system, with the adoption of 
a statutory and prudential framework that meets with international 
standards and a better response to demand for financing generated 
by the development of the Tunisian private sector. The credits to the 
economy increased by 17% on average in 2007-201027 (source: 
BCT28). However, many SMEs still struggle to obtain access to 
loans. The market capitalization of listed companies still remained 
marginal at about 24 percent of GDP in 2010, very far from Egypt 
and Morocco scores where the market capitalization are  37.7  and 
75.8 percent of GDP respectively.
Box II. Generational Fund: new boost for investments
The Generational Fund is a new solution advocated by the Jasmine 
Plan for the period 2012-2016 to boost investment in Tunisia  With an 
initial budget of nearly 2.5 billion dinars ($1.9 billion), the Fund aims 
to contribute to the funding of large-scale projects with the goal of 
eventually transferring the State’s ownership share to private investors. 
The Fund will establish a capital market (an exchange where stocks 
can be traded) designed to fund small and medium enterprises (SMEs) 
and small and medium industries (SMIs), which account for 86 percent 
of the Tunisian industrial sector. The Fund also will support needed 
reforms in tax policy, administration, and the investment code.
The Fund could generate overall investments of $30 billion in the next 
five years, thanks to combined leverage and multiplier effects. It will 
also contribute to the creation of over one million direct and indirect 
jobs (Ministry of Finance).
The Government, as a major sponsor of this Fund, will play a key role in 
management, but will provide necessary latitude to private investors.  The 
Minister of Finance has stressed the challenges involved in marketing 
investment projects abroad and mobilizing competent and specialized 
teams in private equity to identify new investment opportunities.
Source: Tunisian News Agency
27)  Tenth Development plan period 2007-2011
28)  Tunisia Central Bank
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During the last decade, the role and efficiency of capital markets 
were consolidated through various measures. However, recourse 
to such markets by Tunisian companies through the issue of 
securities and debentures to raise funds remains limited although 
there are encouraging tax incentives, in particular a tax reduction 
for companies that engage in a public issue of 35% to 20% (Figure 
10). 
A survey29 of recipients of PMN resources finds that lack of finance 
is the main obstacle to increasing investment: 42 percent of firms 
perceive limited equity, and 29 percent limited access to bank 
finance, as a major constraint on investment. Access to finance 
is still one of the major challenges of the Tunisian economy.  In 
addition to the EMAF, creating an Export-Import Bank is becoming 
essential to better support Tunisian exporters. 
Figure 10 - Market capitalization 
of listed companies (% of GDP)
Source: WDI 2010, World Bank
Over the past two decades, Tunisia has achieved high rates of 
growth and achieved a modern and competitive manufacturing 
sector through reliance on outward-oriented policies. Nevertheless, 
export growth has remained below some regional comparators and 
well below that of the successful East Asian economies, structural 
29) Survey conducted by the Tunisian Institute of Competitiveness and Quantitative Studies (ITCEQ) in 2010
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transformation has been limited, and manufacturing exports remain 
concentrated in low-skilled and processing sectors. To continue 
its economic development, Tunisia has to move towards more 
technologically sophisticated export products. This chapter has 
reviewed the institutional and policy framework that support export 
and industrial development, and recommended policies that could 
guide Tunisia to fully enjoy benefits of a technologically-advanced 
and trade oriented economy.
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Appendix II
Table 1.  Main reforms of the structural adjustment Program
Trade Policy Tax Policy Monetary policy Exchange policy
Phasing out 
of import tar-
iffs and quantitative 
restrictions with 
the aim to liberalize 
everything, except 
for imports of luxury 
products until 1991
Establishment 
of a value add-
ed tax (VAT) in 
1988, set 
at three rates: 6% 
for services and 
consumer base, 
17% for 
most goods and 
services and 29% 
for luxury goods
Part ia l  i r regular-
ity in interest rates
10% devaluation of 
the Tunisian dinar in 
1986 to restore com-
petitiveness
Tariff reform with re-
duction in higher tar-
iffs and an increase 
of 5% to 10% of the 
minimum tariff
Establishment of 
the tax on personal 
income, reduced by 
65% to 35%
Reduction in re-
serve requirements
Progressive liberal-
ization of current ac-
count transactions
  
Alleviation 
of conditions
for the approval 
of  new loans by 
the Central Bank
 
Source: Authors
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5. Conclusion
Industrial strategies have yielded quite remarkable results in the 
three countries.  Over the past two decades, Egypt, Morocco and 
Tunisia have achieved relatively high growth rates by adopting 
outward-oriented strategies to establish a modern and competitive 
manufacturing industry.  However, this economic orientation is still 
timid compared to policies in some Asian countries, particularly 
South Korea. 
The rise in exports (5 percent on average over the past decade) 
has not been sufficient to reduce unemployment, which remains 
above 10 percent of the labor force in Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia, 
higher than in most other developing regions.  Adopting an export-
oriented policy without addressing basic and traditional challenges 
(such as trade finance, trade facilitation and governance issues) 
has tended to maintain dependence on low-cost production and 
high unemployment.  
A successful export-led growth strategy will require a host of 
improvements to the institutions and services that support trade. 
Reducing tariffs, concluding free trade agreements, and easing 
regulatory barriers are necessary but not sufficient to boost exports. 
Complementary efforts will be required to strengthen the institutions 
that support exports, improve logistics, provide finance, increase 
the efficiency of infrastructure, reduce corruption and improve the 
skills of the labor force. 
South Korea has fully benefited from its export-led growth strategy. It 
has succeeded in transitioning from a heavily indebted poor country 
to a high-income country in less than 50 years. Moreover, over the 
past 30 years South Korea has been a model example of improving 
export sophistication and competitiveness, as well as successfully 
overcame two financial crises (1997 & 2007).  Most interestingly for 
North African countries, the structural transformation from low to 
high tech industries has been largely driven by the Government’s 
industrial policies that promoted selected export industries while 
proceeding with a rapid trade liberalization since the late 1980s.
The Korean Experience and Policy Implications for North African Economies
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The next chapter aims to identify lessons from Korean experiences 
which the government of the three countries can adopt to 
improve export sophistication and achieve continued and rapid 
development.
The Korean Experience and Policy 
Implications for North African Economies
Ji Hong Kim
1. Introduction
In the 1960s, economic condition in Korea was similar to those of many developing countries.  Per capita GNP was $82 in 1961, and the exports amounted to only $43 million (Korea had run 
balance of payments deficits since 1948).  Despite these difficult 
initial conditions, by 2010 Korea’s per capita GNP reached $20,759 
while its total trade volume expanded to almost $891 billion.  The 
manufacturing sector’s share of GNP increased from 14 percent in 
1961 to 27.6 percent in 2010, while of the share of the agricultural, 
forestry and fisheries sector decreased from 37 percent to 2.7 
percent.
Korea’s success has been matched by only a few of the roughly 
one hundred developing countries that gained independence 
after the Second World War, and the Korean experience 
provides a remarkable example of the role of export promotion in 
industrialization.  Korea’s development offers several lessons for 
other developing economies, including North African economies. 
The Korean experience also illustrates the relationship between 
political democratization and economic development. Korea 
achieved rapid growth from the 1960s under authoritarian regimes, 
and free elections were not held until 1987.  Economic development 
generated pressures for democracy, led by a rising middle class who 
were frustrated by the lack of political and economic opportunity. 
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Since then, development and democracy have reinforced each 
other, making it possible for an authoritarian state to transition to 
democracy and for democracy to consolidate itself and to facilitate 
development.
The Korean development model faced severe limitations as the 20th 
century drew to a close. The financial crisis of 1997 demonstrated 
the limits of an input-driven growth paradigm, underlining the need 
for improvements in productivity generated by technological progress. 
Faced with competition from other rapidly-growing developing countries 
with low labor costs, Korea had to move into more advanced products. 
Following the crisis, Korea undertook a comprehensive restructuring of 
corporate and financial sectors, public sector administration, and labor 
markets. These efforts enabled Korean economy to move towards a 
knowledge-based economy.
  
This chapter reviews the Korean experience of export led growth and 
the lessons for North African countries.  We first consider Korea’s 
export-led growth strategy and structural transformation, and then 
briefly discuss trade, industrial, & cluster policies.   A final section 
distills lessons from the Korean experience and recommendations 
for Tunisia, Egypt, & Morocco.
Figure 1 Growth Path of the Korean Economy
Source: KDI, Bank of Korea
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2. Overview of the Korea’s Development Process
 
Korea’s development process can be thought of as driven by factor 
accumulation during 1960s and 1970s, large investments during 
1980s and 1990s, and innovation in the 2000s (figure 2).
 
Figure 2 - Three stages of economic growth in Korea
Source: Korea Development Institute
Macroeconomic performance
The Korean economy has sustained high rates of economic growth 
over the past half century, albeit with cyclical fluctuations. GDP rose 
by 8.5 percent per year in the 1960s (twice the 1950s average), 
8.8 percent in the 1970s (excluding the decline in output in 1980 
with the oil price rise), and 9.1 percent in the 1980s (figure 3).  The 
1990s saw a decline in growth to 7.2 percent owing to the financial 
crisis, and growth has since remained much lower than in previous 
decades. 
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Figure 3 Average Annual GDP Growth Rates
Source : Bank of Korea
Figure 4 GDP Growth rate (3YR Moving Average)
Source: Bank of Korea
Rapid growth has been accompanied by high saving and investment 
rates, which rose from about 11 percent in the 1950s to the mid-
30s in 1990 (Figure 5). Economic development in the 1960s and 
1970s was driven by rapid increases in investment, in the latter 
decade reflecting government-led investments in heavy chemical 
industries. The investment rate fell in the early 1980s (to well 
below trend), as government policies emphasized a rationalization 
of investment after excessive levels in the 1970s (figure 5). The 
investment rate then increased again, to a peak of 40 percent 
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late in the decade, and remained high during the period of over 
investment prior to the late 1990s crisis. The economy has become 
progressively less dependent on investment, with the recovery after 
the crisis leaving the investment rate well below the peak.  Except 
in the 1980s, investment has consistently exceeded savings, with 
the gap financed by foreign investment.
Figure 5 - Savings and Investment Rates
Source: Bank of Korea, Korea as a Knowledge Economy
Industrial Structures
The process of industrialization has been accompanied with 
radical changes in industrial structure.  Until the early 1970s, light 
industries such as textile and apparel and food and beverages 
dominated manufacturing (Table 1).  Entering into the 1980s, the 
share of heavy-chemical industries (HCI) exceeded 50 percent of 
manufacturing and continued to increase afterwards.  By 2000, HCI 
accounted for about 80 percent of manufacturing, with electronic 
products, chemicals, and automobiles the major products (Table 
2).
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Table 1
Production Structure of the Korean Economy, 1953-2000
(Unit: %)
Year
Agriculture,
Fishery & 
Mining
Manufactur-
ing
Light 
industries
Heavy-
chemical 
industries
Services
1953 48.4 9.0 78.9 21.1 42.6
1960 38.9 13.8 76.6 23.4 47.3
1970 28.7 21.3 60.8 39.2 50.0
1980 16.7 28.6 45.6 54.4 54.7
1990 9.3 28.9 32.6 67.4 61.8
2000 5.3 29.4 20.7 79.3 65.3
Source: Bank of Korea, National Accounts, each year. , KDI
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Export Policies in the 1960s and 1970s
Korea benefited greatly from access to foreign markets in the 1960s 
and 1970s30.  The expansion of world trade under GATT (Kennedy 
Round and Tokyo Round) and the access to the United States due 
to GSP (General System Preference), in addition to Korea’s export 
promotion efforts, have been crucial to Korea’s export success.31 
Most importantly, Korean policies towards export promotion, the 
exchange rate, and imports enabled the economy to exploit these 
international opportunities.
The Korean government provided a set of incentives (see Table 3) that 
made exporting a profitable activity for private-sector entrepreneurs. 
The government took steps to maintain a competitive exchange 
rate; for example, the Korean currency was devalued by almost 100 
percent in 1961-64.  Finance was channeled to exporters through 
preferential interest rates on working capital loans (the rate fell from 
14 percent in 1960 to 6 percent in 1967) , and increases in the size 
of loans (relative to the gross amount of foreign exchange earned) 
eligible for low interest rates. Exporters were exempted from tariffs, 
import quotas, indirect taxes on intermediate and capital goods, 
and indirect taxes on export sales. The amount of raw materials 
that exporters could import free of duty was determined by input-
output calculations, which included a margin for ‘waste allowance’, 
in itself a significant subsidy since excess raw materials could 
be resold in the domestic market or used to produce goods for 
domestic consumption.   
198
30)  Korea joined the GATT in 1967.
31)  In the 2010s, these favorable contexts may not be applicable to African economies.  The changed global context may 
require African economies to adopt different policies.
199
Korea’s export promotion policies have evolved since their 
introduction in the 1960s. Before 1973, subsidies were provided for 
exports, but did not favor particular firms or industries.  The private 
sector, encouraged by comprehensive incentives, channeled 
resources into export oriented activities with little direct involvement 
by the government.  This changed with the drive to develop heavy 
and chemical industries from 1973-79, where specific economic 
activities were encouraged.   
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Government Think-tank
Strong export promotion
supports high Growth
(Export Growth of 30%
per annum)
Diligent
Workers Overseas Marketing and
Economic Growth
Strong 
Entrepreneurship
Private Enterprises
BOX I:  High Growth Based on Strong Entrepreneurshi p and 
Government Support
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Table 3 - Major Export Promotion Schemes
Types of Incentives Duration
I. Tax Incentives
1. Commodity Tax Exemption
2. Business Tax Exemption
3. Reduction of Corporation and Income Taxes by 50% on Earnings from Export
4. Accelerated Depreciation Allowance for Fixed Capital Directly Used for 
Export Production in Mining, Fishing & Manufacturing
5. Reserve Fund Deducted from Taxable Income to Develop New Foreign 
Markets
6. Reserve Fund Deducted from Taxable Income to Defray Export or For-
eign Investment Losses
II. Tariff Incentives
7. Tariff Exemptions on Capital Equipment for Export Production
8. Tariff Payments on an Installment Basis for Capital Equipment Utilized 
in Export Production
9. Tariff Exemptions on Raw Material Imports for Export Production
10. Tariff Drawback on Imported Raw Materials Used for Export Production
11. Wastage Allowance
III. Financial Incentives
12. Financing for Collection of Export Goods
13. Export Shipment Financing
14. Export Promotion Fund Financed by a Counterpart Fund
15. Financing Imports of Materials to be Used in Export Production
16. Export Credits (Trade Credits before 1961)
17. Financing for Suppliers of U.S. Offshore Military Procurement
18. A Fund to Promote the Export Industry
19. A Fund to Convert Small and Medium Size Firms into Export Industries
20. A Fund to Prepare Exports of Agricultural and Fishery Products
21. Foreign Currency Loans
22. Financing Exports on Credit
IV. Other Promotion Schemes
23. A Foreign Exchange Deposit System
24. Trade Licensing Based on Export Performance
25. An Export Bonus with Preferential Foreign Exchanges
26. Export Subsidies
27. Discounts on Railroad Freight Rates
28. Monopoly Rights to Export Specific Items to Specific Areas
29. Creation of Exporters Associations on Various Export Products
30. The Financing of KOTRA
31. An Export-Import Link System
32. Discounts on Electricity Rates
33. Waiver Issuance for Shipping
34. A Local L/C System
35. Differential Treatment of Traders Based on Export Performance
36. Export Insurance
37. General Trading Company
38. An Export-Import Bank
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1962.1-
1961.1-1972.12
1968.1-
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1973.3-
 
1964.3-1973.12
1974.1-
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Source: Hong, Won Tack, Trade Distortions and Employment Growth in Korea, 
KDI, 1979. 
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Industrial Clusters and Free Export Zones
Providing essential infrastructure in a specific location (referred to 
as industrial clusters-see Box 2) can assist firms’ development 
by reducing the cost of transport, communications and energy 
facilities, and by encouraging interactions that help to overcome 
coordination problems and increase the potential to capture scale 
economies. However, industrial clusters should not be relied on 
excessively, due to limited fiscal resources and the wish to avoid 
divisions between regions or classes that can impair national 
integration and social capital. The development of industrial 
clusters played an important role in the growth of manufacturing 
in Korea (Table 4). 
Box II: Industrial Parks and Clusters 
The goal of industrial clusters is the enhancement of competitiveness 
and innovation through the maximization of interactive learning and 
knowledge spillovers in certain sectors and/or regions.  Policies 
towards industrial clusters cover 3 infrastructure-related areas: physical 
infrastructure, public governance, and institutional arrangements (social 
capital and finance) 
Industrial complexes in Korea have changed with the stages of 
economic development:
•1960s-early 1970s: Mere agglomeration (linkages between firms were 
weak)
• Late 1970s-1990s: Industrial clusters (inter-firm linkages were formed 
with economies of scope)   
• 2000s: Innovative clusters (linkage between firms+ R&D institutes+ 
supporting agencies), synergy in innovation
 
In the 1960s, the Korean government concentrated available 
resources on a limited number of industrial complexes. Fifteen 
industrial complexes were developed, the majority in the Seoul 
metropolitan area (7) and in the southeastern region (6). The 
government also implemented a variety of supplementary export 
promotion measures. These industrial complexes played a pivotal 
role in promoting exports and provided the basis for further growth. 
The Korean Experience and Policy Implications for North African Economies
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Table 4 - Korean Industrial complex Development 
(Unit: numbers/ 1,000)
Category 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s
After 
2000
Total
National 
complex
Numbers 2 15 10 7 2 36
Area 25,26 213,95 163,698 24,665 71,509 499,082
General local 
complex
Numbers 13 18 13 111 106 257
Area 23,213 24,556 31,285 109,822 111,043 299,919
Urban 
high-tech 
complex
Numbers     3 3
Area     290 290
Agro-indus-
trial complex
Numbers   168 126 65 359
Area   25,968 19,219 11,27 56,457
Free trade 
zone
Numbers  2   4 6
Area  1,264   3,005 4,269
Total
Numbers 15 35 191 244 180 661
Area 48,473 239,77 220,951 153,706 197,117 860,017
Source: J.H.Jang
In the 1970s, Korean government established “free export zones 
(FEZs)” in Masan and Iksan for foreign firms to produce export 
products. The FEZs required inter-governmental cooperation, 
as the Ministry of Construction  prepared land and infrastructure 
while the Ministry of Commerce and Industry was responsible 
for management. Investors in FEZs were in principle foreign 
firms.  They benefited from tariff exemptions for importing goods 
to FEZs as well as from tax incentives and low installation costs. 
The Masan FEZ was regarded as more successful than the Iksan 
FEZ. The Masan FEZ increased exports, investment and jobs in 
the Korean economy, and also contributed to improving industry 
in the vicinity of the FEZ through bringing in advanced technology. 
On the other hand, the Iksan FEZ fell short of expectations due 
to underdeveloped supportive industries and inadequate logistics 
in the vicinity. The location of FEZ’s should take into account 
the availability of both output and input markets, as well as the 
infrastructure costs involved.  
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In the 1980s, concerns over imbalanced development among 
regions led to some dispersion of industrial complexes. In 1984, 
seven small sized agro-industrial complexes were designated in 7 
provinces, which increased to 168 at the end of 1980s.  
Table 5 - Free Trade Zones in Korea
Division Masan Iksan Gunsan Daebul Donghae Yulchon
Date of Designation 1970.1.1 1973.10.8 2000.10.6 2002.11.21 2005.12.12 2005.12.12
Area (1,000) 954 310 1,256 1,156 248 343
Number of settling 
firms 
(Foreign  Investment 
firms)
94
(51)
32
(6)
18
(8)
29
(24) - -
Export (US$100 
Million) 51 1.4 0.8 4
-
-
-
-
Foreign Investment 
(US$ Million) 144 5.3 44 38 - -
Employment (Person) 5,936 1,119 559 3245 - -
Note
expansion 
plan
by  2014
2010.12.31
Selection 
Annulled
Planned 
to develop 
before 
2009
Planned 
to develop 
before 
2009
Source: Ministry of Industry
Industrial complexes can play a critical role in development. 
Lessons from the Korean experience include: (i) a limited number 
of large industrial complexes are more efficient than numerous 
small ones; (ii) general efforts to strengthen education and targeted 
training in science and technology should be pursued in parallel 
to supporting industrial complexes; (iii) the characteristics of each 
industrial complex should be decided according to the knowledge 
base and factor conditions of the industry to be fostered in it; and 
(iv) it can be useful to develop benchmarks for industrial complexes 
based on other experiences. (Jang 2009) 
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3. Lessons of the Korean Experience 
Korea’s transformation from a poor country to an industrial powerhouse 
has several lessons for North African countries’ efforts to achieve 
export-led growth.  The Korean development strategy emphasized an 
outward orientation, macroeconomic stability, and large investments 
in human and physical capital (box 3).  The main elements of Korean 
policies can be looked at in terms of the five pillars to achieve economic 
competitiveness (figure 6). Government policies have been altered 
in light of changing development stages and economic conditions. 
While mistakes have been made,  compared with other developing 
country governments the Korean government’s interventions have 
been flexible and practical32 The rivalry among economic ministries, 
especially Economic Planning Board and Ministry of Finance, played a 
useful check-and-balance role. 
Key areas where Korea’s experience is important for the North 
African countries include overall development strategy, marketing 
services for exporters, the financial sector, human development 
and labor markets, subsides, industrial clusters, and public sector 
administration. North African economies can learn from Korea’s 
many successes and its occasional failures.
Figure 6 - 5 pillars for National competitiveness
32)  Aoki, Kim and Okuno-Fujiwara (1997) noted that the role of the Korean government is not a substitute for the market; 
rather it has been successful since it has complemented the functioning of the market, in particular, in the earlier years 
when the markets and institutions were still in a formative stage. 
1
2
3
4
5
Business
environment
Education
system
Informat ion
infrastructure
Fi f th Pi l lar
Innovation
system
• Avibranthome-base for business from allover the world
• Broadening and deepening the service sector
• How do you fosterentrepreneuship ? Innovative SMEs?
• How do you start clusters? Deep craft cultures?
• Wide open, competitive telecom sector
• Minimumfixed line, and the broadband penetration
• ICT Librecy and useage
• E-government as catalyst
• Know ledge Economy-boosting education system
• Know ledge technologists and integrators
• Functional literacy and lifelong learning
• Smart, differentiated higher education setup
• Business - Academia - Research Links
• Know ledge Based Economy-boosting RD and FDI
• 3 innovation strands : S T-led, enterprise - led, creativity-led
• How do you attract the creative class ?
• Government as role model
• Creating an exciting vision, national dialogue
• Openness to the world, and change-friende ly values
• Do you have a trust-based society
(Source: Jean F. Richard)
205
Box II: Korean economic miracle: OECD Economic Surveys
The OECD pointed out three distinctive characteristics of Korean 
economic development:
An outward-oriented development policy
The expansion of exports was required to overcome a lack of 
natural resources and the small domestic market. At the early stage, 
competitiveness was supported by a sharp devaluation and the 
unification of the complicated multiple exchange rate system. In 
addition, strong incentives such as tax exemptions and preferential 
access to credit were provided to exporters.  The export promotion 
policy was generally sector-neutral and did not distinguish between 
industries, except during Heavy & Chemical Industry Drive.
Macroeconomic stability
Sound fiscal and monetary policies were critical. The high level of 
government saving financed investments on public infrastructure and 
policy loans to targeted sectors. The social welfare burden was minimal 
due to the young age structure.
Investment in physical and human capital
The high level of education in Korea has enabled it to efficiently absorb 
technology from abroad. The combination of a well-educated labor force 
and a small stock of physical capital made the return on investment 
high.  Fixed capital formation rose from less than 10 percent of GDP 
in 1961 to 30 percent in 1980.  Strong social capital (trust, stable legal 
system, ownership, etc) reduced transaction costs. 
Mr. Nam Duck-Woo, former Prime Minister, names for the following 
factors that contributed to Korea’s economic development. Economic 
factors: 1) outward-looking strategy, 2) good use of foreign resources, 
3) favorable international environment, 4) education, 5) faith in free 
enterprise system, 6) activist role of government. Non-economic 
factors: 1) ethnic and cultural homogeneity and a strong Confucian 
tradition that places a high value on education, achievement, and 
loyalty to the nation, 2) National security threat, 3) political leadership. 
(Nam, 1997) 
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Development strategy
One important contribution to Korea’s success was that 
policymakers had a vision of what they wanted to achieve and 
understood how government could contribute to this goal.  They 
realized that poor countries faced market imperfections that could 
only be overcome through government interventions.  In addition 
to providing critical public goods (competent and transparent 
administration, an independent judiciary, education, health, 
infrastructure), government can help overcome coordination 
failures that inhibit production of new products and encourage 
activities where firms can benefit from economies of scale and 
technological spillovers.  Thus a key principle of Korean policy has 
been to provide incentives to firms to enter activities that require a 
step up in technology and skill content.33  
By contrast, export production in Tunisia, for example, focuses 
on providing low-cost goods to serve European markets.  While 
this strategy has been successful in boosting export growth, it 
makes Tunisia vulnerable to other low-cost producers with entrée 
to the European market, particularly in Africa and Eastern Europe. 
Government needs to provide firms the opportunity to learn how to 
produce somewhat more sophisticated goods to enable continued 
development. At the same time, ambitious plans to establish 
biotech or life science industries need to be approached cautiously. 
The large investments and highly-skilled workers required would 
sap resources that could be devoted to less-risky projects. The 
problems that beset Korea’s efforts to promote heavy and chemical 
industries in the 1970’s provide a warning of how overly ambitious 
development programs can result in high levels of debt and wasted 
resources.
Another key principle of Korean development policies was to 
encourage competition to ensure that subsidies and protection 
were used efficiently.  Export targets were used to judge firms’ 
performance and to ensure that the goods produced met a market 
test. The integration of some kind of objective evaluation of firms’ 
33)  http://econ.queensu.ca/pub/faculty/lloyd-ellis/econ239/readings/skorea.pdf
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success is essential to ensure the effectiveness of government 
resources devoted to export promotion. In Egypt, for example, the 
lack of a market test for the receipt of subsidies contributed to the 
poor performance of subsidized industries (indicators of industrial 
policies, including effective rates of protection, subsidies, and 
barriers to entry, were negatively related to sectoral performance-
see chapter 2).
The Korean experience highlights the importance of direction from 
the highest levels of government and well-coordinated efforts to 
promote exports. The regular dialogue among trade ministries, 
trade promotion agencies, and the private sector was used to 
eliminate bottlenecks to exports rapidly.  In the 1960s and 1970s, 
President Park held a monthly Export Promotion Meeting with all 
the relevant ministers and private sector representatives to monitor 
export performance, to resolve problems encountered by exporters, 
and to recognize top performers. If some projects were found to 
be lagging behind schedule, the causes of the delay were analyzed 
and a decision on corrective action was taken, often on the spot. 
One result was that every official had to be alert to ensure that a 
project under his responsibility did not become an object of negative 
attention in the presence of the President. This pressure was no 
doubt transmitted down the line, and was reflected in quick action 
to resolve issues where firms needed government assistances (e.g. 
access to credit, resolution of tax disputes, land use approvals).34 
The government also presented various awards to recognize the 
achievement of top export performers.  
It is unclear whether Korean practices in organizing export 
promotion activities would fit well into the North African political and 
social context.  Nevertheless, efforts to upgrade exports will require 
decided attention from high levels of government, and considerable 
improvement is necessary in the coordination of export promotion 
activities, for example in Egypt.  
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Marketing services for exporters 
Firms that wish to enter export markets often face a lack of 
information on foreign markets and a lack of reputation among 
foreign purchasers. Government can play an important role in helping 
exporters to reach foreign markets. The Korean Trade Promotion 
Corporation was established in 1962 to provide marketing services 
to exporters, including overseas marketing surveys and business 
matchmaking. In 1995 its responsibilities were expanded to include 
investment promotion and support for technological and industrial 
cooperation projects, and it was renamed the Korea Trade-
Investment Promotion Agency (Mah 2010).  
Small and medium sized enterprises can face particular difficulties. 
In the early period of export promotion, many Korean SMEs lacked 
marketing knowhow, finance, and credibility in foreign markets. Their 
business volume was too small to justify the investment required to 
establish a network of salespersons in foreign countries, so they 
had to rely on foreign agents, brokers, and distribution companies. 
In 1975, the government introduced the General Trading Company 
(GTC) system, which was modeled on practices in Japan. The GTCs 
helped to market SME exports, and supported SMEs in obtaining 
finance, in bidding on suppliers, and in access to imports of raw 
materials.  By the early 1980s, 10 GTCs accounted for around 42-
50 percent of total exports from Korea and 8-16 percent of Korea’s 
imports. 
Financial sector policies
The Korean government used the financial system to channel loans 
to firms selected for public support.  Controls on interest rates kept 
borrowing costs low, and government control of the commercial 
banks channeled resources to specific, mostly export-oriented, 
industries (Mah 2010).  The government also established separate 
agencies to finance exporters, including the Korean Export Import 
Bank, which provides finance to exporters, mostly for capital goods; 
the Korean Credit Guarantee Fund, which guarantees commercial 
bank loans to SMEs involved in exporting; and the Korean Export 
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Insurance Fund, which provides insurance to exporters for losses 
arising from political and commercial risks.  
All in all, this system was designed to ensure that firms attempting 
to enter more sophisticated sectors had access to finance at low 
rates, at the cost of impairing the efficiency of credit allocation (as 
government fiat rather than private sector decisions had a major 
role in determining who received loans), reducing incentives for 
financial savings (the system was financed in part by maintaining 
low interest rates on deposit accounts), and collusion between 
public sector officials and private firms. However, as the economy 
developed and became more complex and open to the international 
economy, the costs of restrictive financial policies rose. The opening 
to external capital flows in the absence of adequate financial market 
infrastructure exposed the problems of poorly-supervised banks 
and over-leveraged firms to foreign investors, leading to the severe 
financial crisis in 1997 (Cho 2002). After the crisis, the government 
undertook a thorough restructuring of financial sector to resolve 
the problems affecting troubled financial institutions, facilitate the 
recapitalization of banks (both by requiring increased private sector 
capital and injections of public funds), and improve prudential and 
regulatory norms.  This program improved the profitability of financial 
institutions and encouraged more prudent lending practices.
North African economies also have used government direction of 
credit to promote favored industries, albeit with much less success 
than in Korea, and also face important issues in transitioning to a 
more open financial system. They have undertaken steps to ease 
controls on financial sector transactions and address the weaknesses 
of publically-owned banks (Morocco and Tunisia in the 1990s and 
Egypt in the past decade). Nevertheless, financial sectors remain 
small relative to output and subject to high risks, with high levels of 
nonperforming loans (e.g. in Egypt’s state-owned bank), low levels 
of provisioning, and high interest rates.35 Korea’s experience of 
financial liberalization in the context of weak institutions leading to 
a severe crisis should underline the importance of caution in North 
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2011.
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African efforts to remove constraints on capital account transactions. 
Korea’s success in addressing financial sector weaknesses after the 
crisis serves as a useful guidepost for continuing efforts in North 
African countries to improve the soundness and efficiency of the 
financial sector. It is hoped that North African governments can 
be encouraged to step up these efforts without the extraordinarily 
costly experience of a financial crisis. 
Human development and labor markets
Supporting human development has been a lynchpin of Korea’s 
policies.  The government instituted compulsory primary education 
in the 1950s and established technical and vocational schools to 
train engineers and other skilled workers.  For example, the Kum-
Oh Technical High School (1972) was supplied state-of-the-art 
equipment imported from Japan, and Japanese teachers with 
technical know-how were recruited during 1972-76. Korea won 
the International Vocational Training Competition (the Vocational 
Olympics) nine times in a row during 1977-1991.  The government 
also introduced a licensing system to certify the credentials of 
technical personnel and provided tax incentives for private sector 
job training.36  This emphasis on training in technical skills contrasts 
with the North African experience, where a large proportion of 
college graduates are in social sciences (although in Tunisia the 
government has allocated considerable resources to technical 
training) and illiteracy in the general population remains higher than 
in other countries with similar levels of income (the latest data on 
the share of the adult population that is literate equals 66 percent in 
Egypt, 56 percent in Morocco, and 78 percent in Tunisia, while the 
average for middle-income countries is 83 percent).
Korea’s labor legislation was modeled on Japan’s.  Relatively flexible 
labor market policies combined with severe restrictions on labor 
unions (in the context of political tensions on the Korean peninsular) 
facilitated a very rapid absorption of workers from the agricultural 
sector into industrial employment in the 1960s and 1970s (Inegami 
1998).  North African countries may not wish to emulate the Korean 
36)  Information provided by the Korean Development Institute.
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government’s policy towards unions.  Nevertheless, Korea’s 
success in finding work for the huge number of workers leaving 
agricultural employment contrasts sharply with North African 
experience, where rapid increases in the minimum wage (e.g. 
Morocco), high non-salary wage costs such as pension and health 
insurance, and constraints on firing led firms to substitute capital 
for labor, contributing to high structural unemployment rates and 
distorting production away from countries’ comparative advantage 
in labor-intensive goods. 
Subsidies
Subsidies for food and fuels in Egypt and Morocco are a major 
fiscal burden (in the latter country subsidies cost about 5 percent 
of GDP), and largely are devoted to urban consumers that are 
relatively well off. While Korea’s subsidies for export production 
played an important role in development, some subsidies also were 
costly and poorly targeted. The problems in controlling the costs 
involved in untargeted subsidies, despite a commitment to rational 
pricing and regular monitoring, are illustrated by electricity pricing 
in Korea. In addition, within sectors, the marginal price escalated 
depending on the consumption level; heavy users are subject to 
higher marginal price.  For example, in household sector, there 
were 7 levels of escalating price (The marginal price of the 7th level 
was 13 times higher than that of the 1st level). 
Until the last decade, the production of electricity was monopolized 
by KEPCO, a state-owned enterprise under the Ministry of 
Industry and Energy. KEPCO introduced a total cost-based pricing 
mechanism, where different sectors were charged different prices. 
For example, farmers were charged 41 percent, and general urban 
customers 123 percent, of average cost. This system distorted 
domestic production and in an inflationary environment imposed a 
major fiscal burden, as the time lag between a proposal to increase 
prices and approval lengthened due to political pressures.  Korea’s 
failure to control electricity prices highlights the dangers of such 
consumption subsidies, even in a relatively wealthy country with 
strong administration. 
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Clusters
North African countries have established free trade zones and 
industrial clusters, in part to centralize the provision of infrastructure 
and maximize knowledge spillovers among high-tech and export 
firms (ensuring that exporters face world prices for inputs was 
another important goal of the free trade zones).  Difficulties in the 
public provision of infrastructure have encouraged the development 
of public-private partnerships, for example in the establishment and 
management of technological parks. However, Tunisia lacks the solid 
legal framework required to implement public-private partnerships 
successfully. The legal structure introduced by Korea in the 1990s 
provides one example of an efficient legal framework. It clearly 
defines what kinds of infrastructure are eligible for PPPs, procurement 
methods, the process involved, and mechanisms to resolve disputes 
(box 4).  Prerequisites for successful management of PPPs include 
clear and consistent implementation guidelines, strong government 
commitment and budgetary authority, and effective coordination 
between sector PPP and government investment programs.  
Public sector administration
Bureaucratic corruption and inefficiency are major constraints 
on development in the North African countries. For example, 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index 
places Egypt 111th, Morocco 87th and Tunisia 65th out of 180 
countries. There is an unfortunate tendency towards accepting 
poor governance and mismanagement as endemic to a stage of 
development where limited government resources make it difficult 
to pay adequate salaries to attract high-quality personnel.  However, 
Korea provides an example of how the careful monitoring of officials 
and reliance on information technology can limit corruption and 
improve the efficiency of government operations.  One approach 
was to require regular reports on the net worth of political leaders 
and high-ranking government officials.  Increases in net worth that 
do not correspond to an official’s salary and investment income 
can then be investigated.  While officials can file false reports, this 
process can serve as a deterrent to corruption.   
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The use of information technology in tax assessment and collection, 
customs administration and procurement can limit opportunities for 
corrupt practices by reducing personal contacts between suppliers 
and officials, and improving the transparency of rules and their 
application. Information technology also can reduce the time required 
by government and the private sector to process transactions, 
improve revenue generation and operational control, and strengthen 
communication within the public sector and between the public and 
private sectors. One successful example was the introduction of 
e-procurement in Korea in the late 1990s.  The former procurement 
system imposed time consuming procedures on both government 
The Korean Experience and Policy Implications for North African Economies
Box IV: Public-Private Partnership (PPP) in Korea 
In 1994 Korea introduced a legal framework for PPPs, “The Act on Promotion of 
Private Capital into Social Overhead Capital Investment”.  It clearly defines eligible 
infrastructure types, procurement methods, process, and conflict resolution mechanism, 
etc. The types and structure of PPP arrangements are as follows: 
BTO BTL Other 
Investment 
Recovery 
User fees 
Construction subsidy, MRG 
Lease payment 
(Fixed Revenue) 
T, 
O 
Project 
risk 
Demand risk on 
concessionaire 
Little demand risk on 
concessionaire 
Return High risk, high return Low risk, low return 
Eligibility 
Both solicited and unsolicited 
projects (Roads, seaports, & 
railway projects, etc) 
Solicited projects only 
(School, dormitory, 
military housing, etc 
A broad range of infrastructure facilities are eligible for PPPs:  
BO
BO
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officials and private suppliers, led to the provision of inconsistent 
information from different agencies, and resulted in rigged bidding 
practices. The new system has served as a focal point for more 
than 30 procurement related agencies to obtain information and 
gain access to standardized products, documents, and expedited 
payments. Online access has allowed suppliers to retrieve all the 
relevant information on the bidding process, including comparative 
assessment across agencies. The wide availability of information 
and the increased number of participating bidders has most likely 
mitigated the risks of collusion and bid rigging.37  
37)  Source: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPEAM/Resources/
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